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Abstract 
 
Since the end of the Cold War internal conflict has emerged more and more into the 
foreground of concern in the international arena. It is seemingly more perverse and 
intractable than traditional interstate conflict, and as a result it is increasingly harder to 
resolve. Recurrence of internal conflict has been and remains to be a significant issue. 
Because of the nature of internal conflict and the underlying causes of the violence, the way 
in which its resolution is approached has a significant impact on the likelihood of success. 
The theory of peacebuilding, while still in its infancy, is gaining more and attention as a way 
in which to approach internal conflict and help to establish long-term peace in post-conflict 
societies. This thesis analyses the theory of peacebuilding and develops a framework based 
on this research that includes what I believe are the most relevant aspects of the approach. 
This framework is then applied to three cases; East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon 
Islands. The theory is based on the idea of building long-term sustainable peace. This is done 
by not only improving the security situation in the host state but also working through the 
underlying causes of the violence and helping to establish sustainable and self-reliant 
institutions that will help support peace within the state long after the peacebuilders have 
withdrawn. The main focus of this research is internal conflict in the Pacific region. Conflict 
in the region, while somewhat insignificant on an international scale, is disproportionate to 
the small size of the region. The effects of conflict are felt long after the fighting has stopped. 
The theory of peacebuilding in the Pacific is approached by examining three peacebuilding 
missions that have been undertaken in the region and analysing the strengths and weaknesses 
of these cases. From here the overall success of these missions is examined. Ideas about 
peacebuilding success are then developed and a look at the future of peacebuilding in the 
region is outlined. 
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Chapter One 
Beyond Conflict Settlement: The Policy of Peacebuilding in the 
Pacific  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War internal conflict has emerged more and more into the 
foreground of concern in the international arena. For some the end of the Cold War was 
believed to be the end of conflict altogether and was to mark the beginning of a long era of 
peace.  This, as we now know, was not the case. Instead of a decrease in conflict, the end of 
the Cold War can be seen to be the catalyst for an increase in the both number and intensity 
of conflicts in the international system (Bercovitch and DeRouen 2004: 147). The breakdown 
of the Cold War‟s political barriers opened up new opportunities for self-determination, 
independence and advancement, especially for the developing nations. Internal conflict is, as 
the name suggests, internal in nature. It is conflict between groups of people within the 
boundaries of a single state. It is seemingly more perverse and intractable than traditional 
interstate conflict, and as a result is increasingly harder to resolve. Because of the nature of 
internal conflict and the underlying causes of the violence, the way in which its resolution is 
approached has a significant impact on the likelihood of success. Conflict resolution methods 
need to be acceptable to the parties concerned and post-conflict societies need to be involved 
as much as they can be in the process if  peace is to be sustained beyond the initial post-
conflict phase.  
 
The motivation behind this research is the belief that if better ways of dealing with internal 
conflict are developed and established as the norm, then this pattern of increasing internal 
conflicts we have been experiencing since the end of the Cold War will not continue for 
much longer. New ways of thinking about and approaching internal conflict need to be 
considered to stop this pattern from snowballing any further. One area in which internal 
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conflict has been devastating and its effects have wreaked havoc on society is in the Pacific 
region. Many of the small island nations in this region have been plagued by the violence and 
the long term effects that ensue when internal conflicts take control of a society. The complex 
nature and relationships that are evident in many Pacific cultures and the deep seeded causes 
behind much of the violence put real pressure on efforts undertaken to try to resolve them. 
The focus of this research is the idea that once conflict in the Pacific region is better 
understood and its root causes are identified then conflict resolution efforts that are put in 
place are better equipped to deal with the real issues that triggered the violence. This 
introductory chapter acts as an overview of what is going to be covered during the course of 
this research. It outlines the main principles and focus points that make up this paper and 
provides a short summary of what each chapter aims to examine.  
 
1.2 Objectives 
 
The international system has experienced a significant increase in the occurrence of internal 
conflict since the end of World War II. However, what is more worrying then just the number 
of internal conflicts that have broken out is the protracted nature of these conflicts. Even 
though considerable attempts are being made to help resolve internal conflicts, there is a high 
likelihood of violence reoccurring in the post-settlement phase. A change needs to be made 
about how these conflicts are approached to help ensure long-term peace in countries that 
have been devastated by internal conflict. New approaches need to be developed that aim to 
go beyond simple conflict termination. Peacebuilding is such an approach. Its aim is to help 
develop stable and self-sufficient communities where people live in peace and are no longer 
under threat of renewed violence.  
 
This research is based on the theory of peacebuilding, which is the set of activities that are 
undertaken in the post conflict phase to help build long term, sustainable peace in society and 
stop conflict from reoccurring.  The main purpose of this research is to provide an analysis of 
conflict in the Pacific region and examine the steps that have been taken to build peace in the 
post conflict phase.  The aim is to identify what needs to be done in the Pacific region in the 
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post-conflict phase to create a peaceful society where the root causes of the conflict are dealt 
with and where communities have the ability to deal with future problems without the need to 
resort back to violence. Establishing sustainable peace will make conflict recurrence far less 
likely.  
 
The reason for applying the theory of peacebuilding to the Pacific is to see if such an 
approach will help to curb conflict recurrence that is so common in the region. The fact that it 
has already been applied in some places in the region with a certain degree of success 
suggests that the framework could be applied to other zones of conflict in the Pacific as well, 
with a similar chance of success. Just dealing with actual violence in these situations is not 
enough; real causes behind the violence need to be uncovered and society needs to be 
restructured to focus on sustainable peace and how this can be achieved without relapsing 
into conflict. Peacebuilding measures have already been undertaken in East Timor and 
Bougainville. Although these were successful in creating peace, they did have certain 
downfalls that have become evident since reforms were implemented. By looking at both the 
strengths and weaknesses of these cases it is possible to then see what more needs to be done 
in other conflict situations in the region to increase the likelihood of establishing long-term 
peace.   
 
1.3 Internal Conflict 
 
Firstly, a definition of internal conflict is needed before it can be discussed in more depth. 
Michael Brown describes internal conflict as, 
“Violent or potentially violent political disputes whose origins can be traced primarily 
to domestic rather than systemic factors, and where armed violence takes place 
primarily in the borders of a single state” (Brown 1996: 1).  
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Figure 1.1 Number of conflicts by type, 1945-2009 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2010: 503) 
 
Internal conflict has been on the increase since the end of World War II and its effects have 
been devastating to many nations around the world. While interstate conflicts are still being 
undertaken in various areas in the world, internal conflict has been brought to the forefront of 
international attention in more recent time because of its pervasive and persistent nature and 
the difficulties that have been experienced in its resolution, or lack thereof. Internal conflict is 
now becoming the most common form of conflict in the international system. One important 
problem that is associated with this shift from interstate to intrastate conflict is the ever 
increasing number of civilians that are now involved in the violence and perhaps more 
importantly the vast numbers that are being killed in the process. While at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, during the time of WWI, only one out of 10 casualties was a civilian, 
now in the twenty-first century, as the nature of war changes, nine out of 10 casualties are 
now civilians (Misra 2008: 4).  This new reality raises various problems, a significant one 
being how it should be dealt with under international law. The international system is 
designed to deal with relationships and interactions between states, and not within them. 
When the United Nations Charter was drawn up after World War II it was designed for the 
purpose of dealing with interstate conflict, and rightly so since between 1900 and 1941, 80 
percent of all conflicts had been between states (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 11). The problem 
now is that much of the law relating to conflict and conflict management has not evolved to 
suit the current conflict climate of ever increasing internal conflict. Therefore the ways of 
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dealing with such conflicts come up against many challenges when trying to be implemented, 
whether it be an adverse reaction from certain groups within the conflict zone, or more 
worryingly, total rejection of any proposed intervention by the state itself.  
 
Internal conflict is triggered for many different reasons. The most significant causes of 
conflict, which are going to be discussed in more depth in Chapter Three, are economic 
factors, land and natural resources, governance and ethnicity. While certain conflicts are 
caused by just one of these factors, most are caused by a combination. However, although 
these dimensions may be in a country it does not mean that that country will necessarily 
spiral into violence. There are certain triggers that are present in areas of unrest that can tip 
the balance from societal instability to violent conflict and the outbreak of war.  
 
 One worrying consequence related to internal conflict is the high likelihood of the violence 
spilling over into other countries, both in the region and further afield. Internal conflicts are 
often based on very emotive issues. If one country employs violent means to enact their 
frustration in relation to these issues, other countries with the same sort of grievances may 
follow suit. Spill over effects can also be a result of the movement of refugees, which is 
significant during internal conflicts. People are displaced during conflict and many flee 
across borders into neighbouring countries. This influx of people puts great pressure on these 
societies as they struggle to meet the needs of these people. The movement of people can also 
disrupt the balance in these societies and tensions and violence can be transferred with 
refugees into these different areas.  
 
A remaining difficulty is how to solve such conflicts which are often based on intractable 
ideals. Compromise is often not possible and neither party is willing to relinquish any of their 
demands. Attempts need to be made to help reconcile the people within conflicting societies 
and help them to realise that the pursuit of peace needs to be the primary aim. Peace needs to 
become the best option for those involved. If all sides agree to and are involved in building 
peace after conflict then it will seem less like compromise and more like a mutual pursuit of a 
safe and stable future for all people within the community. Peacebuilding in one such 
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approach that aims to deal with and work through the deeply entrenched causes of the 
violence and attempts to reconcile those who used to be enemies and help to establish a way 
in which all sides of the conflict can learn to live together and build a sustainable future for 
their people.  
 
1.4 The Pacific Region  
 
The Pacific region is made up of 22 island countries, about eight million people and spread 
over more than 30 million kilometres of ocean. The region is usually divided into three 
distinct areas; Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. Melanesia is the largest, containing 97 
percent of the land and 76 percent of the region‟s population, excluding Australia and New 
Zealand (Crocombe 2001: 146). The islands, however, only make up around 2 percent of that 
area. The Pacific region is somewhat hard to define is specific terms because it is far from 
homogenous. While similarities can be identified between certain islands, many countries in 
the region are set apart more by their differences. While some countries within the region, 
such as Australia and New Zealand, are highly developed both politically and economically, 
others struggle to provide their citizens with basic amenities such as clean water and power. 
There is also a vast difference in population sizes across the islands states. Whereas New 
Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea have populations in the millions, others such as 
Tokelau and Niue have less than 1500 people. And while some states moved easily into 
independence and self-governance, many other fought long and hard to gain their 
independence (Boxall 2006: 17-18) 
 
The Pacific region, like so many other developing areas, has been plagued by conflict and 
low level skirmishes since countries in this region began to gain independence in the 1960‟s. 
While the intensity of conflict in the Pacific is no more significant than other region in the 
world, its occurrence is disproportionate to the small size of states in the region. Conflict in 
the regions is “sporadic rather than endemic”. Only two conflicts in the region, West Papua 
and Bougainville, have met the Uppsala Conflict Data Program criteria for classifying wars 
of 25 battle-related deaths each year (Henderson and Watson 2005: 8). 
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Date Conflict Fatalities  
Ongoing Independent struggle in West Papua  100,000 estimated deaths 
Ongoing Tribal fighting in Papua New Guinea 
Highlands  
Several hundred deaths each year 
1980s Independence struggle in New Caledonia Over 50 deaths 
1990s Bougainville independence struggle Over 10,000 deaths 
1999-2004  Solomon Islands conflict  200 estimated deaths  
Table 1.1 Armed conflicts in the Pacific Islands region 1980-2005 (Henderson and Watson 2005: 5) 
 
The Pacific region is made up of a vast range of cultures, languages, islands and different 
peoples. The amalgamation of all these factors has made the transition to independence 
wrought with tension for many of the islands in the region. However, the conflict is not 
widespread in the region; the majority of conflict is experienced in Melanesia, as opposed to 
Polynesia and Micronesia. Melanesia is the largest in terms of population and land area and is 
the most culturally diverse area in the Pacific region. The decentralised and fragmented 
nature of its political system and widespread poverty is a catalyst to much of the unrest and 
conflict.  
 
1.5 What can be done about conflict? Prevention, Management, 
Resolution and Beyond   
 
There are many different ways of dealing with conflict in the international system. The 
approach taken may depend on various factors such as the parties involved, the type of 
conflict, who is undertaking the intervention attempt and even what stage the conflict is at. 
To better understand where peacebuilding lies in the wider scheme of conflict resolution, 
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other method of dealing with conflict need to first be defined and analysed. This will help to 
build a clearer picture of what peacebuilding really is and how it is different from other forms 
of conflict management.  
 
Conflict can be described as having a life cycle and the methods of dealing with conflict 
change depending on the stage which the conflict is at. This life cycle of conflict is illustrated 
in Figure 1.2.  The figure shows that conflict needs to be understood as being a dynamic 
situation and not a static one and that the level of intensity changes throughout a conflicts life 
cycle. By understanding the way in which a conflict develops, the ways in which it can be 
dealt with, in terms of how, when and where different strategies can be applied, can also be 
better understood. It needs to be realised that the conflict life cycle model in Figure 1.2 is a 
very simplistic model of the conflict cycle. Often conflicts and conflict management 
approaches will not fit neatly into this model. It is, however, a good starting point in 
explaining the relationship between conflict, conflict intensity and the different methods of 
dealing with conflict (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 9-10).  
 
Figure 1.2 The Conflict Cycle (Lund 1996: 38) 
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The first phase in the escalation of conflict intensity is stable peace which is the situation 
when tensions between parties are low. The next level is unstable peace, which is when 
tension has increased but there is still no violence. After that is open conflict when conflict 
becomes more defined and steps have been taken to deal with it. Following that is the crisis 
phase which is when war is imminent, but violence is only sporadic. The final phase of 
conflict intensity is the war phase, which is categorised by widespread and intense violence. 
The de-escalation phase is this pattern in reverse (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 11). 
These different phases all have corresponding methods of dealing with the situation at hand.  
 
The first step to be undertaken in the early stages of the escalation phase is conflict 
prevention. Conflict prevention is a pre-emptive approach to try to deal with unrest in society 
before violence breaks out. Conflict prevention can be divided into two specific categories; 
direct prevention and structural prevention. Direct preventions measures are those with the 
aim of preventing short term escalation of a potential conflict, through the use of mediation 
for example. Structural prevention measures focus more on the long term underlying causes 
of the potential conflict through the use of such means as economic assistance (Swanström 
and Weissmann 2005: 19).  
 
The next stage is conflict management and is to be attempted when conflict has been 
identified within a given context. Its aim is to reduce tensions between the parties as a means 
of preventing further conflict escalation. Conflict management efforts can take many forms, 
such as reduction of military forces, intervention by a third party and communication between 
the parties. Conflict management can be described as “the limitation, mitigation and/or 
containment of conflict without necessarily solving it” (Swanström and Weissmann 2005: 
23). The focus is more on a move from destructive behaviour to the creation of more 
constructive relationships between the parties.  
 
The following phase is crisis management which involves more drastic measure than conflict 
management and aims at containing the eruption of conflict with all available means. The use 
of third party interventions is used during this phases. Peacekeeping is also a useful tool in 
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this phase of a conflict to help to bring the conflict under control and prevent further 
violence. Peacekeeping is defined as “ the prevention, containment, moderation and 
termination of hostilities through the medium of a peaceful third party interventions, 
organised and directed internationally, using multinational force of soldiers, police and 
civilians to restore and maintain peace” (Butler 2009: 69). Peacekeeping is the main 
peacemaking tool that is employed by the United Nations. It derives its legitimacy and 
credibility from two main factors, consent and impartiality. Peacekeeping forces require the 
consent of the warring parties before they are allowed to intervene in a conflict. They also act 
as impartial actors in the conflict; their job is to establish and maintain the peace and not to 
side with either party. There acceptance into a country is often motivated by the fact that 
while peacekeepers are an armed force, they are not designed to use force to reach their goals 
(Butler 2009: 70).  Peacekeeping forces normally get involved in a country after a ceasefire 
has been reached. Their main aim is, therefore, to monitor the compliance with the ceasefire 
agreement and prevent the re-eruption of violence. They do not, however, deal with the 
underlying causes of the conflict (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 75, 82).One step on from 
peacekeeping and one that is also utilised mostly by the UN is peace enforcement. Peace 
enforcement operations seek to “create or impose, by force, a cessation of hostilities so as to 
provide the conditions amendable to the negotiations of a ceasefire or peace agreement”. 
Peace enforcement operations don‟t require the consent of both the parties but are undertaken 
when it has been decided that the conditions for peace need to be imposed by an outside party 
(Butler 2009: 162-163). While enforcing peace might seem practical in theory, if peace is 
achieved through force rather than cultivated out of the will of the parties to a conflict, then it 
has less likelihood of being sustainable in the long term.  
 
Conflict resolution is the next stage on and is a more far-reaching approach that deals with 
the resolution of the underlying causes of the violence and reconciliation between the parties 
involved. Conflict Resolution is a “range of formal or informal activities undertaken by the 
parties to a conflict, or outsiders, designed to limit and reduce the level of violence in 
conflict, and to achieve some understanding of the key issues in conflict, a political 
agreement, or a jointly acceptable decision on future interactions and distribution of 
resources” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 1). Conflict resolution takes the process one step 
further than many of the previous methods that have been covered. Its focus is more on trying 
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to resolve the causes of the conflict and establish some kind of agreement between the parties 
rather than just focusing on stopping and managing the violence at hand. For an agreement to 
be reached parties need to be brought together and undertake some form of negotiation, 
usually with the help of a third party. Conflict resolution will in the end only be successful, 
however, if the benefits gained from being at peace outweigh the benefits from continuing the 
conflict. Incentives need to be offered to encourage cooperation from the parties to the 
conflict and the costs of noncooperation need to be such to maintain ongoing cooperation and 
commitment to peace. Parties are far more likely to enter into a peace agreement if peace is 
going to generate higher rewards then continued fighting would  (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 
45, 57).  
 
The efforts that are undertaken to help resolve conflicts are fundamental to their success. If 
the process is not acceptable to those involved or does not take into consideration underlying 
causes of the violence then there is little chance for peace being sustained in the long-term. 
Conflict settlement should not be seen as the end goal but as the beginning of what should be 
an ongoing peacebuilding process to help create a situation of sustainable peace throughout 
society so conflict is less likely to reoccur in the future. The focus of conflict settlement 
needs to not only be on stopping the violence at hand but more importantly finding out and 
working through the root causes that lie beneath the surface of a conflict.  
 
Peacebuilding combines the whole array of previously mentioned conflict management 
methods. Peacebuilding is a conflict management approach that is undertaken in the post-
conflict phase, the aim of which is to create sustainable peace and long term stability in war-
torn communities. Peacebuilding focuses on the wider aspects of why a society is in conflict 
and what needs to be changed in order to curb conflict recurrence in the future. This approach 
was initially conceptualised in 1992 by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali. The development of this theory will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. This 
approach focuses on initially ending the violence and creating a stable and safe environment, 
then within that stable environment the focus shifts to resolving the root causes of conflict 
and rebuilding and re-establishing sustainable institutions within society; political and 
economic as well as social. This approach has a long term focus on reforming all areas of 
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society with the help of the local people so that when the external assistance withdraws the 
people are able deal with future problems without having to resort back to violence. A 
forward looking approach like this is important and necessary for conflict recurrence after 
internal wars is so high because those involved in the conflict have to continue to occupy the 
same space as those it was fighting against. If steps are not taken towards reconciliation 
between former adversaries and the underlying causes of the violence are not worked through 
peace will be much harder to sustain in the long term. The central aim of peacebuilding is the 
creation of sustainable peace and stability in post-conflict societies.  
 
1.6 Defining Success and Failure  
 
To be able to analyse whether various peacebuilding missions have been successful in 
creating sustainable peace, success must first be defined. However, success is not an easily 
definable concept and sometimes what seems like success to one person is not the same for 
another. Success is relative and therefore needs to be defined in terms of tangible and 
intangible elements in order to establish criteria against which success can be judged. Success 
in the field of conflict settlement and resolution can relate to common benchmarks in the 
field. These can be both success in terms of tangible outcomes in political, social and 
economic arenas such as the return of refugees, increased economic productivity or the 
holding of peaceful elections, or success in terms of intangible elements like justice and 
reconciliation which can be evaluated in terms of changes in psychological perceptions and 
cultural change. Failure of peacebuilding activities, on the other hand, is somewhat easier to 
determine, but yet is still plagued by some discrepancies. Failure of peace operations is 
usually signified by the recurrence of war and armed conflict (Campbell 2009: 6). This 
definition, however, is often characterised as being too simple and minimalist and is in line 
with what  John Galtung describes as „negative peace‟ (Call 2008: 176).  
 
Many efforts taken to measure peacebuilding success have tended to focus on the general 
impact of United Nations peace operations in the country in which it had intervened in. 
Others have measured success in terms of the peacebuilding activities which were undertaken 
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and how successful these were (Campbell 2009: 5). However, while conflict resolution 
(dealing with the root causes of a conflict and negating the need for future conflict) might be 
seen as a more desirable goal, conflict settlement that involves perhaps just a simple cessation 
of violent behaviour could be considered a success in a situation when total resolution of a 
conflict may be simply unattainable (Bercovitch 2006: 296-297).  
 
One factor that indicates success and is easier to measure than others is effectiveness. While 
this indicator was initially conceptualised by Bercovitch to explain mediation success, I 
believe it can also be applied to explain the success of a peacebuilding mission as well. 
Bercovitch defines effectiveness as “a measure of results achieved, change brought about or 
behavioural transformation” (Bercovitch 2006: 293). This means that success is achieved by 
bringing about a change in the behaviours or attitudes of the parties or causing some positive 
impact or affect on the conflict, for example moving from violent to non-violent behaviours 
(Bercovitch 2006: 294). Effectiveness of the process is therefore a concrete indicator of 
success.  
 
Author Roland Paris defines success as the „achievement of a stable and lasting peace”. He 
believes that the analysis of success of a peacebuilding needs to take into consideration why a 
society erupted into conflict in the first place and whether or not the reasons for this violence 
have been ameliorated through peacebuilding. If they have then it can be defined as being a 
success (Paris in Call 2008: 182). This explanation, based on the resolution of root causes of 
violence being the determinant for success, has been criticised because many post-conflict 
countries that have failed to address the root causes of war have not in turn experienced a 
decline back into violence (Call 2008: 183).  
 
Doyle and Sambanis have also done research into the classification of peacebuilding success 
and failure. They identify three main criteria for measuring successful conflict resolution. 
They are: 
1. “The stated reconciliation of the parties; 
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2. The duration of the reconciliation, and; 
3. Changes in the way parties behaved towards each other” (2006: 312).  
Successful peacebuilding does not only mean a change in behaviour between the parties but 
also a transformation of identities and the institutional context within which they exist. As 
Doyle and Sambanis put it, it is „more than reforming play in an old game, it changes the 
game [altogether]” (2006: 313).  
 
The type of success that needs to be measured in terms of peacebuilding is long-term success 
in sustaining peace in post-conflict societies. The focus on success being determined by the 
end of violence in the short-term is far too narrow an approach. Peacebuilding theory 
emphasises the importance of creating and maintaining peaceful societies and helping 
develop knowledge about conflict management in these communities so that future problems 
can be dealt without the need to resort to violent measures. Success needs to be determined 
instead by the development of what is known as „durable peace‟ being the maintenance of 
peace and security over a significant period of time (Hoffman 2009: 16). The general period 
of time that determines the establishment of durable peace is usually five years. This is 
because “there are [only] rare instances where in which civil wars resumed after five years of 
peace” (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001: 187). Success of peacebuilding will be judged 
in terms of the success in establishing the peacebuilding dimensions that are to be analysed; 
stopping violence, trust and confidence building measures, governmental, judicial and 
economic reforms and community education. Longevity of peace will also be a factor in the 
determination of success or failure of these cases.  
 
1.7 Outline of Chapters  
 
The next chapter provides an overview of the theory of peacebuilding. It begins with an 
examination of the historical background of theory, when it was first conceptualised and by 
whom. The chapter then goes on to outline the most important dimensions of the 
peacebuilding process that, when undertaken in the post-conflict phase, help to reduce 
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violence and develop sustainable peace. The chapter then concludes with the development of 
the original framework of peacebuilding that has been designed to include the most important 
aspects of the peacebuilding approach and is to be applied to the three cases studies that are 
going to be examined.  
 
Chapter Three presents a general overview of internal conflict and how this relates to the 
Pacific region. It begins by defining what internal conflict is and how it compares to interstate 
conflict. It then outlines the prevalence of internal conflicts worldwide and what the main 
causes of such conflicts are. The second half of the chapter relates these general ideas about 
internal conflict to the Pacific. It provides a summary of conflict in the Pacific and its causes 
and consequences. The chapter then ends with a brief overview of conflict resolution in the 
Pacific, with a focus on the main actors that are involved in peace processes in this region. ` 
 
Chapter Four and Five provide an investigation of the peacebuilding processes that were 
undertaken in East Timor and Bougainville, respectively. These chapters explore the causes 
of the conflicts in these regions and what attempts have been made to try to resolve them. 
After that they go on to examine the peacebuilding missions that were then undertaken which 
resulted in stability and peace within these nations. This is done by applying the dimensions 
of the framework that was designed in Chapter Two to the post conflict situation in these 
countries. Lastly the successes and failures of both these missions are investigated to see 
whether peacebuilding in these countries was accomplishment or not.    
 
Chapter Six focuses on conflict in the Solomon Islands and follows a similar structure to that 
of Chapters Four and Five but differs in the fact that the post conflict mission being 
undertaken in the Solomon Islands is still ongoing. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the 
mission and decide whether or not it can be classed as peacebuilding and also what more 
needs to be done by those involved to help establish long-term, sustainable peace in the 
country before their withdrawal. This is done by applying the framework from Chapter Two 
to determine which areas needs more attention before the mission comes to an end.  
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This thesis is concluded in Chapter Seven. Its main focus is on the future of peace in the 
Pacific and how the concept of peacebuilding fits into this. The aim is to examine the overall 
success of the peacebuilding cases that have been examined and to offer some policy 
recommendation about where to go from here in terms of peacebuilding in the Pacific region 
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Chapter Two 
Peacebuilding: A Theoretical Background 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Conflict and conflict recurrence are becoming more and more common in the international 
arena. The way in which conflict is dealt with and how it is managed has a significant impact 
on the likelihood of establishing durable, sustainable peace in the post-conflict environment. 
Sustainable peace can be defined as, “a situation characterised by the absence of physical 
violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic and cultural forms of 
discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; 
and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts” (Reychler and 
Paffenholz 2001: 12). 
 
Peacebuilding is a conflict management approach that, because of its very nature and design, 
focuses on helping to build long-term, sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a set of activities 
that are undertaken in the post-conflict phase to help create a situation of peace and stop the 
recurrence of conflict. The main goal is to identify the underlying causes of the violence, not 
just to focus on dealing with the effects the conflict has had on society. This goal needs to be 
followed through by peacebuilders. Peacebuilding is a long-term commitment to peace, not 
just a short-term solution to stop violence. Post conflict societies needs to be rehabilitated and 
reconciled in such a way that is conducive to sustainable peace for the longevity of the 
process to be assured (Jeong 2005).  
 
This chapter will focus on the various dimensions that make up the peacebuilding process. 
Firstly there will be a historical overview which outlines where the theory first came from 
and who it was established by. This will provide a broad introduction to what peacebuilding 
is in general terms before its dimensions are explored more thoroughly.  The next section will 
focus on the different dimensions of peacebuilding. These are security, political, judicial, 
economic and psychological factors. Finally, the last section will outline a framework that 
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has been designed to incorporate all these factors, and will be applied to the case studies used 
in the research.  
 
2.2 Historical Overview: Peacebuilding and the United Nations  
 
The theory of post-conflict peacebuilding was first conceptualised in 1992 by United Nations 
(UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He defined it in his report, An Agenda for 
Peace, as “action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid relapse to conflict” and saw the UN as a main force behind this 
stability being achieved in post-conflict nations. The UN conducts peacebuilding as one part 
of its tripartite approach to conflict resolution, the other branches being peacekeeping and 
peacemaking. Boutros-Ghali went on to further emphasise the main goal of peacebuilding in 
the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace as “the creation of structures for the 
institutionalization of peace” (Barnett, Kim, O‟Donnell and Sitea 2007: 35-37). This 
approach by the UN conceptualised the fact that peace required more than just the ending of 
armed violence, it needed the elimination of the root causes of conflict so that those involved 
no longer need to or have to use violent means to settle their disputes. Post- war countries 
needed mechanisms to be created in society to foster non-violent processes for overcoming 
future disputes (Ibid: 42). The majority of the peace operations undertaken by the United 
Nations in the 1990s focused on the task of post-conflict peacebuilding. The main aim of UN 
peacebuilders was the importance of promoting democracy as a means for ending conflict. In 
an Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali emphasises the point that democracy is an essential 
element for conflict termination by stating that “peace, development and democracy are 
inextricably linked” (Paris 2004).  
 
Although peacebuilding was established in the 1990s there was no inherent cohesion between 
those undertaking peacebuilding missions. There was a need for an institutional mechanism 
that could address the specific needs of post-conflict societies and help them towards 
recovery, reconstruction and development. An organisation was needed that would have the 
support in terms of funds and people power to be able to see peacebuilding projects through 
into the long-term. This became a reality when world leaders at the 2005 World Summit 
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decided that the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission was needed. It was to be a United 
Nations mandated organisation to advise on, coordinate and facilitate peacebuilding missions 
and activities. The main purposes of the Commission were to be: 
a) “To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and 
propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.  
b) To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary 
for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies 
in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. 
c) To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all 
relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to 
help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the 
period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict 
recovery” (United Nations Security Council Resolution 1645, 20 December 2005: 
1-2).  
 
While the United Nations are still a leading force in post-conflict recovery worldwide their 
scope is often limited, as is much foreign intervention, if countries in conflict do not agree to 
their assistance. The concept of peacebuilding needs to be taken on board by a wider range of 
international organisations if it is to become an effective and widespread practice in post-
conflict situations.  
 
2.3 Dimensions of Peacebuilding  
 
The peacebuilding process has several important dimensions that, when undertaken in the 
post-conflict phase, help to reduce violence and develop sustainable peace. These factors, 
when implemented properly, can help to reduce the recurrence of conflict and establish 
mechanisms within society for dealing with future disputes. The timing of implementation is 
also important for some of the dimensions need to be established more promptly then others 
for the process to be not only successful but also sustainable.  
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2.3a Security Factors  
 
Ending Violence  
One of the most important tasks of the peacebuilding process is to end the violence and help 
to curb its resurgence. Peacebuilders need to provide public security in post-conflict societies 
so that people‟s basic needs can be addressed in the aftermath of the violence. This role may 
have to be assumed by external actors in the beginning for communities may not have the 
capacity for this in the initial post-conflict phase (Jeong 2005: 39). There is a high possibility 
of renewed violence in the post-settlement phase. With an inherent breakdown in law and 
order and political authority, there is a chance for various parties to try to establish their 
dominance in the new regime. These so called “spoilers” need to be dealt with in a 
constructive manner so as not to disrupt the peacebuilding process. This could come in the 
form of inclusion into new governmental structures or more general incorporation into the 
wider peace process. If not dealt with in the early stage, these spoilers will only cause further 
trouble throughout the later phases of the peace process.  It is only after the direct violence is 
dealt with that other reforms can begin to be developed and rehabilitation can move forward, 
for such processes need a stable secure foundation to work from.  
 
This step focuses on the need to end violence, create a cease-fire agreement and discourage 
combatants from further violence. This aspect is a continuance of the work that is started 
initially by peacekeepers. Unlike peacekeeping, peacebuilding goes further by creating an 
atmosphere that is conducive to peace and more desirable than conflict for those involved. If 
conditions of peace are seen as more beneficial for the parties of the conflict then this will 
lead the way to long-term peace that can be sustained by the wider society. The use of 
positive incentives helps to keep the parties of a conflict committed to the terms of the peace 
agreement and end violence in society (Mc Rae and Hubert 2001: 76).  
 
One approach that can be taken to end violence is the establishment of disarmament and 
demobilisation activities. These activities are vital to the overall success of security sector 
reforms and rehabilitation. Disarmament is defined as “the collection, control and disposal of 
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small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management 
programs in the post-conflict context” (Knight and Ozerdem 2004: 499). The proliferation of 
small arms is an ongoing problem is many post-conflict societies. Peace agreements may 
arrange weapons collections but there are no guarantees that these weapons will be stored or 
disposed of in an appropriate manner. Without proper management of this process, further 
security initiatives will continue to be undermined (International Association for 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 2009). Demobilisation is more of a long-term 
goal to be established during post-conflict military reforms. If these activities are undertaken 
too rapidly they can leave people feeling insecure, which could lead to a resurgence of 
violence as people feel the need to re-arm to protect themselves (Hansen 2000: 42). 
Demobilisation activities are just one step in the move towards greater demilitarisation of 
society in the post-conflict period. The newly formed government needs to progress towards 
downsizing the military forces and reducing defence spending, these resources can instead 
then be used for reconstruction and development (Rotberg 2004: 170). “DDR is one of the 
most demanding elements of peacebuilding. In affluent Western societies, there is a notion 
that violence does not pay. Yet in ethnic and similar types of conflict, well-considered 
economic interest is more often than not the dominant reason for rampant and continued 
violence”  (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 384).  
 
Intervention  
In the initial stages of the post-conflict phase, war-torn societies may not have the necessary 
structures to be able to provide physical security for their citizens. Intervention may be 
needed by an external monitoring force in the early stages of peacebuilding to help curb the 
possibility of renewed violence.  
 
 Military intervention may come in the form of United Nations peacekeeping forces. 
Peacekeeping forces can act as a neutral monitor to reduce tensions in society. The traditional 
conception of peacekeeping is that peacekeepers are to undertake impartial activities when 
given consent to do so from the parties involved and to only use force in situation of self-
defence (Chesterman 2004: 101). These forces have to respect the laws of territorial 
sovereignty so therefore are only able to intervene if authorised by the state in which the 
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conflict is present. Peacekeeping interventions are less likely in internal conflict for conflict 
resolution is often seen as unnecessary by the state‟s administration and therefore is not 
authorised.  
 
The main aim of peacekeepers in the earliest stages of intervention into a conflict is to 
establish improved security conditions for the civilian population. Peacekeepers can help to 
maintain law and order in the early stages of the post-conflict period when renewed violence 
is a high probability and the country‟s security forces are severely weakened. This is mostly 
achieved by helping to implement and monitor ceasefire arrangements between the warring 
factions (Chesterman 2004: 112). Peacekeepers can also play a part in demobilisation and 
disarmament activities. They can act as neutral monitors and facilitators of weapon 
collections and maintain security in society while forces are downsizing and disbanding. 
Peacekeepers need to establish a credible first impression. This is because the initial stages of 
the post-conflict period are the most crucial for gathering support and momentum so that 
peacekeeping activities can be implemented most effectively (Rotberg 2001: 173, 112).  
 
Reforms 
Military reform can be defined as “a reorganisation process…aimed at transforming armed 
groups from a war to a peacetime organisation” (Hansen 2000: 44). Most peace settlements 
include the need for some degree of military and police reform. This is because it is these 
forces that have been most likely involved in the conflict. Steps need to be taken to 
reintegrate these forces back into society and also make changes to stop such violence among 
the ranks happening in the future. There are two proposed models of military reform that can 
be adopted. They are not the only approaches that can be taken but are ones that have already 
been adopted in various peacebuilding missions. The first of these is the military merger 
model. This model follows the idea that to establish strong internal security in the post-
conflict period, former enemy armies need to be integrated into a single, usually government, 
force. In situations where this approach has been taken there has been less likelihood of 
renewed violence. This could be because the military personnel are not left unemployed and 
therefore do not have the need to revert to illicit activities, which may be the case if the forces 
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had been totally disbanded. The second model follows the path of demobilisation and police 
reform. This approach concludes that the best way to ensure security among former warring 
factions is to try to demobilise or reduce the power of the armies and shift the balance of 
security responsibilities to a reformed police force (Darby and MacGinty 2003: 212-215). 
Demobilisation is defined as “a planned process by which the armed forces of the 
government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband” 
(Knight and Ozerdem 2004: 500). Political conditions in the post-conflict period determine 
what model is most appropriate in any given case. If there were a high likelihood of renewed 
military conflict then it would be unlikely for a country to undertake demobilisation 
processes. 
 
Although military mergers can have short-term success in maintaining security, post conflict 
societies should aim towards greater reductions of military power as a means of creating 
long-term sustainable peace.  Demobilisation will create a state of increased confidence and 
trust between the parties and add symbolic commitment to the peace process. However, 
demobilisation in the early stages, while fundamental to the establishment of long-term 
peace, may be more difficult in practice in the short term. Parties may hold onto weapons as a 
precautionary measure in case proposed ceasefires and elections are not successful (Jeong 
2005: 45).  
 
Armed forces, whatever form they may take, need to undergo a vetting process. This means 
that the leadership and hierarchical strictures need to undergo a re-selection process to review 
the quality of armed services staff and work towards removing unsuitable staff members; 
those who do not fit into the new mindset of cooperation and control.  Another suggestion 
that is made as part of the larger societal demilitarisation process is to place the armed forces 
under civilian control. “Civilian control contributes to increased transparency, confidence 
building and thus cooperation between former components” (Hansen 2000: 45).  
 
 
 
24 
 
2.3b Political Factors 
 
Peace Settlement 
Conflict settlement is often understood as signifying the end of a conflict and is coupled with 
the belief that a peace agreement will bring about instant and lasting change to a conflictual 
society. When a peace agreement is signed there is an expectation that the decrease of direct 
violence will also be accompanied by a decrease in structural violence. This is rarely the case. 
Relying of a peace agreement as the end goal alone can sometimes even have a negative 
effect when parties feel like the agreement fails to address their needs appropriately or that 
the deal is unfair, which can lead to a relapse into conflict. For peace to be sustainable and 
durable, it needs to be fostered throughout society. It is through the process of peacebuilding 
that trust and solidarity can be developed between conflicting parties. “Trust and confidence-
building measures have to be taken in order to induce cooperation and produce positive 
attitudes that create an atmosphere more conducive to the peaceful settlement of differences.” 
Peace agreements must be viewed as a guide for ending hostilities and working through the 
initial stages of post-conflict transition. It cannot be seen as a blue print for the end of deeply 
rooted societal unrest. 
 
External Assistance 
Peacebuilding may be initially fostered by external actors for a post-conflict society may not 
have the capacity to engage in the process without outside assistance. International 
peacebuilding can be divided into four mandated operations.  The first is a monitoring or 
observer mission. This is when the host government consents to external observers coming in 
and taking on an interim role to help monitor a truce and start to negotiate a peace agreement. 
This stage helps to build trust between the parties. The second operation is traditional 
peacekeeping. This consists of the “deployment of military units and civilian officials in 
order to facilitate the negotiated settlement of the conflict” with the consent of the parties. 
Thirdly is multi-dimensional peacekeeping. This process is “designed to implement a 
comprehensive negotiated peace agreement”. Lastly is peace enforcement. This final 
operation requires a “military intervention designed to impose public order by force, if 
needed, with or without host government consent” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 781). This 
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approach however, is specifically aimed at peacebuilding undertaken by an outside force 
rather than locally based peacebuilders, which could inherently take a different approach to 
the process. An internationally driven peacebuilding approach could be better equipped to 
create a situation of stable peace. However this assistance can also come with certain 
downfalls, including dependence and lack of local ownership of the process. 
 
External intervention can sometimes, however, create a dilemma. On the one hand a 
dominant international presence may be needed to help maintain law and order in the post-
conflict period and to establish the means for economic, political and societal reforms, but 
may risk destabilising local government from establishing its own legitimacy and control 
over the peacebuilding process. On the other hand a less intrusive intervention may be 
necessary to foster local ownership of the process, but with the risk of further violence from 
having a lack of capacity to support reforms long-term (Paris and Sisk 2007: 4-5). 
 
Elections 
Elections stand to be a contentious issue in the peacebuilding process. Although they are a 
key aspect in developing liberal democracies, which is the aim of many peacebuilding 
missions, they can act as a catalyst for the recurrence of violence. Elections are seen as an 
„exit strategy‟ for many peace missions; considered the successful end to a mission. This 
however is a misrepresentation. Peace missions need to be more long-term and forward 
thinking then this. Violence is a common occurrence during elections in the post-conflict 
stage. International assistance needs to remain during and after the elections to help to curb 
and control any possible backlash (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 25). Another problem that stems 
from the holding of elections is the competitive element of such an event. “The competitive 
nature of elections may aggravate existing conflicts and social cleavages”. Elections may act 
to further polarise society when its social structures are already significantly weakened. 
Those who held power in the past may risk losing this power through new elections if they 
cannot gain the support needed from the community. This can also cause unrest and increased 
violence for these parties may use coercive means as a way of gaining voters (Sisk and 
Jarstad 2008: 84-85).  
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Government and Leadership  
Another important aspect of the peacebuilding process is rebuilding state institutions that 
have the capacity and legitimacy to maintain a peaceful society. This can be done by 
peacebuilders either replacing the government as an interim monitoring force or working 
alongside the state to rebuild institutions such as law and order systems, communication 
networks and public administration. Governmental reform is a key aspect of peacebuilding in 
post conflict societies. States have to overcome many societal, political and economic 
difficulties in the post-conflict period and a strong stable government is mandatory for this to 
be possible. Whatever form the government takes after the settlement process its most 
important focus is to “provide security for citizens, make decisions in a politically acceptable 
way and create organisations that will implement these decisions and extract resources from 
the population to pay for the whole process” (Licklider 2007: 704). Although this step may 
seem straightforward in theory, in reality governmental reform may be one of the most 
contentious factors in the post-settlement phase. Problems may include who holds the power 
positions, what shape the new government should take and whether the new leadership will 
have the legitimacy to foster the development and reconstruction of state institutions and 
wider society.   
 
Faith in state institutions needs to be re-established. This alone is a major task for in many 
post-war territories in has been the state institutions themselves that have been used as a tool 
of oppression. Establishing transparency and legitimacy of the new state institutions is the 
key to gaining and enhancing societal support of these institutions (Chesterman 2004: 154). 
Transparency refers to the openness of the government system. “The process of governing 
needs to be both visible and understanding to the population. As such it will reassure them 
that it is trustworthy and encourage their support and cooperation rather that risking their 
alienation” (Harris and Reilly 1998: 349).  
 
The issue of who should be represented in the new governmental structure of a country can 
have adverse affects on the process of peacebuilding. Inclusion of warring parties can 
sometimes be the best approach for parties are more likely to sign a peace agreement if they 
are assured of having a share in the new government. However, this may be problematic for 
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these parties may use force or coercive techniques to try to gain the majority of the power 
(Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 22). A power sharing arrangement might be the most plausible 
solution in trying to satisfy all parties involved. 
 
Theorist John Lederach has developed a framework that conceptualised the different Levels 
of leadership in society and their different approaches to and involvement in peacebuilding 
(See Figure 2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Leadership Model (model adopted from Lederach 1997) 
 
Level One: Top Level Leadership 
This leadership sector is made up of top political and military personal that are involved in 
the conflict. They hold the majority of power in society and have a strong influence on policy 
and decision-making. This level of leadership tends to undertake a top-down approach to 
peacebuilding. The role they take in the peace process is usually as a third party between 
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warring factions. The peacebuilding approach at this level tends to be short term, focusing on 
creating cease-fires and the cessation of violence which will in turn lead to the creation of a 
peace agreement. It is assumed that once these actions are undertaken at the highest level they 
will then translate to and trickle down through the rest of society (Lederach 1997:38- 40).  
 
Level Two: Middle Range Leadership 
This sector is comprised of “persons who function in leadership positions within a setting of 
protracted conflict, but whose position is defined in ways not necessarily connected to or 
controlled by the authority or structures if the formal government or major opposition 
movement” (Lederach 1997: 41). These leaders act as intermediaries between top level 
leaders and those at the grassroots level. They are respected by and connected to many 
influential people across the conflictual divide. It is the people at this level who are involved 
in initiatives such as problem solving. Middle range leaders‟ hold an important position in 
society and can be the key to creating an infrastructure for achieving sustainable peace.  
Through problem solving workshops these leaders can interact, unofficially, with other 
middle range leaders from the opposing side of the conflict. Such workshops aim to develop 
relationships between the participants. These participants are then able to reiterate their new 
outlook on the conflict along with possible prospects for the future when they return to their 
own communities (Lederach 1997: 42-46).  
 
Level Three: Grassroots Leadership  
This level represents the majority of society. The leadership at this level operates on a day-to-
day, more face-to-face basis with the masses. These people understand the conflict better than 
other leadership sectors for they are involved in it on a more personal and direct basis 
(Lederach 1997: 45). These leaders take a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. The aim at 
this level is to foster relationships between members of society and help to deal with the more 
personal ramifications of war such as hatred and hurt. Grassroots leaders can work with 
people in the community to help reconcile grievances and put into practice mechanisms for 
overcoming them (Lederach 1997: 52-55).  
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For the peacebuilding process to be a success there needs to be greater coordination and 
improved channels of communication between these different levels of leadership. Without a 
more conducive approach, the peacebuilding process will become fragmented and therefore 
less efficient in dealing with the problems at hand. The assumption about anchoring the 
approach in the middle and grassroots levels is that “changes in attitudes, perceptions and 
skills, and relationships and trust building within a small group can translate to the policy 
makers who have a role in making decisions relating to conflict behaviour” (Obiekiwe 2009: 
24). “Working together means that those who have the power to get things done are 
supported by those who will be most greatly affected by the changes” (Obiekiwe 2009: 100).  
 
Civil Society 
The establishment of a strong civil society is paramount to the success of peacebuilding 
reforms. Civil society can be defined as “the arena of voluntary, uncoerced collective action 
around shared interests, purposes and values” (Peace Building Initiative 2009: 1). Civil 
society is a network of autonomous organisations that are founded by citizens to help to give 
a voice to the people in the public sphere. It is through civil society organisations that people 
can be active in politics; acting with, not against, the state to create and implement policies 
designed to address societal issues and advance the public good (CIVICUS 1999: 7).“Civil 
society operates as the intermediary between the basic units of a society-families and 
individuals-and the states as represented by the government. Civil society acts both as a 
channel for participation and to provide useful checks and balances on government action, 
ensuring accountability and transparency especially in cases where political parties are weak 
and fail to provide an effective opposition” (Harris and Reilly 1998: 351).  
 
Civil society organisations are essentially a political concept, the main aim being the 
promotion of democracy and good governance as a way of achieving sustainable 
development and peace. Although these organisations are not state based, they work with the 
state and within state structures and channels to achieve their goals. Civil society organisation 
can help install confidence and legitimacy in state institutions among the people as it creates 
a vehicle for participation in public policymaking, helping people to make a difference in the 
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political sphere. Faith in the government and governmental institutions needs to be 
established and strengthened from the bottom up, civil society organisations act as a catalyst 
for achieving this support (CIVICUS 1999: 89, 195). 
 
2.3c Judicial Factors 
 
Rule of Law 
Re-establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict society is also imperative for its 
successful and sustainable transition from war to peace. The absence of a democratically 
defined rule of law system in post-conflict society is very common. This may be solely based 
on the fact that these institutions have been severely weakened by the protracted violence, or 
may lie at a deeper societal level because, through lack of experience and expertise, there is 
no rule of law culture and therefore no trust in such institutions within society. Justice and the 
rule of law are viewed by many as the corner stone of the peacebuilding process for 
successful peacebuilding cannot be achieved “unless the population is confident that redress 
for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of 
disputes and the fair administration of justice.” The establishment of a legitimate rule of law 
system will make long-term peace more sustainable because the people trust in the 
institutions that are going to provide a check on government, operational and behavioural 
rules for society, and stability and conflict resolution mechanisms, therefore creating a more 
peaceful environment (International Association for Humanitarian Policy and Conflict 
Research 04/06/09).  
 
Reforms 
The creation of a stable and legitimate judiciary is a necessary step in the peacebuilding 
process. Without an effective judiciary many other important reforms will not be possible. An 
efficient judicial and legal system is needed for economic growth to be achieved and is a core 
aspect for ensuring and maintaining domestic security (International Association for 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research 25/05/09). The judiciary needs to be strengthened 
so that those who were involved in the conflict can be tried and prosecuted if such action is 
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appropriate. A dysfunctional judicial system will hinder any efforts made towards 
establishing public confidence in the new political structure.  
 
The judiciary needs to be established as an independent check on both government and the 
military, and can no longer be hindered by any political agenda, as may have been the case 
during the conflict (Jeong 2005: 69). New rules need to be established to define criminal and 
civil offences and how such offences are to be dealt with under the new judicial structures. 
The creation on these new rules needs to also be further supported by the establishment of 
institutions such as a reformed police force, prosecutional office and competent judiciary. 
Judicial experience may be lacking in the post-conflict phase. Training and education may be 
needed to help bolster legal expertise in war-torn states. It is common for such a task to be 
undertaken by an external body (Rotberg 2004: 210).  
 
Judicial reform, though necessary, needs to be kept in check so not to promote corruption 
from those involved. If court services improve then there will be more demand for such 
services, therefore increasing the need for resources to maintain these services. This may 
foster the use of bribes and incentives of those wishing to fast track their cases. Reform 
strategies needs to be developed to stop such an occurrence and increased demand needs to 
be monitored to help curb possible corruption and favouritism (Rotberg 2004: 201). “Given 
that the judiciary and law enforcement agencies are the standardised and replicable pillars of 
the rule of law, a weak justice system handicaps the transition to a new democratic state” 
(Jeong 2005: 71).  
 
2.3d Economic Factors 
 
External Assistance 
Economies are greatly weakened in the post-conflict stage and many war-torn societies do 
not have the capacity for the rebuilding and development that is needed. External donors are 
usually a necessary aspect in the early stages of post-conflict development. The use of 
resources as bargaining tools for peace can be a crucial incentive for parties to end violence, 
for financial incentives make peace seem like a more attractive option (Sisk and Jarstad 2008: 
710). However, these incentives are usually underpinned with conditionality aspects.  
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Although external assistance is often an essential element of the peacebuilding process, 
donors are rarely committed to long-term economic goals. Recipient countries have severely 
weakened economic structures that are unable to absorb the large influx of aid in the early 
stages, when donor commitment is at its peak. These funds are often distributed to sustain 
short-term humanitarian goals rather than long-term developmentally focused aims. This lack 
of institutional capacity may lead to economic inefficiency or corruption. Although much 
emphasis is placed on what each donor is contributing, the reality is that a significant 
proportion of promised assistance either gets delivered at a very slow pace, or sometimes 
does not get given at all. Rebuilding a sustainable society after conflict is a long process, the 
need to help tends to diminish once the conflict is no longer in the international spotlight 
(Chesterman 2004: 185, 189-190). 
 
Local society needs to aim towards self-reliance in the early stages or will risk becoming too 
dependent on external assistance, which will only hinder the long-term development process. 
External economic assistance is usually a reality, but can bring with it some unwanted and 
undesirable consequences. Prolonged assistance can create a situation of dependence and 
reduce incentives for local production and internally driven development. This undermines 
long-term economic sustainability for when the humanitarian assistance is withdrawn there 
are no societal structures in place to maintain production, predetermining a scarcity of 
resources (Jeong 2005: 152). Increased consultation between the donors and recipient nations 
will help to ensure that assistance is structured around local needs and abilities and help 
foster the economy in a more sustainable manner (Chesterman 2004: 196).  
  
Reforms 
Economies are often severely affected in times of conflict. Lack of production and a decline 
in income happen for a variety of reasons. These include the decline of physical capital, 
production capacity is reduced through lack of inputs and labour, there can be significant 
shortages of trained and skilled worker who have either been displaced as a result of the 
violence or killed and also investment declines in such hard times (Rotberg 2004: 257). 
Therefore, economic reform is a key factor in post-conflict societies. The establishment of a 
working and productive economy will foster development efforts and means reconstruction 
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and rehabilitation will be more successful and prosperous. Economic reconstruction needs to 
be treated as a vital partner to the success of a peacebuilding mission, as a contributor to the 
peace process and not just the result of it. Reforms and reconstruction can provide “the 
visible benefits of peace that help mollify hostilities, the civilians jobs that absorb 
demobilised soldiers and the tax revenues that strengthen state capacity” (Sambanis 2008: 
31). The revival of the economy will help to reconstruct and improve the quality of life in 
society, therefore making the backslide into conflict seem less desirable.  
 
2.3e Psychological Factors 
 
Trauma Healing and Reconciliation 
“People need the opportunity and space to express to and with one another the trauma of loss, 
their grief at the loss and the anger that accompanies the pain and the memory of the 
injustices experienced” (Lederach 1997). Trauma healing helps people to better understand 
and come to terms with their experiences and work through how to move forward into the 
future. This is a necessary step in the peacebuilding process for if the effects of trauma are 
not dealt with and worked through this trauma could have further negative effects on the 
person or the people around them (Peace Building Institute 2009: 2).  
 
The need for reconciliation between former adversaries can be advocated through community 
mechanisms. Warring factions need a chance to share their personal grievances relating to the 
conflict. This will hopefully help people move forward with the peace process rather the hold 
onto the past. Reconciliation is as much about communicating one‟s grievances against the 
actions of the opposing party as it is admitting one‟s own role and behaviour in the conflict. 
Peacebuilders can help to facilitate communication between the warring parties and create an 
atmosphere that moves away from finger pointing and laying blame to a situation where all 
those involved can look within and make changes to themselves and not just expect changes 
from the other side (Reychler and Paffenholz 2001: 341-342). Emphasis needs to be put on 
working towards a shared future rather than focusing on what was a divided past. Talking 
through issues and working through what caused the violence can help people to overcome 
personal demons relating to the conflict. Without this chance to come to terms with what has 
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happened and build a more trusting foundation for the future, peace agreements have little 
chance being successful.  
 
2.4 Framework 
 
After researching what key scholars have said about the peacebuilding process, what aspects 
it may involve and what were the positive and possible negative effects of the approach, I 
was then able to construct my own peacebuilding framework. This framework is based on my 
personal interpretation of what I thought were the most important dimensions to be included. 
The framework that is going to be applied to this study has six dimensions that, when applied 
in a post-conflict situation, will help to pave the way to long-term peace. 
 
The first dimension is Security Sector Reform. This step can involve both internal and 
external intervention and the focus is to establish an initial peace agreement between the 
parties and to address domestic security issues, usually through a ceasefire arrangement.  
 
The second focus is to help develop Trust and Confidence not only between the conflicting 
factions but also between them and the intervening forces. This foundation is needed in the 
early stages before any other reform should be attempted. Conflict is often caused by 
misperceptions held by opposing parties and conflict settlement attempts are often 
undermined because of a lack of trust between those involved. If trust is fostered between all 
involved then other reforms have a higher chance of being successful.  
 
The next two dimensions, Governmental Reform and Judicial Reform, need to be undertaken 
in parallel. A strong and legitimate government is pertinent for sustainable peace to be 
possible. This is not possible without having a successfully reformed judicial system to act as 
a check and balance on the new leadership and verify the government‟s legitimacy.   
 
This leads to the next aim, which is Economic Reform. This sector would have been 
thoroughly destabilised during conflict so reform of the economic system is an important step 
in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation.  
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The last aspect that needs to be undertaken by post-settlement peacebuilders is Community 
Education and Reconciliation. Post-conflict societies need to be educated on how best to deal 
with future problems without resorting to violent means and support for the new economic 
and governmental changes needs be established at a grass-roots level. Having strong 
community support as a foundation will make long-term peace a more achievable reality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Peacebuilding Framework 
 
 
 
Security Sector Reform 
Trust and Confidence 
Building Measures 
Governmental Reform Judicial Reform 
Economic Reform 
Community Education 
and Reconciliation  
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2.5 Conclusion  
 
Peacebuilding can be seen as a forward looking and comprehensive approach to ending 
violence and helping to establish long-term peace in war-torn communities. The focus goes 
well beyond just the need to stop the violence at hand. Its greater focus is on reforming 
institutions within society so they are more conducive to peace. It is also about involving the 
wider community from the grass roots level up so that any reforms that are established are 
supported by all levels of society. Peacebuilding also emphasises the need to teach the local 
people how problems and tensions can be dealt with in the most constructive manner without 
the need to resort back to violence This approach, when applied in the post-conflict phase, can 
have real success in establishing long-term sustainable peace. The framework that was 
established in this chapter in now going to be applied to three cases, East Timor, Bougainville 
and the Solomon Islands, to illustrate real cases where peacebuilding has been attempted and 
the strengths and weaknesses of these various approaches to building peace. 
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Chapter Three 
Internal Conflict: Causes, Consequences and the Pacific Region 
 
“The region has not seen any interstate violent conflict in recent times, nor is it likely to 
develop in the foreseeable future. The focus therefore is on (potential) intrastate or internal 
violent conflict” (Spence and Wielders 2006). 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Conflict in the Pacific region, as is increasingly more common worldwide, is generally 
internal conflict, based on intractable issues that are becoming more and more difficult to 
resolve. This kind of conflict is different from others because of the actors that it involves. 
Violence is not just restricted to trained military forces, but other parties such as rebels, 
insurgents, militia and even a significant number of civilians. This is why it is, in a way, more 
dangerous than traditional interstate war. There are fewer rules determining what people are 
allowed to do, and more limited authority to stop them from doing it. Although conflict in the 
region is not qualified as severe on an international scale, its occurrence is disproportionate to 
the size of states in the region. One of the major problems with the incidence of internal 
conflict is the fact that such unrest is significantly harder to solve using traditional methods of 
conflict resolution, which in turn further extends the possible conflict cycle (Reilly 2002: 10). 
By looking at how conflict is undertaken in the region and how it has been approached, we 
can then analyse the appropriateness of undertaking peacebuilding activities in the region as a 
way of assuring long term peace is sustained in the post-conflict phase.  
 
3.2 Nature of Internal Conflict  
 
To best understand conflict in the Pacific region, intrastate and interstate conflict need to first 
be clearly defined. From there we can examine more closely what is meant by intrastate 
conflict and outline the causes and consequences of such conflict. By examining intrastate 
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conflict in more general terms we can develop a strong conceptual basis for the specific 
analysis of intrastate conflict in the Pacific region that is being undertaken in the second part 
of this chapter.  
 
3.2a Interstate versus Intrastate   
 
It is important to first define what is meant by armed conflict before a more in depth 
comparison of interstate and intrastate conflict can be made. According to the UCDP 
database, armed conflict can be defined as: 
 
“A contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, 
resulted in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 
Database 2010). 
 
Whereas interstate conflict is, as the name suggests, an “armed conflict [that] occurs between 
two or more states”, intrastate conflict is, “a conflict that occurs between a government and a 
non-government party, with no interference from other countries” (UCDP Database 2010). 
Internal conflict is in a way more violent and deadly then interstate wars. This is because the 
conduct of those involved in not monitored or constrained by international norms and laws of 
war. There are no specific rules on how a country is to act when it is at war with itself, as 
there is with interstate conflict. One of the main problems about internal conflict, and the way 
in which it is dealt with in the international system, is that there is a significant blurring of the 
lines between civilians and combatants. Civilians are not only the primary victims of internal 
violence, but also the main perpetrators. This affects the way in which wars are fought, how 
combatants are controlled and also how and if they can be held accountable under 
international laws of war (Alley 2001: 45). 
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Another difference is that parties involved in intrastate conflict are not as easily identifiable 
compared to those involved in interstate wars. Internal conflicts are often multi-dimensional, 
with many parties and many issues underlying the violence. This also makes these conflicts 
inherently harder to resolve. Because there are usually multiple parties involved, negotiating 
an agreement that satisfies all factions is extremely difficult. In the last 50 years more than 
twice as many interstate conflicts have ended in successful negotiated settlements as have 
internal conflicts (Hartzell 1999: 5). 
 
Characteristics  Interstate Conflict Intrastate Conflict  
Parties  Primary warring parties 
are state governments   
Conflict between a 
government and non-
government  party; inter-
group rivalry  
Issues  Power relations, border 
disputes, terrorism, 
resources  
Identity and ethnicity, 
Collective grievances, 
discrimination, type of 
government, economic 
distress, collapse of 
government, territory  
Duration 6 Months (on average) 5 years (on average)  
Perpetrators  Government forces  Government forces, rebel 
groups, militia forces, 
civilians   
Victims  Mostly military forces  Mostly civilians  
Table 3.1 Characteristics of Interstate versus Intrastate Conflict (UCDP database 2010; Yilmaz 2007; 
Collier 2007)  
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3.2b Prevalence of Internal Conflict: Causes and Consequences  
 
The question remains, why are some countries more susceptible to internal conflict and what 
are the main factors behind such outbreaks of violence? Internal conflict has become more 
and more prevalent since the end of the Cold War. They have replaced the Cold War‟s 
ideological clashes as the primary sources of current conflict (Yilmaz 2007: 12). Almost all 
major armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War have been internal conflicts; internal 
conflicts have made up over 80 percent of the wars and casualties since the end of the Second 
World War (David 1991: 553). These conflicts have been mostly situated in the developing 
countries. By 2007, economist Paul Collier noted that, “seventy-three percent of people in 
societies of the bottom billion have recently been through a civil war or are still in one” 
(Collier 2007: 17).  
 
Internal conflict tends to be more persistent then interstate conflicts. This is perhaps because 
this type of conflict is usually based on intractable ideals that cannot be resolved as easily by 
compromise. “The average international war lasts about six months. But the average civil war 
lasts more than ten times as long, even longer if they start off poor” (Collier 2007: 27). There 
is rarely a finite beginning or end to internal conflicts as the conflict usually builds slowly but 
the political destabilisation and negative impacts on society last long after the physical 
violence has ended (Alley 2001: 1).  
 
Internal conflicts cannot necessarily be defined as having only one main cause; rather it is the 
intersection of many variables and social triggers that will lead to the outbreak of violence. 
There are however, some significant factors which are evident in most internal conflicts. 
These are economic factors, usually a weak economy and the issues related to that such as 
poverty; issues to do with natural resources, whether it be an abundance of such or a 
shortage;  weak governance structures; and finally ethnicity, which, whether it was the cause 
of violence or not, is present in most internal conflicts.  
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There is a higher risk of violence breaking out in a country with a weak economy. This does 
not mean that all poor countries are overrun with war, but it is one factor that tilts the chances 
more towards possible internal violence (Collier 2007: 19). A weak economy leads to high 
levels of poverty and unemployment, which are significant causes of social grievances and 
unrest. Lack of development and economic stagnation can be the result of weak state 
institutions that do not have the capacity to help create a well-functioning and efficient 
economic sector. Many of these poor, underdeveloped countries rely on external assistance. 
But handouts do not foster self-reliance or sustainability. Lack of knowledge about economic 
growth and development coupled with the high probability of corrupt government institutions 
forces these countries into the poverty trap even further. All these factors increase the 
likelihood of violence (Misra 2008: 17-18). 
 
Another cause of internal conflict is natural resources. However, there are arguments for both 
sides as to whether natural resource fuelled violence is because of their scarcity or because of 
their abundance. Economists Paul Collier and Anne Hoeffler have done significant research 
into the link between resources and conflicts. They have found that countries that are 
dependent on natural resources are more prone to civil war (Le Billon 2005: 12). Disputes 
over ownership and revenue allocation are at the core of resource conflict but they are not the 
only factors. Other problems can include loss of local livelihood due to pollution or 
displacement, uneven employment opportunities, disruption of societal hierarchy structures 
and influx of outsiders into the resource rich region, leading to increased us versus them 
disparities, and in turn the escalation into violent conflict (Le Billon 2005: 25).  
 
When the government of a country is weak there is more chance of civil war, for those 
countries do not have the capacity to deal with unrest or the ability to control internal attacks. 
Weak governments promote internal war by tempting would-be rebels to challenge the 
regimes authority. Weak governments leave themself open to violence for those who wish to 
challenge the power structure believe that they have a high chance of success against weak 
governmental institutions (David 1991: 554). These countries have come to be known as 
„failed states‟ and are those that have had their governments break down completely. This 
gives other parties an opportunity to try and gain back some of the control or further destroy 
the already weak government structure; this is usually done through violent means (Snow 
1996: 100). Weak state structures can also lead people to be compelled to provide for their 
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own safety, as they can no longer rely on the state for protection. However in taking steps to 
defend themselves, they can be seen as a threatening the security of other groups. This is 
known as the security dilemma and is rife in internal war situations.  
A further cause of internal violence is ethnicity. This is, however, not usually the stand alone 
cause of conflict but is another factor that, when linked to aspects such as poverty, social 
uncertainly and a history of conflict, can act as the catalyst for social unrest (Misra 2008: 14). 
Lake and Rothchild (1998) believe that there are two main fears that ethnic groups have that 
could be the root causes behind ethnically fuelled violence. The first is the fear of 
assimilation into a dominant culture and hegemonic state. However, because of the strength 
of the dominant culture, conflict is unlikely because of the relative weakness of the fearful 
minority.  The other fear is for their personal safety and survival. When ethnic groups are 
evenly matched in a country and neither can absorb the other, insecurity emerges. This is 
because there can be increased competition between groups to gain dominance in society. If 
state structures are weak and lack the ability to arbitrate between the groups, this competition 
is, more often than not, likely to erupt into conflict. This competition is usually signified by 
the competition for resources between different ethnic factions (Lake and Rothchild 1998: 
8).Ethnic conflict is often triggered by elites in times of trouble who use ethnicity as a way of 
mobilising the people against other groups who may be threatening the position of the elites 
within society (Brown 1996: 18). Support may be gained by blaming a certain group in 
society for the problems their country may be experiencing.  
 
Although internal wars are, as the name suggests internal, they can have significant spill over 
effects that can have an impact on the international system. They can generate the movement 
of refugees that require assistance from humanitarian organisations, which is an expensive 
process. Refugees can also destabilise the greater region in which they are situated, which 
affects regional stability and can stimulate cross-border linkages with similar resistance 
organisations, which can in turn internationalise the conflict. As a result of internal violence 
people become displaced and often flee across borders in large numbers in search of some 
degree of security. Refugees impose a high economic burden on the host states and can be the 
source of further unrest in the places in which they seek refuge (Brown 1996: 3). Internal 
conflicts can also become internationalised as they may breed contempt in other countries 
who are suffering similar sorts of problems. Internal conflict in one country can act as a 
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catalyst for violence in other countries where people see themselves as political or ideological 
allies and believe their plight could to be resolved using the same means (Brown 1996: 8). 
 
Another significant consequence of internal conflict compared to interstate conflict is the 
extreme number of civilian that are involved in the violence. The nature of internal conflict 
means that civilians are now both the main perpetrators and victims of violence. People 
within internal conflict situations are being subjected to significant human rights abuses, 
many at the hands of their own government. The increased proliferation of small arms has 
been a significant factor in the increasing violence that is experienced in internal conflicts. 
The spread of small arms has meant that civilians are now more able to become directly 
involved in conflict (Dahal, Gazdar, Keethaponcalan and Murthy 2003: 19).  
 
Internal conflict weakens the state from the inside out. State institutions become so weak that 
the state can barley function, if at all. The economy usually collapses as a result, from both 
the overwhelming cost of war and the withdrawal of foreign investors and trade connections. 
Insecurity and corruption become ingrained in society as a result of people doing what they 
can do survive. With the state lacking virtually any ability to contain the violence, the 
security situation gets escalated further as each day passes.  The affects of internal conflict 
are felt throughout all levels of society. The next question to face is how such a situation can 
be remedied. Conflicts that have ravaged the lives of those within the state do not just get 
turned around over night. Conflict management in the aftermath of internal violence needs to 
combine a security focus with an emphasis on institutional reform and society wide 
reconciliation. Peacebuilding is such a process that endeavours to incorporate these factors 
into a long term focus aimed at establishing sustainable peace.  
 
3.3 Conflict in the Pacific 
 
Conflict in the Pacific region has been mostly internal conflict, much of which has taken 
place in the aftermath of decolonisation in the 1960s. The Pacific is a vast region which is a 
melting pot of different cultures, languages, peoples and traditions. While this diversity adds 
to the uniqueness of the region, it is also at the centre of much of the unrest that has been 
experienced by the people in the Pacific. 
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3.3a Overview of the Region  
 
The Pacific region is one of extremes. Although it is small in terms of population, with 
approximately eight million inhabitants, it is vast in terms of geographical size, spanning over 
30 million kilometres of ocean. There are 22 island countries and territories in the Pacific 
region, most of which are highly heterogeneous with hundreds of different languages and 
cultures. Generally, the Pacific region is usually divided into three broad ethnic groups; 
Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian (NZAID website 2010). 
 
Conflict in the Pacific Islands region usually eventuates from a range of different causes. In 
some cases the underlying cause may be straightforward and easily identifiable; in others it 
may be much more complex and intertwining with a range of conflict inducing aspects. From 
the literature, there is evidence that the causes of conflict can be divided into four main 
categories. These are economic factors, ethnic divisions, land and resource issues and good 
governance. By expanding on the causes of conflict in the region in general, the causes of 
specific conflicts become easier to identify when case studies are reviewed in more detail in 
later chapters.  
 
Location Parties  Conflict  
West Papua  Indonesian 
Government/OPM  
Independence struggle by 
West Papua, 1960s-ongoing  
Bougainville Papua New Guinea 
Government/Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA)  
Independence struggle by 
Bougainville, 1988-1998  
Fiji Fijian Government/ Fijian 
armed forces  
Ethnic conflict-multiple coup 
d‟états  
Solomon Islands IFM/MEF; Solomon Islands 
Government/MEF  
Ethnic conflict, territorial 
dispute, 1998-2003  
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Papua New Guinea Highland tribes  Tribal fighting between 
competing groups, ongoing  
Vanuatu Anglophone/Francophone 
groups 
Civil War, 1980-ongoing  
New Caledonia French security, local 
European settlers/indigenous 
Kanak population  
Ethnic conflict 
East Timor  Indonesian Government and 
armed forces/ Fretilin  
Independence struggle by 
East Timor, 1975-1998  
Table 3.2 Major Conflict in the Pacific Region (adapted from Henderson 2005 et al; Bercovitch, DeRouen 
and Wei 2009; Siegmund 2003)  
 
Intrastate conflicts are not fought with tanks and high powered weaponry, which is common 
in interstate war, but rather with small arms and light weapons (SALW). These weapons are 
relatively affordable and attainable, can be concealed easily and are simple to use and 
maintain. It has been suggested that small arms are responsible for as many as 90 percent of 
all casualties in contemporary armed conflicts.  The proliferation of small arms in the Pacific 
region has had a dire effect on the nature of internal conflict and general security in the 
Pacific. Arms left over from the Second World War are still being used in the region. The 
issue of disarmament has been evident in many peace agreements in the region but has often 
been a contentious provision in many states (Capie 2003: 15-17).  
 
Various terms have been applied to the Pacific region to try to explain the presence of 
conflict and perhaps offer some insight into how it should be approached. Many of these 
terms however, paint a bleak picture of the region, which is not altogether accurate when 
conflict is examined at more closely. Much of the academic literature on conflict in the 
Pacific refers to the presence of an “arc of instability”, “failed states” and even the 
“Africanisation” of the region.  While much of this is somewhat exaggerated or 
overemphasised, the region has been plagued with a substantial numbers of internal conflicts 
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since the end of the Second World War. This conflict, however, has been mainly confined to 
Melanesia (Spence and Wielders 2006: 8). The “arc of instability” refers to the chain of 
islands which extends from Indonesia right through Melanesia. This area is one of the most 
conflict prone regions in the world today. Every one of these nations in the arc is facing or 
has faced in the past some sort of unrest and, in most cases, violent armed conflict (Reilly 
2002: 11). However, putting this blanket generalisation on the region as being homogenously 
unstable is an artificial construct. It has been suggested by some scholars that the term 
vulnerability is more suitable then instability to describe the unrest in the region. Instability is 
too relative a concept, the need to qualify each state as having a certain degree of instability is 
a clearer representation rather than just grouping all states together for analysis (Rumley 
2006: 40-41). 
 
The nature of conflict in the Pacific has been regularly compared to other fragile and failing 
regions in the world. Perhaps most importantly is the comparison made with Africa. 
Benjamin Reilly made this correlation in his paper titled the Africanisation of the South 
Pacific. This article outlines the four inter-related criteria that have been associated with the 
failure of states in Africa and what Reilly believes is reflected in the same way in the Pacific. 
These are: 
 The growing tensions in the relationship between civil regimes and military forces; 
 The intermixture between ethnic identities and the competition of natural resources as 
factors driving conflicts 
 The weakness of basic institutions of governance such as prime ministers, parliaments 
and, especially, political parties; and 
 The increasing centrality of the state as a means of gaining wealth and of accessing 
and exploiting resources (Reilly 2000: 262-263).  
 
This comparison however, may be somewhat over-emphasised. Although the nature of 
conflict is similar between the two regions the scale and calibre of the violence is far from 
comparable.  The ill fit between modern systems of government and traditional forms of 
governance is a significant similarity however. Many countries in both the Pacific and Africa 
were colonised by the British, and the ill fit of the British system of governance has been 
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noticeable since decolonisation. The indigenous structures in these regions do not bode well 
with western concepts of leadership and government and this has been at the root of much of 
the unrest of the Pacific region especially.  
 
3.3b Causes of Conflict in the Pacific  
 
The main causes of internal conflict that were identified in the first section of this chapter are 
also evident as being behind much of the violence in the Pacific region. Ethnic clashes, issues 
over land and natural resource, economic factors and the ill fit between traditional systems 
and western notions of governance have all been factors which have underpinned internal 
conflict in the region. However, these causes cannot be looked at in a vacuum. Much of the 
conflict has various degrees of all these elements which have served as a catalyst for the 
violence. These causes will now be examined in the Pacific context.  
 
Ethnic Divisions 
“Ethnic identities are constricted when some people self-consciously distinguish themselves 
from others on the basis of perceived common decent, shared culture (including values, 
norms, goals, beliefs and language) or both” (Burnell and Randell 2008: 112).  
 
Ethnic divisions are a leading dimension in many Pacific conflicts. Whether it is the main 
cause or an underlying factor, it is one aspect that is extremely predominant throughout the 
conflicts in the region. The underlying catalyst for many ethnically fuelled conflicts relates 
back to the colonial era when national boundaries were carved out by colonial powers, with 
little or no respect for already established cultural and ethnic divisions (Henderson and 
Watson 2005: 10). This created artificially homogenous states with state institutions that have 
no salience with traditional ethnic structures and as a result there is no sense of national 
identity (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 15). Self-determination has been and 
continues to be a source of many of the violent clashes in the region. Border divisions have 
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fused islands that hold little allegiance to one another. The fight to break away is usually 
signified by violence as a sign of reluctance to grant independence and relinquish some of the 
majority share of power (Brown 2007: 25). 
 
Land Issues 
Land is also an important factor when examining causes of Pacific conflicts. This is mainly to 
do with the way land is viewed is terms of community and ownership in many Pacific Island 
cultures. Land holds a deep spiritual importance for people in the Pacific and it is usually 
communally owned, therefore the individual purchase or alienation of land is not allowed. 
This is what most land-based conflict stems from, when land rights and ownership are not 
respected. Land is at the centre of life for many people in the Pacific region. It is a source of 
livelihood and income, a sign of power and authority, and a source of security and identity. 
Conflict can occur when one of these aspects comes under threat, whether it be from central 
government, resource owners or foreign companies who might try and exploit the states 
resources for their own benefit, disregarding the local people altogether (Heijmans, 
Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 528). 
 
Natural Resources  
A subset of land issues is that of natural resources, or more specifically the exploitation of 
resources as a source of conflict. This is because natural resources, and the profit that is 
gained from their exploitation, gives people something of value to fight over. Mining has 
been and remains to be a contentious issue in the Pacific. Factors relating to the mining 
industry that have been the cause of conflict include “disputes over royalties and 
compensation for loss of land and other environmental impacts” (Henderson and Watson 
2005: 10). The way these natural resources are extracted can cause further tension in society 
because of the environmental degradation and devastation that extraction can cause 
(Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 528). Extraction of resources has been 
undertaken on many island nations in a haphazard fashion with little or no attention paid to 
future sustainability. The forestry industry is where this aspect is most visible. The forests 
belong to all the people but immense pressure is being put on locals by timber companies 
who want to extract this resource for their own benefit. These companies undertake 
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unsustainable deforestation techniques with no long-term commitment to the land or the 
people who own it and no interest in conservation for future generations (Heijmans, 
Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 89). This issue is summed up in a statement made by 
AusAID, “Economic growth in many parts of the region has come at the expense of the 
natural environment and has significantly impacted on the sustainability of the region‟s 
fragile resource base” (2004: 12).  
 
Economic Factors 
The transformation of a society‟s economy from traditional structures to modern fiscal 
systems brings with it the creation of uneven economic cleavages within society. This new 
economic competition creates winners and losers, with some of those on the losing side 
willing to resort to violence to gain some of the winner‟s benefits, such as access to natural or 
economic resources (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 17). Slow and stagnant 
development in many Pacific states is the cause of much of the poverty in the region, 
therefore it can be seen as of one the reasons why these societies turn to violence. Many of 
the states in the region are economically unstable and have experienced low or even negative 
economic growth rates. Of the 14 Pacific Islands Forum countries (excluding Australia and 
New Zealand), five are among the world least developed countries according to United 
Nations indicators. They are Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu (Peebles 
2005: 15).  Most states in the region are also heavily reliant upon a relatively small pool of 
donor countries for development assistance (Rumley 2006: 44). Violence can be seen as a 
way to get something one does not have; to shift the balance of power in ones favour so they 
can gain certain benefits they have not had in the past.   
 
There is a significant correlation between population growth and economic development in 
the Pacific region. As a result of increases in life expectancy and fertility rates and decreases 
in infant mortality rates, population growth is increasing at around three percent per annum. 
While this is a positive indicator, it is well ahead of economic growth in the formal sector. 
The weak economies of most islands states cannot support this acceleration in population.  
One of the most significant effects of this population growth is the urban drift that it has 
caused people, mostly youths, to move to urban centres looking for work. Economies are 
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struggling to expand sufficiently to support this influx of people to urban centres. Youth 
unemployment is also high in many urban areas in the Pacific. Many who move cannot find 
work. As a result crimes rates are also increasing in these places. It is these unemployed 
youths who are a common target for those pursuing political unrest (Brown 2007: 20). 
 
Good Governance  
Good governance is defined by the Pacific Islands Forum in the 2000 Biketawa Declaration 
as the “practice of open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative, fair and 
equitable government.” Governance generally focuses on four main areas; legitimacy, 
accountability, respect and competence. The meaning and establishment of these ideals tends 
to differ between Western and traditional Pacific societies. This is when governance becomes 
a cause of conflict (Henderson 2006: 11-12). International aid agencies promote good 
governance as a condition for continued support. “A major focus of the governance aid is to 
counter corruption and promote accountable government. The adoption or blending of 
Western forms of government has worked better for some island states than others” 
(Henderson and Watson 2005: 10). Conflicts highlight the poor fit between Western forms of 
governance, which have been imposed on many Pacific states as a result of colonisation, and 
traditional systems of authority and culturally based hierarchical structures (Henderson and 
Watson 2005: 21). Many Pacific communities still have an allegiance to their tribe or 
community group, so the idea of a national authority run by centralised state based 
institutions can seem a somewhat foreign concept in the Pacific. The problem dates back to 
the end of the colonial era, when the belief and expectation was that traditional allegiance 
would wither away in the face of modernisation and would be replaced with new societal 
structures such as class interests. This however, was the reverse; imposed modernisation led 
to a strengthening of ethnic, linguistic and group bonds and has become a basis for mobilising 
support (Reilly 2002: 12). Many Pacific conflicts reflect the turbulent nature of this 
relationship. It is because of the fractious relationship between tribal structures and state 
authority, combined with the short lifespan of these newly independent states, that there are 
no mechanisms in place for dealing with social and political tensions before they erupt into 
violent conflict (Brown 2007: 3, 8).  
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Independence wasn‟t gained by most states until the 1970‟s. This makes these countries very 
young on the international stage. Independence, while much sought after, can be seen as a 
double-edged sword, for many countries did not have the capacity to take over the state 
institutions that had been created and administered by colonial powers (Brown 2007: 17). The 
Westminster form of government is prevalent in most of Polynesia and Melanesia. There 
have been many difficulties in implementing this system of governance in Pacific societies. 
Since transplanting the Westminster system into the Pacific, there has arisen the criticism that 
by creating a clear division between those in power and those in the opposition, internal 
divisions along racial and ethnic lines are further exacerbated. This approach to government 
also clashes with the traditional consensus based decision-making structures of many Pacific 
Island states (Henderson 2006: 15). 
 
As has been covered above, conflicts in the Pacific region are mostly based around 
intractable issues. It is because of the very nature of conflict in the region that makes 
peacebuilding an appropriate approach to try. Peacebuildings aim is to go beyond just the 
need to improve security in the post conflict phase. Those involved in the process aim to pay 
ongoing attention to working through the underlying causes of violence and work towards a 
mutually beneficial solution that meets the needs of all parties involved. By taking a gradual 
and inclusive approach to building peace past grievances can begin to be reconciled. By 
changing the relationship between the parties to one based around peace and not violence 
society can begin to be reformed and rehabilitated.  
 
3.4 Conflict Resolution in the Pacific Region 
 
There are various players who have been involved in conflict resolution and post-conflict 
rehabilitation in the Pacific. However, there are three main actors who have had the most 
influence and input in this region in the area of peace and security. They are the Pacific 
Islands Forum (PIF), Australia and New Zealand.  Their involvement has come in the various 
forms such as aid, facilitation of peace talks, peacekeeping, peace monitoring and other 
conflict management activities. The extensive involvement of these actors is due mainly to 
the geographical proximity and ongoing engagement in the region. The need to maintain 
regional security and stability is a top priority for these actors. Additional to the involvement 
52 
 
of these regional actors has been the contribution made to conflict resolution in the region by 
other international actors such as the United Nations and the European Union and other 
nations such as China. These actors have also employed a range of conflict management 
techniques in an attempt to stabilise various conflicts in the Pacific region.  
 
3.4a Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)  
 
The Pacific Islands Forum has increasingly addressed security and conflict issues in the 
region since it was formed in August 1971.  The Pacific Islands Forum is made up of 16 
independent or self-governing states, with three observers, one special observer and 13 
dialogue partners
1
. It is a means for Pacific leaders to meet and deal with issues in the region 
along with developing strategies for the region to maintain stability. There are no formal 
procedural guidelines for the Forum; however, decisions are usually made by consensus. 
Australia and New Zealand are the main contributors to the annual budget of the Forum, 
paying one third each of the budget, while Pacific Island members collectively make up the 
other third (Boxall 2006: 20). 
 
Two of the initial efforts of the PIF to become involved in conflict resolution in the Pacific 
were both turned down. In the aftermath of the 1987 coup in Fiji, the Forum offered to send a 
mission to Fiji that would help facilitate talks between the parties that were involved. This 
offer, however, was declined by the Governor General of Fiji. The PIF had the same response 
in 1992 when it offered to send a mission to Bougainville. The Papua New Guinea 
government announced that it was an internal problem and accepting their help would 
legitimise the claims of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, so, therefore, their offer to 
intervene was once again denied (Urwin 2005: 14). The PIF began to become more involved 
in the resolution of Pacific conflict from 2000 onwards. Its support was instrumental in the 
creation and allowance of RAMSI to intervene in the Solomon Islands.  
                                                     
1
 Members: Australia; Cook Islands; Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; 
New Zealand; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu.. Observers:  
French Polynesia (2004); New Caledonia (1999); Tokelau (2005). Special Observer: Timor Leste (2002). 
Dialogue Partners: Canada; PRC; EU; France; Indonesia; India; Malaysia; Japan; Philippines; Korea; 
Thailand; UK; US.  
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The PIF has drawn up various agreements relating to conflict and security in the region. 
These include the 1992 Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation; the 1997 
Aitautaki Declaration of Regional Security and Cooperation; and, perhaps most significantly, 
the 2000 Biketawa Declaration. While the PIF has had some success in this area there have 
been concerns raised over the slow implementation of regional security policies and lack of 
capacity of some Forum nations to meet the provisions of these declaration (Heijmans, 
Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 531-532). 
 
Biketawa Declaration 
The Biketawa Declaration was signed by Forum leaders in Biketawa, Kiribati in 2000. It is a 
regional security framework that builds upon past agreements that have been implemented in 
the region. Its key features include “its commitment to upholding democratic processes and 
good governance, its recognition of indigenous rights and cultural values and the process for 
addressing crises in the region” (Pacific Islands Forum 2009). The Biketawa Declaration 
outlines the importance of regional cooperation amongst its member countries when conflicts 
arise in the region. It also makes a commitment to the reduction and resolution of all conflicts 
in the region and the use of customary practices as a way in which this can be achieved. This 
Declaration highlighted the recognition by Forum leaders of “the need in time of crisis or in 
response to members‟ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all 
members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family” (2000: 1). The 
Biketawa Declaration did, however, run into strong opposition, especially from Fiji. They 
believed that under this new agreement they would be singled out and face further sanctions 
as a result of the 2000 coup (Bryant-Tokalau and Frazer 2006: 19). The Biketawa Declaration 
has been invoked twice since its creation, both times in relation to the Solomon Islands 
conflict. The first time was in 2001 when it was used to explore a possible role for the Forum 
in ending the conflict and secondly in 2003 when it was used to legitimise the intervention of 
RAMSI (Henderson and Watson 2005: 17). 
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3.4b Australia and New Zealand 
 
Though many other counties have been involved, Australia and New Zealand have been, and 
remain to be, the leading powers involved in conflict resolution in the Pacific region. Because 
of their significantly overlapping interest in the region the relationship between Australia and 
New Zealand in the Pacific is one of cooperation, consultation and coordination (Seed in 
Henderson et al: 136). Over time Australia has maintained more of a focus in Melanesia 
while New Zealand‟s attention has been focused more on Polynesia. Both have also 
maintained close links with their former colonial territories in the region, Papua New Guinea 
and Nauru in the case of Australia and Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau for New 
Zealand (McDougall in Henderson et al: 128).  
 
Australia and New Zealand have both maintained important development assistance 
programs in the region and, because of their size and resources, are both significant actors 
within the Pacific Islands Forum. Both countries have strived to maintain stability in the 
Pacific, with a particular focus and emphasis on sustainable development and political 
democracy. For New Zealand the Pacific region is more central to its foreign policy than it is 
perhaps for Australia. New Zealand sees itself as a Pacific nation and places itself within the 
region, whereas Australia is more likely to see itself as a bordering power rather than a 
Pacific country and its assistance in the region is based more on security concerns due to its 
geographical proximity to the Pacific (McDougall in Henderson et al: 128-134).  
 
New Zealand‟s main contribution to conflict resolution in the Pacific was the role it played in 
bringing peace to Bougainville. While earlier efforts, such as the Endeavour Accords, failed, 
the facilitation of talks between Bouaginvillean representatives and those from Papua New 
Guinea at Burnham in 1997 were instrumental in bringing an end to the conflict and have 
shaped how conflict resolution is viewed in the region. New Zealand is a key actor in the 
region. Unlike Australia, New Zealand has maintained a constant presence in the region 
(Peebles 2005: 54). Conflict resolution and intervention by the Australian government in the 
Pacific is best demonstrated by RAMSI. RAMSI marked a turning point in Australian foreign 
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policy. This mission signalled a move from what had been a generally hands-off policy to one 
that focused on cooperative intervention. Before RAMSI, Australia had been reluctant to 
intervene in the region for fear of being perceived as acting in a neo-colonial manner. 
Australia‟s involvement in the region was restricted mostly to the provision of bilateral aid 
(Brown 2007: 20). The Solomon Islands, however, posed a threat that was deemed too close 
to home. Any spill over effects would have had dire consequences for Australia because of its 
geographical proximity (Dinnen 2008: 51). While RAMSI has made inroads in resolving the 
situation in the Solomon Islands it has also received criticism that it is too Australian-centric 
in its approach, rather than being a regional force as it should be.  
 
3.4c International Organisations  
 
Various International Organisations (IO‟s) have also played a role in conflict resolution in the 
Pacific region. Two significant IO‟s that are involved in the region are the United Nations 
and the European Union.  The United Nations has taken on an important role in various 
conflicts in the region, including East Timor, Fiji and Bougainville. The UN has a significant 
involvement in East Timor. The first step in their involvement was their role in monitoring 
the referendum vote for independence in 1999. It was after this election turned violent that 
the UN intervened and undertook an extensive process of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in 
East Timor. They played an important role in controlling violence and re-establishing law and 
order throughout the state. This intervention, which is being covered in more depth in 
Chapter Four, has hoverer been criticised as having a general lack of engagement with and 
inclusion of the local people in the post-conflict process.  The United Nations become 
involved in Fiji in the aftermath of the 2006 coup. They tried to engage in dialogue with coup 
leader Commodore Bainimarama, although these attempts proved to be less then fruitful. Due 
to this breakdown in relations and the actions taken by Bainimarama, there has been a virtual 
freeze on Fiji‟s participation in the UN and subsequent UN missions. The UN also played an 
important role in Bougainville where they were involved in peace monitoring and provided 
general support for the peace process. They were also significant in terms of the weapons 
disposal program, which will be covered in more detail in Chapter Five (Wainwright 2010: 
13-14).  
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The European Union also has maintained an ongoing link with the Pacific region. France still 
retains three territories in the region (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and 
Futuna). This link is also maintained by the United Kingdom as a result of old colonial ties. 
Their influence is enacted through not only the EU, but also the Commonwealth as a member 
of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and as a PIF Dialogue partner. The EU‟s conflict 
resolution focus comes mainly in the form of development assistance through the European 
Development Fund, but the EU have also been involved in broader political dialogue as a 
way of approaching peace and development issues in the region (Siegmund 2003: 5).  
 
New Zealand, Australia and the United Nation have been the leading forces when it comes to 
peacebuilding in the region. New Zealand‟s approach to conflict management tends to stem 
from the need to create good relationships between the parties before any other steps can be 
taken forward in building peace in society. Their intervention in the Bougainville conflict has 
set a precedent for how Pacific conflicts should be approached and how rehabilitation and 
reconciliation in the region needs to follow a specific format, the idea of the Pacific Way, if it 
is going to be acceptable to the local people. Australia and the United Nations have 
encountered some problems in their attempts to undertake peacebuilding activities in the 
Pacific, most of which stem from a lack of engagement with local customs and communities. 
These downfalls are going to be discussed in subsequent chapters.  
 
In the book Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific author Nic Maclellan identifies certain 
common aspects that he believes will make or break a peace process in this region. They are: 
 “The importance of operating at a range of levels: from community to national, from 
regional to international  
 The importance of time: allowing people to meet, consult and decide at their own 
pace 
 The often undervalued Pacific tradition of consensus; talking together; the power of 
the spoken word, shame, and personal pledges and commitment 
 The need to engage a range of players: not just government officials, soldiers and 
leaders of armed militias, but a full range of civil society, church, and customary 
leaders  
 The key role of women‟s groups, church leaders and customary authorities in 
catalysing grassroots consultation, disarmament and reconciliation initiatives 
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 The catalysing effect of outside groups: whether through lobbying and advocacy by 
solidarity and human rights groups or the provision of resources and meeting spaces 
by outside governments and neutral brokers” (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 
2004: 531).  
 
The criteria mentioned provide an important insight into the various aspects that need the 
most attention during conflict resolution activities in the Pacific region. It also demonstrates 
the importance of creating a culturally acceptable approach to peace and the inclusion of all 
levels of society. This provides a good starting point for the case study analysis of 
peacebuilding in the region and can provide an indicator as to why some cases have been 
more successful than others due to the approach that has be taken by the various intervening 
parties.  
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
Internal conflict is becoming more and more prevalent worldwide. Its increase not only 
threatens the countries where it is being experienced but also the wider region in which that 
country is situated. Internal conflict is having a greatly destabilising effect in the Pacific 
region. Many countries in the region have been plagued by unrest, much of which has been 
stimulated by the transition to independence. These conflicts have caused widespread 
devastation in the region.  
 
Three cases of conflict in the region are now going to be examined in more detail. They are 
East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands. The causes of each are going to be 
identified and efforts that have been taken to resolve them will be outlined. This will lead on 
to the final investigation into the overall success of these missions in building long term 
peace in these societies.  
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Chapter Four 
The Policy of Peacebuilding in East Timor 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The conflict in East Timor was the result of the fight by the East Timorese people to gain 
independence from Indonesia. While East Timor was initially under Portuguese authority, the 
Indonesian government proceeded to invade the province in late 1975 where it remained 
under their occupation for 24 years. During this time the people of East Timor suffered 
tremendously, with an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 lives lost (Heijmans, Simmonds and van 
de Veen 2004: 348; CIA World Factbook 2010). This devastation looked as if it was coming 
to an end in 1999 when Indonesia, with the assistance of the United Nations,  announced that 
a referendum would take place so the people of East Timor could vote on whether they 
wanted independence from Indonesia or not. Indonesia promised the United Nations that they 
would respect the decision that was reached by the referendum. However, after the vote, 
which was in majority favour of independence, they reneged on this promise and the 
Indonesian military invaded the country once again. In response to this renewed violence, the 
United Nations intervened and began a peacebuilding campaign in East Timor.  
 
This aim of this chapter is to outline the peacebuilding activities that were undertaken by the 
various United Nations missions that intervened in East Timor after the 1999 vote for 
independence and examines how successful the peacebuilding process has been in East 
Timor. While the theory of peacebuilding, which has already been outlined in Chapter Two, 
may seem straight forward, in reality peacebuilding missions do not always go as smoothly as 
anticipated. Peacebuilding in East Timor was less than successful due to a general lack of 
engagement with the local community.  This chapter will aim to link up the ideas about 
peacebuilding and internal conflict that have already been covered in the first few chapters 
and use these ideas to analyse the level of success of the United Nations peacebuilding 
mission in East Timor.  
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4.2 Causes of the Conflict  
 
The fight for self-determination in East Timor was pushed forward significantly by the 
overthrow of the fascist Salazar regime in Portugal in 1974. This broke down the barriers 
against political participation and led to the establishment of several political parties in East 
Timor. The main parties that emerged were the right wing Union for Democratic Timor 
(UDT) and the more liberal Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin). 
Initially the political aims of these parties were not radically different but Indonesian 
authorities needed the support of the party that was more closely aligned with their agenda, 
which was UDT. They conspired against Fretilin by spreading false intelligence about 
possible Fretilin plans for a coup (Kingsbury 2000: 18). As a precautionary act against this 
threat, the UDT aligned itself with the Indonesian authorities and launched a pre-emptive 
strike against Fretilin (Robie 1999: 104). 
 
Civil war erupted between the factions that wanted independence and those that wanted to 
integrate with Indonesia. UDT forces, which supported integration with Indonesia, launched a 
coup in Dili, East Timor‟s capital. Fretilin, who were adamantly against Indonesina rule, 
fought back and managed to defeat UDT forces gaining almost complete control of the 
territory (Robie 1999: 104). It was during the initial stages of this civil war that Fretilin 
established an armed branch called Falintil (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East 
Timor) (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 17). The violence began to escalate and Portugal 
withdrew, leaving East Timor open to invasion. In November of 1975, the Democratic 
Republic of East Timor was established (Robie 1999: 104). Indonesia was losing the battle so 
launched an assault just over a week later. It intervened with over 10,000 Indonesia troops 
and annexed East Timor (Paris 2004: 218). Before this time Indonesia had never tried to lay 
claim to East Timor or ever challenge the legitimacy of Portuguese rule over the territory 
(Robie 1999: 104). It is estimated that over 60,000 people were killed in initial two months of 
the invasion. Tens of thousands of East Timorese fled from their houses into the mountains, 
which were Fretilin territory (Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 18). 
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4.2a Santa Cruz Massacre  
 
Indonesian rule of East Timor was dominated by the military, with all levels of the 
administration involving army personnel. The regime was characterised by brutality and 
repression, with little or no respect paid to East Timorese culture or traditions (Robie 1999: 
105). One event that epitomises the violent and domineering rule of Indonesia in East Timor 
is known as the Santa Cruz Massacre, which took place in November 1991. Indonesian 
soldiers opened fire at close range on a peaceful protest at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. 
The protestors had gathered to mourn the loss of a student who had been killed just days 
before by Indonesian military forces (Kingsbury 2000: 23-24). Sebastio Gomes had been 
killed during an attack on the Motael Church, which had become a refuge for a number of 
political activists. The peaceful procession, which began after an early morning memorial 
service for Gomes, was estimated to have had nearly 4000 unarmed participants. During the 
procession a plain clothed army major and private were reportedly injured by some of the 
protesters. This spurred a violent response from the Indonesian forces, who later used this as 
the justification for the murder of hundreds of East Timorese (Inbaraj 1995: 88). Due to an 
increase in openness of the borders by President Surharto in the late 1980s, there were now 
international media present in the country. There were foreign reporters present at the Santa 
Cruz cemetery. They were able to capture the whole attack on film and broadcast it 
internationally. This provided a turning point in international opinion and support because it 
turned the media spot light on to the grim realities of the Indonesian occupation in East Timor 
(Tanter, Selden and Shalom 2001: 22). The situation in East Timor was transformed from an 
internal problem, which had long been ignored by the international community, to major 
international news, which heralded attention from all around the word (Inbaraj 1995: 88). 
 
One of the driving forces behind the East Timorese independence movement was Xanana 
Gusmao. He was a Fretilin supporter and, because of his previous military training in the 
national service, became the commander of Falintil. The Indonesian authorities followed his 
support of the movement and in 1992 he was captured in Dili and arrested. Xanana Gusmao 
was sentenced to life imprisonment. This, however, only fuelled the movement and by 1993 
he had taken up leadership from inside prison. His imprisonment also opened him up to 
greater international support. He received visits from top international figures, such as Nelson 
61 
 
Mandela, and also international organisations like the United Nations (Tanter, Selden and 
Shalom 2001: 18, 22-23). 
 
By the 1990s, the UDT and Fretilin had begun to work together towards a mutually supported 
goal; the goal of independence. A united effort was needed. This came into fruition through 
the establishment of the Council for Timorese National Resistance (CNRT) in 1997. This 
council became the main driving force behind the fight for independence (Kingsbury 2000: 
25). 
 
The struggle for independence took a turn for the better in 1998, with the instillation of the 
new Indonesian President BJ Habibie after Surharto‟s resignation. Although his initial stance 
was one against East Timorese independence, he was willing to open up for discussion the 
possibility of granting special autonomy to the region. In early 1999, however, he announced 
that a referendum on independence was to take place, to give the East Timorese the chance to 
decide their own future (Kingsbury 2000: 260. In response to this Xanana called for a 
ceasefire and disarmament and reduction of troops. The CNRT and Falintil abstained from 
violence as a show of support and dedication to the voting process, maintaining the moral 
high ground and encouraging compromise and tolerance with Indonesia (Tanter, Selden and 
Shalom 2001: 24-25). In May 1999, Indonesia and Portugal formally allowed the United 
Nations to come into the country and monitor the referendum. Indonesia had to accept that if 
the referendum concluded with the call for separation by the East Timorese people then these 
results would be respected (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 349). The election 
monitoring mission was known as the United Nation Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). The 
mission was set to take five months and began in early June, 1999. The main tasks of 
UNAMET were to “register voters, prepare and authenticate electoral roles and facilitate 
eligible voters to secretly cast their preferences”. The mission concluded with the undertaking 
to the vote on the 30
th
 of August 1999 (Smith 2003: 18). 
 
History was made on August 30
th
 1999 when, with a monumental voter turnout of 98 percent, 
78.5 percent of the East Timorese voted for a transition to independence and a separation 
from Indonesia. Indonesia, however, backtracked on its promise to allow the move to 
independence. The Indonesian military and supportive militia undertook a bloody campaign 
against East Timor, where countless civilians were subjected to rape, torture and 
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approximately 1,400 people lost their lives (CIA World Factbook 2010). In the following 
weeks the military and militia forces destroyed the majority of buildings in East Timor, 
infrastructure crumbled under the violence and up to 75 percent of the population was 
displaced as a result. By late 1999, the United Nations was authorised to intervene to try to 
take control of the situation that had become out of hand (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de 
Veen 2004: 349-350).  
 
4.3 Conflict Summary 
Conflict Type  Internal armed conflict 
Incompatibility  Territory, Self-determination  
Duration 1975-1999 
Parties in conflict Indonesian Government, Indonesian Militia, 
Fretilin  
External Intervention INTERFET  
Conflict Resolution Attempts  N/A 
UN Involvement  UNAMET, UNTAET  
Peace Agreements  Agreements Regarding the Modalities for the 
Popular Consultation of the East Timorese 
through a Direct Ballot  1999 
East Timor Popular Consultation Agreement 
Regarding Security 1999  
Various UN Security Council Resolution 
1999-onwards  
Fatalities  Estimated 100,000-250,000 deaths  
Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons  Estimated 100,000 (UNDP 2007)  
Table 4.1 Conflict Summary: East Timor (UCDP Database 2010; CIA World Factbook 2010)  
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4.4 Peacebuilding in East Timor 
 
A peacebuilding approach was appropriate because in the aftermath of the conflict it was not 
just the matter of the violence that needed to be dealt with, but a greater focus on the need to 
rebuild and rehabilitate society from the ground up. Due to the nature of the conflict and the 
parties involved external intervention was needed because of lack of local capacity in terms 
of both resources and state-building expertise. Post-conflict peacebuilding in East Timor was 
characterised by an overwhelming concentration of international intervention. The 
international community poured vast resources, both in terms of funds and time, into the 
reconstruction of East Timor. Although, in theory, this cannot be seen as being negative, in 
reality it left a country with limited ownership of the process and little knowledge of what to 
do after the help had withdrawn (Call 2008: 272). The United Nations were the main 
international actors during the peacebuilding process in East Timor. Their intervention can be 
broken down into three distinct phases. The first phase of its intervention was their 
administration of the independence vote in 1999 (UNAMET), the second was the restoration 
and maintenance of security by the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), and the 
third was the work done to prepare the East Timorese for independence, which was 
undertaken by UNTAET (Smith 2003: 18). 
 
4.4a After the Vote of Independence 
 
The policy of peacebuilding was officially begun as soon as the United Nations intervened in 
the aftermath of the vote for East Timorese independence in late 1999. The United Nations 
authorised the intervention of an Australian-led military force whose main aim was to restore 
law and order in East Timor. This force was known as INTERFET and was a multinational 
force whose role was to restore and maintain security until the United Nations could properly 
assemble a peacekeeping force. INTERFET was made up of forces from 22 contributing 
nations and at its peak included around 11,000 personnel. INTERFET remained in operation 
for five months, until UNTAET was established at the end of October 1999 (Smith 2003: 19).  
Although INTERFET‟s main task of restoring law and order in East Timor was eventually 
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achieved, it was undertaken somewhat too late for much of the physical infrastructure, civil 
administration and judicial systems had already been thoroughly destroyed (Paris 2004: 218). 
 
In September 1999, Indonesia handed over control of East Timor to the United Nations. The 
peacebuilding operation, authorised by the Security Council, was to be known as the United 
Nations Transitional Authority of East Timor (UNTAET) and was under the direction of 
Special Representative of the Secretary General, Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil (Smith 
2003: 59). UNTAET, which took control in October 1999, was to “assume overall 
responsibility for the administration of East Timor and to exercise all legislative and 
executive authority, including the administration of justice” (Paris 2004: 218). UNTAET was 
a much larger force then its previous counterparts in East Timor. It had a broadly defined 
mandate of “preparing East Timor for sustainable independence” (Smith 2003: 19). UNTAET 
assumed authority over East Timor up until May 2002.  
 
4.4b Security Sector Reforms  
 
INTERFET were tasked with ending violence in the initial stages after the independence 
vote. Their main focus was on the restoration of law and order in East Timor. INTERFET‟s 
initial task was to secure Dili first and then to move out into other regional centres, until the 
entire territory had been secured.  This process, under the command of Major General Peter 
Cosgrove from Australia, was undertaken at a calculated rate. Although Cosgrove was 
criticised for taking an exceedingly cautious approach, moving too quickly would have 
increased the risk of further destabilisation in the regions.  When INTERFET arrived in East 
Timor, their presence prompted the militia to flee to West Timor. This made the initial 
security situation very different from in other conflict zones for the risk of renewed conflict 
was greatly reduced for the potential resistance forces had fled the country. Disarmament was 
not a significant issue in East Timor. None of those involved in the conflict possessed heavy 
weapons. What weapons the militia did have, they took when they fled into West Timor and 
INTERFET confiscated all other weapons in East Timor (Call 2008: 47-50). UNTAET‟s 
military component, which consisted of around 8,000 personnel, replaced INTERFET in 
early 2000 and continued to maintain security in East Timor (Smith 2003: 62). 
65 
 
 
In post-independence East Timor, international attention paid to local security forces quickly 
diminished over time. Once Indonesian troops withdrew from East Timor there was thought 
to be no immediate threats to security. Since threats to security remained low they were not 
on the agenda of most international donors. UNTAET‟s mandate did not include any 
reference to security sector reform or how to deal with the East Timorese resistance force, 
Falintil.  
 
Army 
Unlike in other peacebuilding situation, where resistance forces have been absorbed as the 
national armed forces, Falintil did not automatically become the national army. There was 
some debate over whether East Timor needed a national army at all. But there was wide 
support for the establishment of such a force and the Timorese leadership would only agree to 
demobilise Falintil if this came into fruition. The new national force was formed on February 
1
st
 2001 and was known as Falintil-Forcas de Defensa de Timor Leste (F-FDTL); 650 of the 
new F-FDTL troops were previous members of Falintil (Call 2008: 292-293). Since its 
establishment, however, the F-FDTL has remained a source of contention and threat against 
the government. The reality is that the force is too small to really be effective against the 
main possible aggressor, Indonesia, but is too large and expensive a force for a small state 
such as East Timor (Kingsbury and Leach 2007: 24). 
 
Police 
In 2000 a Timorese police force was hastily created by UNTAET. It was known as the 
Policia National de Timor-Leste (PNTL). The mode is which this was done, however, has 
many weak points. The UN training approach lacked cohesion with the UN police having 
members from over 40 different countries. They did not share a common language with the 
Timorese people or have any specialised knowledge of Timorese law. The UN model made 
no attempt to incorporate a Timorese identity into its structure, which made for a weak and 
disjointed organisation (Call 2008: 294). 
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Security in East Timor, or Timor-Leste as it was then known as, was threatened in April of 
2006 when a military strike led to the outbreak of violence and the near collapse of law and 
order in the country. At the request of authorities in Dili, an Australian-led International 
Stabilization Force (ISF) was deployed to Timor-Leste in late May. The UN also reacted to 
this renewed violence and established the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), 
which included over 1600 police personnel. The ISF and UNMIT managed to restore stability 
in Timor-Leste, allowing for presidential and parliamentary elections to take place in 2007 in 
a largely peaceful environment (CIA World Factbook 2010).  
 
4.4c Trust and Confidence Building Measures 
 
There was minimal effort made on the part of UNTAET to form a strong working 
relationship with the Timorese people or a bond with Timorese society. The main concern in 
the post-independence phase was the need to totally rebuild and redefine a national identity 
and create a common sense of political interest among the people of East Timor. The idea of 
nationhood was not properly fostered in the early stages of post-war rehabilitation. There had 
been no planning regarding the way in which UNTAET would work in partnership with the 
East Timorese.  
 
One way in which the society was further divided, instead of draw together, was the decision 
to implement Portuguese as the official language in East Timor. This decision was a 
reflection of the interests of those who held the power in the new government. Portuguese 
was used by the country‟s elites but was little understood by the common majority of East 
Timor. This further divided an already fractious new state, and installed little trust of the 
people in the government (Kingsbury 2000: 23). 
 
4.4d Governmental Reform 
 
The main focus of UNTAET was to act as an interim administration therefore governmental 
reforms gained the most attention in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase. In the haste to 
67 
 
create new state institutions, little attention was paid to Timorese society. Ready-made 
institutions were created and then handed over to the Timorese people who had very limited 
input into there formation. UNTAET used its own model of state building and never really 
attempted to include existing social structures such as kinship networks. If this approach had 
been taken there may have been a more fluid transition from UN administration to Timorese 
rule, rather than the disjointed nature of society that now exists (Call 2008: 272). 
 
This phase of UNTAET‟s mission was known as Governance and Public Administration 
(GPA). The aims of this phase were to re-establish governance at both the central and district 
levels, to restore public and social utilities and to encourage and regulate investment in the 
private sector. UNTAET faced significant challenges when trying to implement this phase, 
including creating a sustainable budget, developing an experienced staff base and gaining the 
confidence and trust of the East Timorese people. This aspect of the mission was accused of 
been too Dili-centric, with too much focus being on establishing governance in the capital 
and little attention being paid to other districts. The GPA was later replaced by the East 
Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA). The ETTA had a greater focus on preparing the 
East Timorese for self-government, by giving the people direct experience in government. 
This shift in focus helped to improve the partnership between the UN and the East Timorese 
(Smith 2003: 63-65).There was a need to create a joint decision making body to ease the 
transition from UNTAET. The initial transition from a UN dominated administration to a 
local administrative body came in the form of the National Consultative Council (NCC) and 
its successor, the National Council. The NCC was created in early December 1999 with 11 
Timorese members and four UNTAET representatives. This body was replaced by the 
National Council on 23 October 2000 by a 36-member council made up of all Timorese 
members (Kingsbury 2000: 35). 
 
Elections are an important aspect of any peacebuilding mission but they can also be the cause 
of disagreement within society, as was the case in East Timor. The CNRT was dissolved on 9 
June 2001 to allow parties to contest the election. One problem that was faced in the lead up 
to the first elections was the dominance of the Fretilin party. UNTAET tried to encourage the 
people of East Timor to adopt a mixed voting system with proportional representation, to try 
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and spread the votes across some of the smaller parties as well. In the end, however, Fretilin 
did eventually win an overwhelming majority and gained 55 of the 88 seats in government. 
The first Presidential elections were held on 14 April 2002. Independence leader Xanana 
Gusmao won the elections with an overwhelming majority of the votes. It was after this 
election that independence was officially declared in East Timor on 20 May 2002 and 
UNTAET was replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), which 
remained until 2004 (Chesterman 2004: 141, 231). 
 
The creation of a workable Constitution was a significant step towards sustainable 
independence for East Timor. The main features of the new Constitution, which was 
implemented with some international help, are respect for the rule of law, democracy and 
human rights. The human rights section was a necessary addition in light of all that had 
happened in East Timor in the past. The Constitution was drafted with the aid of popular 
participation. Commissions were established throughout the country to consult with the 
people. Input was welcomed and received by many. Sometimes this input came from 
individuals but mostly it came from civil society organisations, particularly the Catholic 
Church (Hill and Menzel 2008: 71, 75).  
 
4.4e Judicial Reform 
 
Judicial reform remains the weakest aspect of the peacebuilding process in East Timor. There 
was a general lack of cohesion between UNTAET‟s judicial policy and existing customary 
law. As with many other aspects of UNTAET reform, there was no effort made to incorporate 
and include existing local judicial practices with the new UN-initiated judicial reforms (Call 
2008: 287). 
 
Reforms that were undertaken were unrealistic from the beginning, with most of the trouble 
centring on the overall lack of judicial expertise amongst the East Timorese people. The 
transitional administration chose to install Timorese judges, prosecutors and public defenders. 
At the time of independence there were only 60 Timorese people who had law degrees, most 
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with very limited work experience, and none having ever served as a judge. After a short 
training period by UNTAET, the first Timorese Judges were installed in early 2000. The lack 
of experience in such a specialised and significant field was only too obvious. By 2002 there 
was a formidable backlog in the justice system, with any decision that were made being of 
varied quality (Call 2008: 287). Indonesian Law was re-instated in the judicial sector, 
however it did undergo certain modifications to ensure that it complied with UN conventions 
on human rights (Smith 2003: 82). 
 
The implementation of Portuguese as the official language had serious repercussions in the 
judicial sector. Many of the judiciary had very little comprehension of Portuguese, the 
language in which they were trained in and had to conduct their affairs in. The main problem 
was the fact that the legal code was also written in Portuguese, therefore understanding of the 
main pillar of the judicial system was weak among legal practitioners and the general 
population (Kingsbury 2000: 23). This problem was further illustrated when, in 2005, none of 
the local candidates passed the minimum requirement of the exam for becoming a judge and 
this was mostly because of problems with the Portuguese language (Hill and Menzel 2008: 
87). 
 
4.4f Economic Reform 
 
At the time of the declaration of independence, East Timor was the poorest country in the 
Asia Pacific region. It had a per capita income of about $300 and around 70 percent of its 
building stocks were damaged or destroyed in the aftermath of the vote for independence in 
1999. Every decision to be made about economic policy was urgent for each choice was 
crucial is shaping the future of the new nation. These decisions would have a direct impact on 
how quickly the country could be lifted out of poverty and begin down the path of 
rehabilitation and restoration. One significant weakness of East Timorese society is the 
dependence on a small export base of commodities, such as coffee and oil, which have 
volatile prices on the world stage. Being reliant on a small number of products which do not 
have a fixed value is a huge risk for an already weak economy (Hill and Saldanha 2001: 3-5, 
40). 
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The public finance system was initially created by a joint effort involving UNTAET, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Portugal and Australia. The system, 
although workable, is not self-reliant. It remains dependent on international assistance, which 
on the one hand was necessary in the beginning, but on the other is unsustainable in the long-
term. There have been considerable donor resources dedicated to rebuilding, or more so 
creating, workable institutions. Although this process has been on the whole a success there 
remains doubt about whether they can remain sustainable once donor funding reduces. Lack 
of local resources will have an impact on the resilience of these institutions to perform once 
donors have withdrawn their support (Hill and Saldanha 2001: 290-295). 
 
Although the Fretilin government made some sound economic decisions when it came to 
power after independence in 2002, such as the strengthening of the oil and gas field revenues, 
it also made some poor decision that caused the economic sector to suffer. One of these was 
the implementation of the US dollar as the official currency of East Timor. Even though such 
an action was suggested by the UN, its effects were, however, more negative than positive. 
This move made the local economy less competitive and caused an increase in inflation and 
relative costs of goods. Such a decision could not be seen as beneficial in such a weak 
economic system, which was already in a dire state in the post-independence phase 
(Kingsbury 2000: 19). 
 
While the development of oil and gas resources has greatly supplemented government 
revenues, the challenge for the country now is how to best to use the oil and gas wealth to 
urge higher growth in other sectors of the economy and to reduce widespread poverty that is 
still present in Timor-Leste (CIA World Factbook 2010). East Timor is still severely under-
developed; even after all the assistance it has received since independence. It has an 
extremely low Human Development Index (HDI) rating due to the high levels of poverty, 
with nearly half of the population on or below the poverty line of $0.55 per day (Richmond 
and Franks 2008: 189).  
 
71 
 
4.4g Community Education and Reconciliation   
 
One positive aspect in the field of community education and reconciliation was the creation 
of a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, which uses the Portuguese 
acronym CAVR (Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao). Established by the 
East Timorese Government in 2002, its aim is to examine the violence that occurred in the 
country from 1974 to 1999 and to promote ongoing community reconciliation. The main 
motivation behind the creation of the Commission was the reintegration of refugees. This is 
because many among the returning refugees were perpetrators of serious crimes and it was 
believed that their reintegration would threaten the peace and stability in East Timor 
(Kingsbury 2000: 129-130). Building a more united and reconciled community will help 
strengthen the support base for other peacebuilding reforms that have taken place. This 
Commission incorporates customary laws and traditions into its mandate, which has helped to 
enhance its local legitimacy. CAVR facilitates reconciliation between victims and offenders. 
The process is based around that of restorative justice which puts an emphasis on getting the 
offender to accept responsibility for their behaviour and apologise to the victims for their 
wrongdoings so that both parties can begin to heal and move forward. The aim is to restore 
social relationships, which is important when trying to create a more peaceful future for all 
those involved in the conflict (Kingsbury 2000: 133). 
 
4.5 Summary of Peacebuilding Activities  
Dimensions  Actors Activities   
Security Sector 
Reforms  
 
INTERFET 
 
 
UNTAET 
 
Restoration of law and order  
Weapons disposal  
 
Maintenance of security  
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ISF and UNMIT  Restored stability post-2006 military strike  
Trust and 
Confidence 
Building Measures 
UNTAET  Minimal effort was made on the part of 
UNTAET in this area  
Governmental 
Reform 
UNTAET  
 
 
 
 
GPA 
 
ETTA 
 
 
NCC 
Formed an interim administration-focus on 
statebuilding 
Organised first presidential elections in 2002  
 
 
Aim was to re-establish governance at both 
the central and district levels, restore public 
and social utilities and encourage investment 
in private sector  
Prepared the East Timorese for self-
government  
 
Acted as the initial local administration body  
 
Judicial Reform  
 
UNTAET  Training and instillation of East Timorese 
judges  
Economic Reform  
 
UNTAET, Word 
Bank, IMF, 
Portugal and 
Australia  
 
Creation of a public finance system  
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Fretilin 
Government  
Strengthening oil and gas field revenues  
Community 
Education and 
Reconciliation  
CAVR Community Reconciliation 
Reintegration of refugees  
Table 4.2 Summary of Peacebuilding activities in East Timor  
 
4.6 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Process   
 
The peacebuilding mission undertaken by the United Nations in the East Timor has been 
hailed as on overall success. However, along with the strengths that have been portrayed by 
this mission, there were also weaknesses in the process. Both strengths and weaknesses of the 
UN‟s missions in East Timor are now going to be identified. By doing this type of analysis 
future missions can recognise what were the most beneficial features of the process and what 
areas need more attention.  
 
One of the greatest strengths of the United Nations mission in East Timor was the legitimacy 
of the intervention and the acceptance of it by the East Timorese people. Legitimacy and 
acceptance are importance parts of any international intervention and were a positive aspect 
of the intervention into East Timor. The UN mission was authorised due to the failure of 
Indonesia to uphold its requirements to respect the outcome of the referendum in 1999. In the 
violence that followed the election results, Indonesia agreed that a force was needed to 
restore security and governance in East Timor. The UN‟s mission in East Timor was not only 
legitimised by Indonesia by was also accepted by the people of East Timor. Host country 
support is of the utmost importance for a mission to be a success. The UN‟s involvement in 
East Timor was strongly supported by the people. While there was criticism of the certain 
aspects of the process and although proper partnership between UNTAET and the East 
Timorese was slow to be established, there was no significant backlash to the UN being 
present in the country, or any desire for them to withdraw too quickly (Smith 2003: 98-101). 
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Another strength of the mission, which in part relates to the legitimacy factor, was the 
sustained international commitment of all those involved in East Timor. The longevity of 
international commitment has a direct effect on the sustainability of peace during and 
intervention. International support in East Timor remained strong throughout. One reason for 
this was that the UN‟s intervention had political support from the Security Council and other 
powerful nations such as the United States. If an intervention can gain such support, donors 
are more willing to become, and more importantly remain, involved.  East Timor was seen as 
a manageable size, with a population of less than a million (Smith 2003: 98-99).  
 
While many aspects of the mission were deemed to be a success it also had various 
weaknesses. One weakness that was evident was the lack of forward planning by UNTAET. 
The planning process for the mission was slow and ambiguous. There was little planning in 
the early stages that set out the arrangements for acting in partnership with the East Timorese. 
This meant that coordination between UN staff and East Timorese did not eventuate properly 
until mid-2000 (Smith 2003: 104). 
 
Another weakness was the lack of donor coordination, which had an impact on economic and 
social development. Peacebuilding requires an emphasis on creating sustainable institutions. 
Development should be a high priority in the early stages of an intervention. Well planned 
development strategies were slow to emerge in East Timor. The UN Development Program 
did not open their office in Dili until March 2000.  
 
Many of the reforms that have been undertaken in East Timor have been criticised as being 
too Dili-centric. The reformed governmental institutions are accused of having minimal 
outreach beyond Dili and are said to have little connection with traditional governance 
practices that still provide much of the social order in the country, especially in the rural 
areas. There has been a general lack of attention paid to the rural sector which is sliding 
further and further into poverty (Brown 2009: 150). If changes are not made to help 
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rehabilitate the rural sector and the wider population, poverty levels will continue to rise 
beyond the already alarming levels that they have been reached in East Timor.  
 
Although this peacebuilding mission was classed as a success by the United Nations, the 
cracks in the process began to show by early 2006. In January of 2006, 400 soldiers went on 
strike, sighting east-west discrimination, ill treatment and poor conditions as the catalyst for 
this reaction. These soldiers were dismissed from the F-FDTL in early March of the same 
year. These soldiers remained disgruntled and at the end of April a demonstration by them 
turned violent. What had begun as a demonstration by members of the armed forces about 
internal problems, soon turned into a violent protest against the Alkatiri government. The 
police were not able to control the violence so the army were called in to re-establish law and 
order. The official death toll was five, but others alleged that up to 60 people had lost their 
lives. By June, as the conflict escalated, foreign peacekeeping forces were invited into the 
country to help restore law and order. This prolonged violence led to the resignation of the 
country‟s Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri (Palmer, Niner and Kent 2007: 1). The unrest 
continued into 2007, although there was some order restored along the way. The crisis 
severely damaged the capability of both the army and the police. This breakdown in law and 
order among the armed forces signifies the institutional weakness and lack of a cohesive 
framework for both forces (Call 2008: 297).  
 
In this case it is clear that the weaknesses tend to outweigh the strengths of this peacebuilding 
process. While the United Nations may have succeeded in terms of their state-building 
agenda, a wider campaign of peacebuilding that focuses of community reconciliation and 
local capacity peacebuilding was not followed through. A further analysis of the relative 
success of this peacebuilding mission will be undertaken in Chapter Seven.  
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Chapter Five 
The Policy of Peacebuilding in Bougainville 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Bougainville is a small island that lies between Papua New Guinea to the west and the 
Solomon Islands to the east. With a population of approximately 200,000 people, while being 
relatively large in regional standard, this island holds little significance on the international 
stage. However, in the last 20 years it has been host to one of the deadliest conflicts in the 
region since the Second World War (Boege 2009: 29). The crisis in Bougainville began 
initially as a localised dispute between disgruntled employees of the Panguna Mine and those 
who ran it, but eventually snowballed into a full scale internal conflict which devastated 
much of Bougainville and lasted nearly 10 years. The triggers of the conflict stemmed from 
discontent among local landowners over the effects the mine was having on the local 
environment and the perceived inadequacy of compensation being received by locals in 
comparison to the profits being gained by the owners of the mine and the Papua New Guinea 
government. These disgruntled land owners eventually banded together to form the 
Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). Their actions led to the closure of the mine, a 
service blockade to Bougainville and ongoing violence which lasted for nearly a decade. 
While this conflict was small on an international scale, in relation to the sparsely populated 
Pacific island, this incident became one of the most devastating conflicts in the region since 
World War II (Adams 2008: 63).  
 
While various attempts were made to try to reconcile the parties, none were successful until 
New Zealand became involved for the second time in the peace process in 1997. This chapter 
follows the same structure as Chapter Four. It first outlines the main causes of the conflict 
and analyses what attempts were made to create peace between the Bougainvillean factions 
and Papua New Guinea. It then goes on to outline the successful efforts undertaken by New 
Zealand to facilitate a peace agreement between the parties, which set in motion a process of 
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peacebuilding in Bougainville. The process undertaken by New Zealand was ultimately 
successful because it prescribed a long term approach to building peace between the warring 
parties. An in-depth analysis of what made the mission an overall success will be undertaken 
in Chapter Seven.  
 
5.2 Causes of the Conflict 
 
The initial catalyst of the Bougainville conflict was the external exploitation of natural 
resources in Bougainville and centres around the Panguna mine. The Panguna copper mine 
was established in 1979 by Australian owned company Bougainville Copper Limited at 
Panguna in central Bougainville. The mine was the cause of much unrest relating to the 
perceived unfair benefits that were being gained by both Australia and Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) at the expense of the Bougainvillen people and their environment (Fry and  
Kabutaulaka 2008: 186). Although the most visible cause of the conflict was to do with land 
and the unequal extraction and distribution of resources and revenues there was an underlying 
ethnic component to this conflict. Bougainvilleans felt no allegiance to PNG; nonetheless, 
their calls for self-determination were met with violence not support.  
 
For Bougainville, the late 1980‟s were signified by an uprising of discontent among local 
landowners over the degradation of the environment that the mine was causing, the loss of 
traditional land and the perceived inadequacy of compensation being received by locals 
(Henderson and Watson 2005: 459). Claims for compensation were made to the mine but 
when these were not met mine workers began to destroy mine property. These local 
landowner formed the basis of what was to become known as the Bougainville Revolutionary 
Army (BRA), part of a breakaway faction of the Panguna Landowners Association (PLA), 
which was formed in 1979 to facilitate between locals and the mining company. Francis Ona, 
a former driver at the mines, led the newly adapted PLA. In 1988 the BRA began 
orchestrating attacks against mining infrastructure, resulting in its eventual closure in May 
1989 (Adams 2001: 26). As a result of these attacks a state of emergency was declared and 
police squads and military forces were brought in to help curb the violent backlash.  
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Landowners believed that the culture of Bougainville was being destroyed by having 
outsiders, more specifically those who were involved with the mine, present in the region. 
The need to breakaway was further fuelled by the fact that Bougainvilleans saw themselves 
as culturally and physically different from the people of PNG (McKinnon 1999: 22). In early 
1990, fuelled by the mistreatment of Bougainvilleans that were suspected of supporting the 
BRA by the Papua New Guinean Defence Forces (PNGDF), a wide spread secessionist 
movement was established on Bougainville. Strengthened by this newfound support, Francis 
Ona announced a unilateral declaration of independence and moved to establish the 
Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) (Henderson and Watson 2005: 460). This 
declaration of independence was not recognised by the PNG government, or by any other 
state in the international community (Heijmans, Simmonds and van de Veen 2004: 567). 
 
The PNG government was unable to control the increasingly violent situation on 
Bougainville and in an attempt to help subdue it they implemented a service blockade and 
withdrew all security personnel from the region. The blockade prevented all import and 
export of goods to Bougainville and had a dire impact on health and educations services. 
However, the violence was not only between PNG forces and the BRA. Opposition factions 
within Bougainville began to emerge in resistance to the BRA. The main group that formed 
was the Bougainville Resistance Force (BRF) who supported the PNGDF and emulated this 
support by demonstrating acts of violence against members of the BRA (Fry and Kabutaulaka 
2008: 186-187).  
 
This crisis recorded the largest number of casualties in any South Pacific conflict since World 
War II. It is estimated that more than 10,000 people lost their lives during the conflict from 
both direct and indirect violence (McKinnon 1999: 22). The conflict caused severe trauma to 
those involved and had an incredibly disruptive impact on everyday life. The service 
blockade brought industry and infrastructure to a standstill, leading to major economic and 
societal degradation (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 187).  
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5.3 Initial Efforts to Resolve the Conflict  
 
There were many attempts undertaken to resolve the Bougainville conflict throughout the 
1990s. Negotiations spanned over a period of nearly 13 years between 1988 and 2001. During 
this time some 46 major agreements were negotiated between and among the various parties 
that were involved the conflict throughout this period (Bowd 2009: 5). Although steps were 
taken towards resolution they were perhaps too narrow in there scope to be successful. 
Conflict settlement is not a rapid process. It takes time and commitment by those involved to 
reach an agreement that is mutually acceptable and provides for sustained cooperation and 
negotiation.  
 
5.3a Endeavour Accords 
 
One of the first conflict resolution initiatives is known as the „Endeavour Accord’, and was 
undertaken by New Zealand. In July of 1990, New Zealand sent its naval vessel the HMSNZ 
Endeavour to Bougainville to act as a neutral venue where peace talks could take place 
between the PNG government and representatives from Bougainville. The agreement that 
was reached during these talks was supposed to lead to the restoration of services on 
Bougainville. However, disagreement over who would be involved in delivering those 
services hindered its final implementation (Rosanowski 2001: 75). 
 
5.3b Honiara Declaration 
 
The government of the Solomon Island also tried to undertake its own effort to resolve the 
Bougainville crisis. At the start of 1991 representatives of the PNG government and leaders 
from Bougainville all signed the „Honiara Declaration’. The provisions of this agreement 
were that, “the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) would be annulled, that 
services would be restored to Bougainville and that a truce would be supervised by a 
multinational supervisory team‟. The supervisory team was also to be in charge of a weapons 
collections scheme and would grant amnesty to all BRA fighters who complied with the 
agreement. However, this initiative was also unsuccessful, as members of the BRA were 
reluctant to relinquish their arms (Rosanowski 2001: 75). 
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5.3c Sandline Affair 
 
Yet another unsuccessful attempt to resolve the crisis on Bougainville is referred to as the 
‘Sandline Affair’. In January of 1997, the then Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan made a secret 
arrangement with a private military consultancy firm called Sandline International, to use 
mercenaries to sort out the rebels on Bougainville. Sandline were supposed to train and 
accompany PNGDF troops on an operation to defeat the BRA and take back control of the 
Panguna mine (Rosanowski 2001: 79). This plan, however, was never launched for details of 
the operation were leaked to the public, who were adamantly against such measures being 
used. This misguided attempt at conflict resolution led to Sir Julius Chan stepping down from 
the position of prime minister (McKinnon 1999: 23). 
 
In a working paper for the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National 
University, author Reuben Bowd identifies that in this initial stage of conflict resolution 
attempts there were various factors that led to the failure in securing peace on Bougainville. 
These included: 
 Lack of ripe moment: The conflict had not run its course yet as parties believed they 
could still resolve the conflict through use of force; 
 Unwillingness to negotiate the main issues: The issue of the future of the political 
status of Bougainville keep being omitted from agreements; 
 A continued failure to involve all parties: not all parties were recognised or 
represented in the early stages of the peace process; 
 Spoilers: The early attempts at peace were thwarted by the presence of spoilers, 
including factions of the PNG defence force and elements of the BRA and BIG; 
 Lack of motivation to negotiate: For much of the crisis PNG still believed the conflict 
could be resolved through a military solution (Bowd 2009: 10-12).  
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The second phase of the peace process, 1997-2001, however was characterised by a 
significant number of breakthroughs which led to the establishment of peace on Bougainville. 
This phase began with the Burnham peace talks. These talks, which were facilitated by New 
Zealand, overcame many of the problems and downfalls of earlier attempts to facilitate peace 
between the parties. One breakthrough that was made was the realisation that there was not 
just one Bouaginvillean faction, but many different groups within society that had different 
motives, aspiration and positions in the conflict. It was recognised that reconciliation between 
the different Bougainvillean factions was needed before any attempt at negotiations with the 
Papua New Guinean Government could be made. This was accomplished at Burnham for the 
first round of talks were only among representatives from the different Bougainvillean 
factions to try to establish a common Bougainvillean position. It was only after this had been 
achieved that talks were held between representatives from Bougainville and those 
representing the Papua New Guinea Government (Wolfers 2006: 6).  
 
5.4 Burnham and Beyond  
 
It was in July 1997 that peace initiatives in Bougainville took a turn for the better. After many 
failed attempts to try to resolve the Bougainville conflict, the first step toward future peace 
was solidified at Burnham Military Camp in Christchurch, New Zealand. The way these 
peace talks were undertaken, who was included and the pace at which it was achieved are all 
aspects that contributed to its success. It is because of these elements that this process can be 
said to be in line with an overall policy of peacebuilding and not just solely conflict 
resolution or settlement. The Burnham peace talks were a forward thinking approach that 
made long-term plans and arrangements and not just short-term goals.  
 
After failed attempts at reconciliation such as the Endeavour Accord, New Zealand decided a 
new approach was needed to help resolve the Bougainville conflict. New Zealand realised 
that for the outcome of any resolution attempts to not only be successful but also sustainable 
the parties would have to work towards creating a solution themselves, not having one forced 
upon then by an outside actor (Hayes 2005: 143).New Zealand‟s aim was to create a neutral 
and secure environment for talks between the opposing parties to take place. New Zealand 
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decided it needed to act as a supporting third party and not an active mediator facilitating 
discussions. The Burnham talks were orchestrated by the then New Zealand Foreign Minister 
Don McKinnon.  
 
The first round of talks began on July 5 1997. These first set of talks were between various 
Bougainvillean factions. Its purpose was to create some kind of unity in the Bougainvillean 
position. This gave the representatives of the different Bougainvillean factions a chance to 
talk amongst themselves and resolve the differences they had with each other, before tackling 
the grievances they had with Papua New Guinea. Those who were included in the talks were 
representatives of the Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), the BRA-BIG, the 
resistance and Bougainville‟s four members of parliament (Rosanowski 2001: 189). The talks 
were successfully completed on Friday 18
th
 of July. During the time at Burnham, the 
delegates participated in social activities such as sightseeing trips. This gave them a chance to 
interact without the pressure of a more formal setting. It was such interactions that were the 
backbone to building greater trust and confidence between all those involved. It was at the 
conclusion of this first round of talks that the Burnham Declaration was drawn up. As part of 
this agreement the signatories “recognised the importance of unity and reconciliation between 
the divided Bougainvillean people”. They also “acknowledged the desirability of the 
development of a process for negotiation between Bougainville leaders and the PNG 
government to bring about an end to the war” (Rosanowski 2001: 194). 
 
The second round of Burnham talks were held at the beginning of October 1997. Burnham II 
was to also include representatives of PNG, and act as the next step on from what had been 
achieved during the July round at Burnham. This round was more formal and included more 
officials. The agenda of the talks included the establishment of a truce on the island and also 
organisation for future talks to be had between the parties. The talks concluded with the 
signing of an agreement known as the Burnham Truce. According to the agreement “the PNG 
government, the BTG, the resistance, the BIG and the BRA recognised the desirability of 
taking immediate positive measures to end the armed conflict, to promote peace and 
reconciliation, to encourage the restoration of services and to actuate a return to normalcy by 
all parties” (Rosanowski 2001: 199). 
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5.5 Conflict Summary 
Conflict Type  Internal armed conflict 
Incompatibility  Resources, Self-determination 
Duration 1989-1997  
Parties in Conflict  Papua New Guinea, BRA  
External Intervention  Truce Monitoring Force 1997 
Peace Monitoring Force 1998-2003  
Conflict Resolution Attempts Endeavour Accords 1990 (unsuccessful) 
Honiara Declaration 1991 (unsuccessful) 
Cairns Talks 1995 (unsuccessful)  
Sandline Affair 1997 (unsuccessful)  
Burnham Peace Talks 1997 (successful)  
UN Involvement  United Nations Observer Mission to 
Bougainville 1998 
Peace Agreements  Burnham Truce 1997 
Lincoln Agreement Concerning Peace, 
Security and Development on Bougainville 
1998 
Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001  
Fatalities  Approximately 10,000 lives lost  
Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons  Approximately 50,00 displaced persons  
Table 5.1 Conflict Summary: Bougainville (UCDP database 2010; Downer 2001) 
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5.6 Peacebuilding in Bougainville 
  
The next section of this chapter is going to analyse the peacebuilding activities that were 
undertaken in Bougainville after the post-conflict settlement had been reached at Burnham. It 
is going to be set out using the dimensions of the framework from Chapter Two. After an 
analysis of the various peacebuilding dimensions that were focused on in Bougainville, the 
chapter will conclude with an examination of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
peacebuilding mission in Bougainville. 
 
5.6a Security Sector Reform  
 
The Burnham Truce was the first real concrete step in the direction of peace on Bougainville 
since the beginning of the conflict in 1989. The truce was not formally a cease-fire agreement 
but provisions were made so that it would eventually lead to the creation of one. It was 
agreed that the parties who took part in Burnham II would make recommendations to the 
PNG government for the authorisation of a regional peacekeeping group to be invited to 
Bougainville to help monitor the provisions of the truce (Rosanowski 2001: 199). This force 
was to become known as the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG). The TMG were to be an 
unarmed force made up of participants from various Pacific nations. The mandate of the 
TMG was to “monitor and report on the parties‟ compliance with the truce, to promote 
confidence in the peace process by its presence and interaction with the community, and to 
provide information to the Bougainvilleans on the truce and the peace process” (Regan 2008: 
193). The TMG was made up of personnel from New Zealand, Australia, Vanuatu and Fiji 
and commenced their time on Bougainville in November 1997. The TMG was in force for 
only five months, but was then replaced by a regional Peace Monitoring Group (PMG), 
which finally withdrew from Bougainville in 2003 (Adams 2001: 10, 31). 
 
The next step towards decreasing violence came about in January 1998 with the signing of 
the Lincoln Agreement Concerning Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville. In 
terms of stopping violence, the agreement provided for “an extension of the truce and 
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continued presence of the TMG until April 1998; a permanent cease-fire; a phased 
withdrawal of the PNGDF…and the deployment of a UN Observer Mission to Bougainville 
(UNOMB)” (May 2005: 462).  
 
The Bougainville Peace Agreement which was drawn up in 2001, and is mentioned in more 
detail later in this chapter, made another important step forward is establishing improved 
security in Bougainville. One of the three main aspects of this agreement was weapons 
disposal. This agreement outlined a three staged weapons disposal process that was to be 
undertaken before any steps towards greater autonomy could be put in place. Weapons 
disposal, along with the other aspects of this agreement, is covered in more detail in the 
Governmental Reform section.  
 
5.6b Trust and Confidence Building Measures 
 
The way in which the peace process was undertaken was the backbone to building increased 
trust and confidence between all the opposing factions. The fact that New Zealand led the 
way and coordinated the Burnham meetings was a deliberate act. Trust and confidence in the 
third party is just as important as trust and confidence between warring factions. Bougainville 
accepted New Zealand as an impartial third party. The same cannot be said about Australia, 
and this is why their participation came at a later stage. Australia was regarded with suspicion 
and apprehension in Bougainville because of their close historical ties with Papua New 
Guinea. It was also an Australian company, Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA), who was 
the owner of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) and it was BCL that operated the Panguna 
mine, the initial catalyst of the ten-year conflict. Australia agreed that New Zealand was seen 
as neutral by all the parties involved so did not take part in the peace process until 1998, 
when it became part of the TMG (Regan 2008: 188-189). 
 
Another way in which trust between members of society was re-established was the use of 
customary dispute resolution mechanisms, which focused less on punishment of the 
perpetrators and more on the “restoration of social harmony among the conflict parties”. The 
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way in which this is achieved is that the “perpetrators have to confess, they have to take 
responsibility for their wrongdoings and admit their faults, they have to apologise to the ones 
they have wronged and ask for forgiveness; victims have to develop a willingness to forgive 
and to reconcile; on this basis parties can overcome hate and mistrust and achieve 
reconciliation; and finally justice”. This reconciliation is finalised by the exchanged of gifts 
which act as compensation for the wrongdoings and is a visible sign of this move towards 
rebuilding of harmonious relationships within society (Boege 2006: 9). 
 
5.6c Governmental Reform 
 
Bougainville Reconciliation Government  
The Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) was established on January 1 1999. Its 
creation was outlined in the Lincoln Agreement.  The BRG was established to “provide an 
agreed political framework through which the parties and other participants in previous 
conflicts can cooperate in providing good government for Bougainville”. The main aims of 
the BRG were to strengthening the peace process, work towards a political settlement, 
undertake reconciliation activities with the assistance of civil society groups and keep the 
public up to date about plans for restoration and development (Bougainville Reconciliation 
Government 1998). The BRG had both legislative and executive arms and was structured to 
be broadly representative of the people of Bougainville.  
 
Bougainville Peace Agreement 
The most significant agreement that was aimed towards governmental reform and the more 
serious question of the future political status of Bougainville did not come into force until late 
2001. The Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in Arawa on 30
th
 August 2001 (May 
2005: 462). This agreement was based on three pillars and was to signify the basis of a 
comprehensive political settlement for Bougainville. The three pillars were autonomy, the 
referendum on independence and weapons disposal.  
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Autonomy  
This agreement provided the Bougainville government with a higher degree of autonomy. 
This new level of autonomy allows the Bougainville government to have its own public 
service and control over police and prison services. As a result of this agreement 
Bougainville is allowed to legislate its own criminal code, but it has to be in line with 
national PNG governmental standards (May 2005: 463). The new constitution of the 
Autonomous Region of Bougainville was also created. It outlined the power and 
responsibilities of the new Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG).  
 
The Referendum 
The Bougainville Peace Agreement provided arrangements for a future referendum to be held 
to consider Bougainville‟s political status, with full independence from PNG to be posed as 
an option. It is not to be held for at least ten years after the autonomous government has been 
established and “when weapons disposal has been fully implemented and good governance 
has been achieved” (May 2005: 463). 
 
Weapons Disposal  
Weapons disposal is the third and final pillar of the Bougainville Peace Agreement. The 
Agreement sets out a three-stage process for this to be achieved.  
1. “The withdrawal of RPNGC (Royal PNG Constabulary) and PNGDF personnel and the 
placing of weapons surrendered by combatants in secure containers controlled by local 
BRA and BRF commanders; 
2. The movement of weapons to more central containers jointly controlled by local 
BRA/BRF commanders and UNOMB (United Nations Observer Mission on 
Bougainville); 
3. The final stage envisages the removal of all weapons” (May 2005: 464).   
 
Weapons disposal is possibly the hardest area in which to rally support. Security concerns 
were still high even in 2001 in Bougainville so asking people to give up their weapons was 
always going to encounter some opposition. To provide an incentive it was agreed that 
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arrangements concerning autonomy would not be put in place until stage two of the weapons 
disposal was completed. This was done in 2003 (May 2005: 464). As a result of the 
completion of stage two of the weapons disposal, arrangements concerning autonomy were 
begun. A Bougainville Constitution was drafted in 2003. However, its finalisation and 
implementation were somewhat slow to eventuate. It seemed that there was a certain amount 
of reluctance on the part of the PNG government to accept the realities of Bougainvillean 
autonomy.   
 
Bougainville Constituent Assembly  
The new constitution was drafted by the Bougainville Constitutional Commission (BCC) 
between 2002 and 2004 and was adopted by the Bougainville Constituent Assembly (BCA) 
on the 12
th
 of November, 2004. It was then brought into force by the national Papua New 
Guinea government in early 2005. The drafting of the constitution was a highly inclusive 
process and several drafts were presented to the people for discussion before it was adopted 
by the BCA (Boege 2006: 19)  
 
The first elections for the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) were held in May 
2005. Elections were conducted from 20 May to 2 June. These resulted in the democratic 
election of a 39 member government on 15 June 2005 (Bowd 2009: 18). Joseph Kabui 
became the first Bougainvillean president. The capabilities of the ABG were outlined in the 
Bougainville Peace Agreement. These stated that Bougainville “has the right to establish an 
independent administration, judiciary, police and correctional system, which are subject 
solely to the control of the ABG”. However, the Papua New Guinean government remains in 
control of “defence, foreign relations, immigration, highly migratory and straddling fish 
stocks, central banking, currency, international civil aviation, international shipping, 
international trade, posts and telecommunications” (Boege 2006: 18). This shows that while 
Bougainville has been liberated in some areas, it still remains until the central control of PNG 
in others. The ABG, however, lacks strong administrative capacity making its ability to 
govern effectively and efficiently a slow process.  
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5.6d Judicial Reform 
 
A strong judicial system is the corner stone to successful state building. The Bougainville 
Constitution was at the centre of the restructuring and rehabilitation of the Bougainville 
judicial system. The judicial system, like so many other areas of the new autonomous 
government, shows a strong correlation between traditional practices and modern state-
building activities. The ABG stressed the need to “build on what was happening on the 
village level and to build the capacity of Bougainvilleans to implement and manage the new 
judicial system” (ICJ Australia 2010).  
 
As noted earlier there was a significant focus placed on reconciliation and restoration of 
relationships and not just on the punishment of crimes. The emphasis is on restorative justice. 
Making those admit their wrongdoing and working towards rebuilding stronger and more 
harmonious relationships between those involved are the main aims of Bougainville‟s new 
justice system (Boege 2006: 21). The reason why the inclusion of traditional customs into the 
judicial system was so well supported and has be successful, is that the structure of a modern 
(Western) judicial system is somewhat of an alien concept to many in the Pacific. Traditional 
structures of justice have always been of special significant in Bougainville so therefore their 
inclusion in the new judicial system of the autonomous region was of particular importance to 
the people of Bougainville. 
 
5.6e Economic Reform 
 
There were significant donor funds that were allocated to the peace process in Bougainville. 
Humanitarian assistance during the conflict and in the early stages of the peace process was 
generally well targeted. The focus on rehabilitation and small scale projects helped to restore 
basic services such as health and education in many areas. This assiatnmace did, however, 
have somewhat of a negative effect in the community as well. Allowances and financial 
benefits were offered to those Bougainvillens who were playing a part in the peace process. 
However, such offers led to payments becoming a necessity for people became reluctant to 
take part unless they received some kind of financial compensation. This fostered an attitude 
of dependence for it formed a misperception that there were unlimited donor funds allocated 
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to the peace process in Bougainville. This kind of dependence and expectation of hand-outs 
undermines any efforts aimed towards fiscal self-reliance (Brown 2007: 106). 
 
After his election in 2005, President Joseph Kabui reiterated that fact that Bougainville was 
still too dependent of foreign assistance.  The Papua New Guinea government subsidised 64 
percent of Bougainville‟s 2005 revenue with donor countries making up a further 34 percent. 
He was saddened to think that Bougainville could only raise two percent of what was needed 
to run its own affairs. This type of reliance does not bode well for the future as independence 
is only viable when Bougainville becomes financially self-sufficient.  President Kabui 
believes that the economy is too limited and too reliant of copra and cocoa crops. This narrow 
scope of exportable products is not only a problem in Bougainville, but remains to be a 
significant weakness of many Pacific Island nations. Mining could be resumed as a way of 
increasing Government revenue but this idea is not widely supported as it was the source of 
the past violence in Bougainville (Radio New Zealand 2010). While peace agreements 
relating to this conflict have been very successful at addressing the wider issues and concerns 
over identity, they have left the trigger of the conflict, the mine, to be dealt with at a later 
stage (Adams 2008: 77).   
 
5.6f Community Education and Reconciliation  
 
Community education and involvement was significant during the peacebuilding process in 
Bougainville. The Bougainville peace process was a “bottom-up” approach. The whole 
society was involved in the process, with ex-combatants leading the way in discussions and 
activities to help build a stronger and more sustainable peace on Bougainville. Grassroots 
organisation such as women‟s and church groups have had a significant role in helping to 
build peace among the Bougainvillean people (May 2005: 466). The Church is an important 
institution in the everyday lives of the people of Bougainville. The Church can act as a bridge 
between opposing factions and as a neutral mediator who is not seen as a threat or as having 
its own agenda in the conflict. 
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One significant women‟s group during the time of the Bougainville conflict was the 
Bougainville Inter-Church Women‟s Forum (BICWF) which was established in 1995. They 
had four main objectives, which were: 
 “To establish better cooperation and a working relationship between churches;  
 To develop a unified stance on human rights and justice issues; 
 To encourage women to take a leading role in the search for a genuine and peaceful 
solutions to the conflict; and  
 To develop plans and a program for a peaceful Bougainville” (Tankunani Sirivi and 
Taleo Havini 2004: 96). 
 
The BICWF formed strong working groups throughout Bougainville‟s various districts and 
put in place concrete plans for establishing a lasting solution to the conflict. One significant 
aspect of the conflict that they were involved in was halting the Sandline Affair. A delegation 
of women from the organisation went to Port Moresby with a petition that was to be 
presented to the Prime Minister‟s First Secretary that urged the Government not to involve 
the Sandline Company and search instead for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. Alongside 
this official action they continued to plan community development projects and also build 
links with NGO partners from overseas. Their actions helped to enhance community 
involvement in the peace process and stimulate the participation of women, who had suffered 
greatly during the conflict (Tankunani Sirivi and Taleo Havini 2004: 97). 
 
5.7 Summary of Peacebuilding Activities  
Dimensions  Actors Activities   
Stop Violence  
 
TMC 
 
 
 
Peacekeeping 
Monitoring compliance with the true, 
promote confidence in the peace process in 
the community, providing information about 
the peace process  
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BPA  
 
 
Weapons disposal  
Trust and 
Confidence 
Building Measures 
New Zealand  Burnham peace talks- focus on 
reconciliation between all parties involved 
Undertook process in a way that was 
acceptable to those involved  
Governmental 
Reform 
BRG  
 
 
Bougainville 
Constituent 
Assembly  
 
BPA 
 
 
 
 
ABG  
Strengthen peace process, work towards a 
political settlement and undertake 
reconciliation activities  
 
Review, debate and approve the proposed 
constitution  
 
Provided Bougainville government with a 
higher degree of autonomy  
Provided arrangements for a future 
referendum on Bougainville‟s political status  
 
 
Elections held in May 2005  
Judicial Reform  
 
BPA Establishment of the Bougainville 
Constitution  
Economic Reform  International Provision of significant economic assistance  
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 donors  
Community 
Education and 
Reconciliation   
BICWF  Established better cooperation between 
churches 
Formed working groups and put in place 
plans for establishing lasting solutions to the 
conflict 
Community development and community 
involvement in the peace process-especially 
fostered the involvement of women  
Table 5.2 Summary of Peacebuilding activities in Bougainville 
 
5.8 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Process   
 
Possibly the greatest strength of the peacebuilding process in Bougainville was that it was a 
bottom-up approach that was inclusive of a wide range of society. Each step, from Burnham 
onwards, was directed by the people involved and not imposed on them by outside forces. 
Trust and confidence building measures took priority in the initial stages of the peace 
process. It was only after trust had been established, not only between the parties but also 
within them, that any other issues were brought to the table. The strong foundation this 
created was crucial to its overall success. Wide community involvement on both sides helped 
to facilitate greater support of peacebuilding activities and acceptance of the overall peace 
process (May 2005: 466). Another aspect related to the importance of building trust and 
confidence between those involved in the peace process was that fact that the TMG and the 
PMG were unarmed. This was a necessary precursor for the force being allowed on 
Bougainville. While there were worries about the safety of the force, the benefits that came 
from being unarmed overshadowed these fears  
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The agreements that were drawn up not only after Burnham but on other subsequent 
occasions were future focused. They put an emphasis on ongoing consultation and future 
requirements. This meant that parties were kept on track well beyond the initial 
implementation of the agreements. This aspect is of significant importance in terms of 
peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in post-conflict society is about looking towards creating a 
more prosperous and peaceful future in war-torn communities. While many interventions 
focus on establishing peace, there is often not enough of a long term focus or more 
importantly long term commitment from those initially involved. In Bougainville this was not 
the case. Those involved, especially New Zealand, maintained an ongoing interest and 
dedication to the peace process long after their initial facilitation of talks at Burnham. This 
provided not only continuality in approach for those involved but helped to solidify the trust 
of the parties and made future agreements develop smoothly and be implemented with greater 
ease.  
 
Another positive aspect of this approach was that a significant effort was made by all 
involved to draw on traditional models and incorporate them into the new system, rather than 
just trying to impose a Western approach to state-building on the people. While the 
organisation of the new autonomous region may seem fragmented and somewhat incomplete 
to western observers, the structure is one that is supported and seen as highly legitimate by 
the local people.  
 
Although this peacebuilding process, such as was the case in East Timor, was applauded as a 
success, it did still possess some weaknesses. One significant weakness in the post-conflict 
phase is the fragile economy and ongoing dependence on donors. Economic reform is one of 
the most significant activities to be undertaken during the peacebuilding process. If a stable 
economy cannot be established in the early stages and is slow in becoming financially self-
reliant huge pressure is put on those external parties involved to foot the bill. This is what has 
happened in the case of Bougainville. Nearly a decade on since the peace talks in Burnham, 
the economy is still weak in Bougainville and donor dependence remains high. This 
continued dependence is not healthy in terms of future plans for independence. 
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Chapter Six 
The Policy of Peacebuilding in the Solomon Islands 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The Solomon Islands is a former British Protectorate that is located to the east of Papua New 
Guinea. The country is made up of a large chain of islands and has a population of just over 
half a million people. (BBC News Website 2010).  Peace and stability in the Solomon Islands 
took a severe turn for the worst in the late 1990s. What began as unrest between the people 
from Malaita and Guadalcanal escalated into a conflict that divided the society and wrecked 
havoc throughout the Solomon Islands. Social tensions, feelings of inequality and economic 
hardship fuelled the outbreak of violence in the Solomon Islands. While attempts were made 
to try to contain the conflict, none were successful. This was until the intervention of the 
Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, RAMSI. What is different 
about this case compared to the two previous cases that have been covered is that RAMSI is 
still present in the Solomon Islands, and even thought the violence has been subdued, the 
country still remains very unstable.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to review RAMSI, the post-conflict mission being undertaken 
in the Solomon Islands, and determine whether or not it can be truly classified as being 
peacebuilding. This will be done, as was done in the previous two chapters, be first giving an 
overview of the conflict that occurred before RAMSI intervened. It will outline the causes of 
the conflict, which parties were involved and what was done in the lead up to RAMSI‟s 
intervention to try to curb the violence between the warring factions. This will be followed by 
a breakdown of the RAMSI mission, what its purpose was in the Solomon Islands and how it 
went about achieving this. The final section of this chapter will be an analysis of what more 
needs to be done in the Solomon Islands before RAMSI withdraws so that it can constitute a 
true peacebuilding mission. For the mission to successfully build long term peace in the 
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Solomon Islands certain dimensions of the peacebuilding framework need significantly more 
attention before RAMSI can contemplate full withdrawal from the country.  
 
6.2 Conflict in the Solomon Islands 
  
6.2a Background to the Conflict  
 
The conflict on the Solomon Islands that occurred between 1998 and 2003 mirrored much of 
the conflict that has taken place in the Pacific region since decolonisation in the 1960‟s. As 
with many other Pacific nations, independence brought with it a rural-urban shift. Many 
people from the densely populated island of Malaita moved to other areas such as 
Guadalcanal where the capital city, Honiara, was located (Henderson and Watson 2005: 402). 
The population of Guadalcanal increased from 195, 000 in 1978 to 450,000 by 2000.  
 
Social and economic pressures were at a critical level in the lead up to the outbreak of 
conflict in the Solomon Islands in 1998. Poor economic development had plagued the country 
since independence. Those on Guadalcanal felt like they should be compensated for allowing 
the influx of Malaitans coming to their islands and also allowing the capital city to be situated 
on Guadalcanal as well. The Governor of Guadalcanal, Ezekiel Alebua, demanded that all 
lands that were occupied, rented or purchased by Malaitans be returned to the people of 
Guadalcanal. Militia groups began arming themselves in Guadalcanal and forcing Malaitans 
off the island. Hordes of people began evacuating in the face of this armed intimation which 
was mainly perpetrated by young Guadalcanal men. This group came to be known as the 
Guadalcanal Revolution Army (GRA), later changing its name to the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement (IFM). In opposition to this insurgency and because of frustration at the lack of 
response from the government, some Malaitans banded together to form the Malaitan Eagle 
Force (MEF) and began to attack IFM strongholds and villages. The flood of Malaitan 
refugees mostly ended up in Honiara or back on the island of Malaita. This sudden influx of 
people put enormous pressure on the local resources of these settlements, which is turn 
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fuelled further unrest. By 1999 it was estimated that around 35,000 people had been displaced 
from their homes and communities. The unrest was attempted to be contained by the Royal 
Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIP) and its paramilitary wing, the Police Field Force (PFF). 
However, the police force‟s impartiality was somewhat questionable for the majority of its 
personnel were ethnic Malaitans. The RSIP was considered to be practically another unit of 
the MEF by many on Guadalcanal (Henderson and Watson 2005: 403-404, 413). 
 
An initial attempt at conflict resolution was made in 1999, under the auspices of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat, by Fiji coup leader Major Sitiveni Rabuka. He was sent to the 
Solomon Islands to try to facilitate talks between the IFM and the Solomon Island 
government. His visit resulted in the creation of two agreements, the Honiara Peace Accord 
and the Panatina Agreement. Both agreements eventually failed. The main reasons for this 
failure were the lack of inclusion of Malaitan groups in discussions and Rabuka‟s lack of 
authority as a mediator (Henderson and Watson 2005: 404).  
 
6.2b The 2000 Coup  
 
The MEF continued to place pressure on the government with their demands for 
compensation for the damages inflicted by the IFM. When these demands were not delivered 
the MEF decided to take action against the government itself (Adams 2008: 101). In early 
June 2000, the MEF, supported by members of the police, took over the police armoury in 
Honiara, forced Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa‟ulu to resign and took control of the 
government. A few weeks later, parliament met and elected Manasseh Sogavare as the new 
prime minister. Once installed in parliament, Sogavare announced a 100-day plan to “restore 
law and order and promote economic recovery” (Henderson and Watson 2005: 403-404). 
 
After the election of Sogavare, Australia and New Zealand proceeded to revive efforts to 
bring the militant groups to the negotiation table. In August of 2000, Australia orchestrated 
talks between the two groups on board an Australian naval vessel. These talks concluded in 
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the signing of a ceasefire agreement. The provisions of this agreement required the MEF and 
IFM to “lay down their arms and refrain from hostile, offensive, insulting or provocative 
behaviour”. A Ceasefire Monitoring Council (CMC) was set up to enforce and monitor the 
conditions of the agreement and report any breaches. The initial period of the ceasefire was to 
be 90 days and was to be extended if necessary. However, before this period was up breaches 
were reported on both sides (Dinnen 2002: 290). 
 
6.2c Townsville Peace Agreement  
 
Talks took place later that year in Townsville, Australia to try to broker some kind of peace 
agreement for the Solomon Islands. These talks concluded with the signing of the Townsville 
Peace Agreement (TPA). This Agreement called for “the surrender of weaponry, greater 
ethnic equality in appointments to the security forces and an amnesty for members of the IMF 
and MEF”. An International Peace Monitoring Group was established to oversee the 
disarmament process. Although there was some decrease in tensions after the implementation 
of the TPA, disarmament was generally unsuccessful for lack of incentives offered to 
militants for compliance with disarmament provisions (Fraenkel 2004: 99, 205). The lack of 
disarmament continued to be a source of trouble for there was extensive proliferation of small 
arms on the island. This fear of the gun stood in the way of community-based peace 
initiatives.  Although disarmament provisions could help to take weapons off the street, such 
action did not remedy the deeper societal problem of the total collapse of law and order in the 
Solomon Islands. Corruption was evident at all levels of government and throughout the civil 
services, people lost faith in the security forces and the government. It was because of this 
inherent state failure that the new Prime Minister Sir Allan Kemakeza requested outside 
assistance (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008: 3). 
 
Although there were repeated calls for assistance from the Solomon Islands government, 
Australia, while offering advice and financial support, refused to physically step in, retaining 
their position of non-intervention in the Pacific. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander 
Downer announced in January 2003 that “sending in Australian troops to occupy Solomon 
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Islands would be folly to the extreme…The real show stopper is that it would not work…The 
fundamental problem is that foreigners do not have the answers for the deep-seated problems 
afflicting Solomon Islands.” However, only six months later, Downer revoked this statement 
and announced Australia‟s plans for a military intervention in the Solomon Islands, stating 
that the “unrest had forced Australia to produce a new Pacific policy involving nation 
rebuilding and cooperative intervention” (Henderson and Watson 2005: 413). 
Poor governance was a not only a major cause of conflict in the Solomon Islands, but also a 
hindrance to its resolution. Successive incompetent and corrupt governments stood in the way 
of any possible development or financial growth during the conflict, further contributing to 
the weakness of the state. The ongoing conflict impacted heavily on the economy, not only 
because of the violence that cut off trade but also because companies began to withdraw from 
the Solomon Islands because of it. This led to both a loss of revenue and employment in the 
Solomon Islands (Hegarty, May, Regan, Dinnen, Nelson and Duncan 2004: 6). 
 
International donors reduced the amount of aid being given to the Solomon Islands for they 
were unwilling to continue to prop-up the corrupt regime. During the time of the crisis 
Taiwan provided the Solomon Islands with substantial loans and grants. This however, was in 
return for diplomatic recognition, a precursor to financial assistance from Taiwan and China 
alike (Moore 2004: 195). This sort of bilateral „aid‟ is frowned upon by other powers in the 
region such as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAT). DFAT stated that 
“Australia opposes such chequebook diplomacy because…we have made a very considerable 
effort to address governance issues… [and we] see chequebook diplomacy directly 
undermining the efforts that we have made” (Atkinson 2009: 52). 
 
6.3 Conflict Summary  
Conflict Type  Internal armed conflict  
Incompatibility  Territory, ethnicity  
Duration 1998-2003  
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Parties MEF, IFM and Solomon Islands 
Government  
External Interventions  RAMSI 2003  
Conflict Resolution Attempts  Ulufa‟alu Government, Papua New 
Guinea 1998 (unsuccessful)  
Commonwealth Secretariat (the Honiara 
Peace Accords and the Panatina 
Agreement) 1999 (unsuccessful)  
Townsville Peace Talks 2000 
(unsuccessful)  
UN Involvement  N/A 
Peace Agreements  Townsville Peace Agreement 2000 
(unsuccessful)  
Fatalities  Around 200 deaths 
Refugees/Internally Displaced Persons  Approximately 35,000 displaced persons   
Table 6.1 Conflict Summary: Solomon Islands (UCDP Database 2010; Hameiri 2007: 410)  
 
6.4 RAMSI: Peacebuilding or Neo-colonial Reassertion?  
 
The situation in the Solomon Islands at the time of intervention is best articulated in a 
comment by Mark Otter. He stated that: 
 
“Solomon Islands is in a perilous state…The government is bankrupt, development 
has stalled, investment has ceased and the economy is at an all time low. Lawlessness 
is rife on the streets of Honiara where „order‟ is maintained through the barrel of a 
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gun. The police force is incapable and unwilling to maintain law and order. Solomon 
Islands is a failed state. Its future is bleak” (Otter cited in Moore 2004: 177). 
 
The Australian-led „cooperative intervention‟ mission was known as the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The mission derives its legitimacy from the fact that it 
intervention was requested by the Solomon Islands government and that it was, in theory 
anyway, a regional mission (Weiders 2004: 140). 
 
6.4a Australia Steps In  
 
In the words of the then Prime Minister John Howard, the force was designed to “arrest this 
downward spiral, which if not addressed could result in the total collapse of the Solomon 
Islands‟ governance and sovereignty…A failed state would not only devastate the lives of the 
people of the Solomons‟, but could also pose a significant security risk for the whole region” 
(Hameiri 2007: 410). This reaction and justification by Prime Minister John Howard shows 
that intervention is often prompted as much by self-interest as it is by humanitarian 
awareness. Geographical proximity was an important factor for certain spill over effects from 
the conflict would have impacted on Australia, such as movement of refugees. The final 
decision to intervene was in reaction to the threat of what effect instability would have on 
Australia and the wider region as much as it was to do with the effect it was having on the 
Solomon Islanders themselves (Wainwright 2003: 490). 
 
The Pacific Islands Forum also came on board with their support. Their justification was 
embedded in the principles of the Biketawa Declaration, signed in 2000, which provided for 
“a regional response when developments within a member country raised issues for the 
region as a whole”. The Solomon Islands government were also in agreement with the 
intervention and made this stance official when they passed legislation in parliament which 
approved the intervention, and allowed for it to enter the country (McDougall 2004: 218). 
This legislation also gave RAMSI personnel immunity under Solomon Islands law.  
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6.4b RAMSI’s Mission  
 
RAMSI is constructed around three main pillars: law and justice, economic reform and 
machinery of government (Morgan and McLeod 2006: 419). After outlining what was 
undertaken during the various phases of RAMSI‟s operation, a closer investigation can be 
made into whether this mission can be classified as peacebuilding or not and what 
improvements need to be made to set it on the path towards durable and sustainable peace.  
 
Phase One:  
The first phase of RAMSI focused on the restoration of law and order in the Solomon Islands. 
The initial intervention was led by a police force made up of approximately 300 police, 
drawn mostly from Australia but also New Zealand and other Forum member nations (Table 
6.2). This force was to be known as the Participatory Police Force (PPF) and they were able 
to swiftly restore security without any bloodshed (Dinnen and Firth 2008: 12). A 21-day 
amnesty was announced on arrival of RAMSI which was to cover charges relating to the 
possession of weapons. By the end of this amnesty period, RAMSI declared that over 3,700 
guns had been surrendered (Fraenkel 2004: 169). 
 
Country of Origin  Police Personnel  Military Personnel 
Australia 196 1,379 
New Zealand 33 240 
Fiji  15 121 
Papua New Guinea - 83 
Samoa 15 - 
Tonga 10 35 
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Kiribati 5 - 
Cook Islands  2 - 
Total  276 1,858  
Table 6.2 Initial Police and Military Deployment under RAMSI (Fraenkel 2004: 167) 
 
By the end of 2003, over 1,300 people had been arrested, including key militant leaders and 
25 police officers. However, the courts were struggling to process all these convictions. 
Gaining evidence and persuading witnesses to testify was plagued with difficulty. People 
were scared of the repercussions from getting involved, which they believed would be felt 
after the withdrawal of the intervention force (Fraenkel 2004: 175). This backlog has been 
eased somewhat with RAMSI personnel providing free legal advice and representation for 
those charged, usually those who had committed criminal offences. The help and support of 
RAMSI has strengthened the justice system so that it can more effectively deal with cases. 
RAMSI have also helped with reconstruction of prison services in the Solomon Islands. This 
includes both the training of prison personnel and the improvements to prison infrastructure 
and equipment (RAMSI Website 2009). 
 
This phase, overall, has been highly successful. Its success is in a large part due to the wide 
support RAMSI received from the Solomon Islands people at the time of the intervention. 
Law and order had improved markedly, which has helped restore normality of movement to 
the region and also encourage the return of investors, which has been a great boost to the 
severely weakened economy. RAMSI have also undertaken reforms of the RSIP, which was 
involved in much of the unrest when it acted alongside the MEF. Corrupt and ill-disciplined 
officers have been removed from the RSIP force. These reforms have helped to restore some 
confidence back in to the police, and the wider legal and judicial systems (Leua Nanua 2008: 
150). 
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Phase Two:  
The second phase of the mission was aimed at broader state reconstruction and capacity 
building. RAMSI aimed to strengthen the failing state before it totally collapsed. One 
difference between this mission and others such as East Timor was that, even though it was 
weak, there was still a functioning government to work alongside in the Solomon Islands. 
One way in which RAMSI approached this phase was to install in line appointments of 
RAMSI personnel in Treasury, Finance and Health.  
 
RAMSI also made inroads with reform of the security and justice sector. RAMSI police 
began to work with local forces. There was large scale reform of the Solomon Islands Police 
Force (SIPF), which included the removal of approximately a quarter of the force. Although 
this sort of reform seemed necessary, such an approach was to be problematic. Many of those 
removed were senior officers, their removal led to a weakening of the knowledge and 
authority base of the SIPF. Although these reforms and reconstruction of the forces was a 
necessary step towards a new law enforcement culture in the Solomon Islands, it was also 
somewhat of a step back at the same time (Moore 2007: 145). 
 
This phase is likely to be more time consuming and a lot less straightforward then the 
disarmament initiatives. This is because of the long history of corruption at all levels of 
government and a general lack of trust and confidence in state institutions by the people of 
the Solomon Islands (Roughan 2003: 2). Rehabilitation of the public service will be a long 
and arduous process, for much of the corruption is entrenched in the political culture of the 
Solomon Islands.  There had been limited implementation of checks and balances on the 
county‟s leadership and political elites (Moore 2004: 222). Why the corruption has become 
so entrenched relates back to cultural and societal norms in the Solomon Islands. This 
concept is known as wantokism. This term literally means „one talk‟, meaning “from the same 
language and implies giving preference to kin in the expectation of a series of reciprocal 
obligations being fulfilled”. This could in some instances help to strengthen relationships in 
the community but can also have negative implications when preference and favouritism are 
given in the political realm (Moore 2008: 392). This favouritism is most significant during 
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the election period. Political parties in the Solomon Islands are fluid entities and loyalty to 
ones party can be easily bought and sold. 
 
The economy was totally stagnant at the time of intervention and had been for much of 
duration of the conflict. Logging, which had contributed to almost half of government 
earning in the mid-1990s, had been undertaken in an unsustainable manner that provided 
minimal lasting benefits to the country.  Stabilising the country‟s economic capacity was to 
be a major task for RAMSI. To help re-invigorate the economy, and also to weed out corrupt 
officers, RAMSI installed members of its own civilian team in various posts within the 
Ministry of Finance. RAMSI has been working with the Solomon Islands Government to 
“strengthen financial management systems, to encourage broad-based economic growth and 
create a more prosperous Solomon Islands”. With the re-establishment of greater law and 
order in the country importing and exporting has been able to reconvene and foreign 
investment in the country in increasing. Economic reforms have been undertaken by the 
Solomon Islands government, in partnership with RAMSI, in the areas of “taxation, transport 
(including aviation and shipping), industry revitalisation and simplifying regulatory 
requirement”(RAMSI Website 2009). Significant progress has been made in strengthening 
government revenues and restoring the stability of government finances. Government 
revenues increased by around 170 percent during the first three years of RAMSI.  
 
RAMSI‟s Machinery of Government program is an essential part of RAMSI‟s agenda in the 
Solomon Islands. This program has helped to improve the function of government so that it 
provides better services to the Solomon Islands people. One important aspect of this program 
is the four-day induction session for Members of Parliament (MP). Experts from around the 
region were brought in to educate new MPs on what it means to be an MP, procedures of 
parliament, constituency relations, parliamentary scrutiny, ethics and communication. The 
track record of the Solomon Islands Government shows that there was a lack of education 
about what it really means to be an MP and what the job actually entails. Therefore, this type 
of education and training was necessary and was well-accepted by those involved. RAMSI is 
helping to establish accountability mechanisms that can act as a check on government on 
behalf of the people of the Solomon Islands. These accountability mechanisms will need a lot 
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of support and sufficient resources to help uncover corruption and mismanagement and to 
properly deal with offenders. These mechanisms are an important step towards creating a 
more trustworthy and productive government administration (RAMSI Website 2010). 
 
Unlike other intervention forces such as UNTAET in East Timor, RAMSI was different in its 
approach to state building. While RAMSI have extensive practical influence and input in the 
Solomon Islands they still work with the Solomon Islands government, which has retained 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. This issue was somewhat contentious for Australia 
has continually labelled Solomon Islands as a failed state. The question arises then, why did 
RAMSI proceed to partner with and work alongside a government which is failed, and even 
worse which holds little legitimacy with the local people because of its corrupt track record 
(Leua Nanua 2008: 155). 
 
Phase Three:  
The third step of the RAMSI program focuses on self-reliance and sustainability of peace. 
This phase “concentrates on sustainable long-term development and will strengthen earlier 
reforms” (Moore 2007: 145). This is the phase that has come under the greatest scrutiny for 
many of the activities undertaken by RAMSI are criticised as being unsustainable because of 
the lack of involvement and coordination with the local population. This outlook is further 
weakened by the fact that neither the Kemakeza government (2001-2006) not the second 
Sogavare government (2006-2007) demonstrated much interest in engaging cooperatively 
with the implementation and operation of RAMSI‟s work and reforms. This lack of local 
engagement on the part of the government tends to undercut claims of genuine partnership 
between RAMSI and Solomon Islands authorities and does not bode well for long-term 
sustainability (Dinnen 2008: 69). 
 
The civil society movement made a significant effort towards building peace in the Solomon 
Islands, but were not, however, utilised by government in the way which would make them 
significant vehicles for change. The Civil Society Network (CSN) was a way in which 
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women could become part of the peace process. Women had a vested interest in peace for 
they were often the victims of much of the violence and unrest in the Solomon Islands. The 
CSN were in full support of the intervention of RAMSI (Moore 2004: 194). 
 
Phase Four:  
The fourth and final phase will be the withdrawal of RAMSI. The initial timeframe for the 
RAMSI mission was estimated to be at least 10 years, but there is no finalised exit date. 
However, this estimation may soon come under some scrutiny for the Sogavare government 
have put the pressure on RAMSI to come up with a clear exit strategy, and have even 
threatened to terminate the RAMSI intervention altogether (Moore 2004: 146). 
 
6.5 The 2006 Riots  
 
The cracks in the RAMSI intervention began to show in 2006. After the widely unpopular 
appointment of Snyder Rini as Prime Minister, large numbers of disgruntled Solomon 
Islanders‟ took to the streets, targeting mainly Chinese businesses in the destruction; burning 
down 90 percent of shops in the Chinatown area. There was a wide belief that the use of back 
door politics and finance had been behind the election victory, with funds coming from the 
wealthy Chinese migrant community. The idea that money changed hands during the political 
process was widely believed throughout the country. Labour Party leader Joses Tuhnuku was 
quoted by an Australian radio station as stating that, “…it‟s common knowledge here that the 
election of the prime minister was not a fair and free one. It has been corrupted by Taiwanese 
and by business houses owned by Solomon Islanders of Chinese origin” (Senevirtne 2006: 1). 
As a result of the riots, Rini was forced to resign from his post as Prime Minister, before a 
certain no-confidence vote, in order to keep the peace in the wider community.  
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6.6 Criticisms of RAMSI  
 
One ongoing criticism of RAMSI is that, apart from its name, there are very limited aspects 
that are regional about this mission. The majority of RAMSI personnel are from Australia. 
There is a lack of collaboration with the local people and lack of local ownership of the peace 
process. Both of these issues are a threat to the longevity of peace. In line with this concern is 
that fact that this mission is somewhat top down in its approach. For the mission to build 
sustainable peace it needs to have a more wide society approach. Without building a solid 
foundation of support from the bottom up many efforts undertaken by RAMSI will collapse 
once they withdraw. There is little point in undertaking any reconstruction activities if local 
staff are not being trained at the same time for efforts have a limited chance of being 
sustained once RAMSI withdraws.  
 
Another problem that has come to light with RAMSI is their overemphasis on law and order 
at the expense of other important issues such as regional development and land reform. 
RAMSI needs to broaden its approach for peace to be sustainable. These reforms are 
necessary and if RAMSI does not attempt to resolve issues other than law and order then they 
will be left up to the national government to sort out, which is weak to say the least (Moore 
2007: 146).  
 
There has been a lack of attention paid to addressing the underlying causes of the violence, 
with the majority of resources going towards the damage the conflict has caused. This 
emphasis on resolving the deep seated issues that caused violence to erupt is one of the main 
focuses of peacebuilding. By unearthing and working through the initial causes of the 
conflict, society can begin working towards building a more peaceful future. If these causes 
are not dealt with then there is a chance that the conflict will recur further down the track, 
undoing all efforts made towards conflict resolution. RAMSI needs to now focus on working 
with community organisation to rehabilitate society (Leua Nanau 2008: 159). Building trust 
and confidence between opposing faction should be the first task that is undertaken in the 
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post-conflict phase. Working from a more stable societal foundation will help solidify the 
success of all other reforms.   
An ongoing issue is that of what will happen when RAMSI finally withdraws. This is when 
the reality of whether or not RAMSI is really peacebuilding will come to a head. The reforms 
that have been made will have to endure without help from RAMSI, both financial and 
personnel oriented, and the sustainability of the mission will be truly challenged.  RAMSI has 
been accused of merely providing a band aid to the areas problems, therefore when  it 
withdraws its reforms will have little chance of being sustained successfully by the people in 
the Solomon Islands (Adams 2008: 113).  
 
6.7 Exit strategy: Where to From Here?   
 
By applying the peacebuilding framework developed in Chapter Two to the Solomon Islands 
it can offer another approach to conflict resolution that could be a more sustainable option 
compared to the approach being undertaken by RAMSI, which is reality cannot really be 
considered peacebuilding. When RAMSI withdraws there is a chance that, because of the 
lack of sustainability of their reforms, recurrence of violence may be likely. This section is an 
outline of what more needs to be done in the Solomon Islands to stop that from happening.  
 
6.7a Security Sector Reforms  
 
This dimension has been well covered by RAMSI and does not need much more additional 
attention. The re-establishment of law and order in the Solomon Islands was one of the main 
aims of the RAMSI intervention. Their dedication to disarmament and weapons collection, 
along with the restructuring and retraining of the armed forces, has meant that the Solomon 
Islands had become a safer place. This stability was, however, tested during the 2006 riots. It 
reflects the reality that the use of violence is still seen as a legitimate way of expressing one‟s 
grievances. This mentality needs to be curbed and a greater emphasis needs to be put on 
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educating the people about more productive and peaceful ways of dealing with grievances to 
reduce the need to resort to violent means.  
 
One change that still needs to be made in the security sector is the strengthening of the 
Royals Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) force. Since the intervention began, RAMSI‟s own 
police force, the PPF, has been operating in the Solomon Islands. They filled a gap that was 
needed in the initial aftermath of the conflict and while the national force was undergoing 
reforms but it is now time for the PPF to scale back and the RSIP to increase capacity. This 
will mean that when the PPF does withdraw, the RSIP has the competence and support to 
perform as the central law enforcement mechanism (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 12). 
 
6.7b Trust and Confidence Building Measures 
 
For peacebuilding to be successful there needs to be the establishment of trust between the 
parties. If there is not a trusting and committed foundation to start from then reforms have 
little chance of being maintained in the long term.  The issues and differences between the 
Malitan and Guadalcanal people were enough for people from each side to turn to violence. 
These issues do not just get resolved because the weapons have been taken away and the 
fighting has stopped. Active attempts need to be made to create a better relationship between 
all people in the region. There needs to be some sort of institutional mechanism created to 
help with reconciliation. While efforts have been made to calm violence in society, the 
underlying grievances that led to the initial outbreak of conflict have not been adequately 
dealt with. There still needs to be more effort taken in the area of reconciliation between not 
only the Guadalcanal and the Malitan people, but throughout Solomon Islands society to 
work through the feelings of resentment and inequality still held but many who were involved 
in the conflict.  
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6.7c Governmental Reform and Judicial Reform 
 
This area has had a lot of attention and resources poured into it by RAMSI, but its 
sustainability will be put to the test once RAMSI withdraws. There has been vast criticism of 
RAMSI‟s actions in this sector, especially the idea that RAMSI is acting like a shadow 
government, placing their personnel in high level government position at the expense of 
Solomon Islanders. More effort needs to be placed on creating an equal partnership between 
RAMSI and the Solomon Islands government. A change needs to be made from an 
interventionist approach, which is the way in which RAMSI has been operating, to a more 
developmental approach to curb the risk of dependency by people of the Solomon Islands. 
They need to be involved and take ownership of the development and not just get it handed to 
them by RAMSI (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 6). Also, if RAMSI works more closely with 
the Solomon Islands government then that helps to restore people‟s confidence in their own 
leadership, which is lacking due to the history of corruption and mismanagement.  
 
One important issue relating to government reform that has not yet been addressed is whether 
the Westminster system in the Solomon Islands is really workable or if a move towards 
federalism should be considered. The ill fit between the Westminster system and Solomon 
Islands culture is extremely apparent. There was little attempt made by the colonial 
administrators when creating the government in the Solomon Islands to blend the 
Westminster system with local cultures and traditions (Tara Kabutaulaka 2008: 101-102). 
One significant difference of the Westminster system from traditional Solomon Islands 
culture is that it is inherently confrontational and competitive in nature. Traditionally 
differences are worked through and discussed by large groups until a consensus is reached. 
The Westminster system, however, fosters somewhat of an „us against them‟ mentality with 
each side vying for what they want. Another issue that relates to the ill fit of the Westminster 
system is that of the electoral law. The Solomon Islands has a First-Past-the-Post electoral 
system. With parties being so weak and individuals being the main contenders in elections, 
no one person is going to get the majority. Therefore, whoever is elected in the end does not 
represent the majority interests of the people. An electoral system that would possibly better 
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suit the Solomon Islands would be some kind of system of proportional representation such 
as MMP.  
 
6.7d Economic Reform 
 
RAMSI has helped to strengthen the country‟s economy in the time that it has been in the 
Solomon Islands. Government domestic revenue has increased from SBD258 million in 2002 
to SBD625.9 million in 2005. Much of the debt accrued by the Solomon Islands has been 
relieved with the help of RAMSI personnel. Over 90 percent of government business arrears 
have been paid and nearly all small debts to business have also been paid. The lifting of some 
of the debt is a positive step forward for the country‟s economy, which was severely affected 
by the conflict. However, while steps have been taken to service debts this still remains an 
issue and is putting constraints on economic growth and development (Eminent Persons 
Group 2005: 9). Efforts have been made to re-attract foreign investors back into the country. 
The strengthening of law and order has made this possible as investors feel it is now a safer 
place to do business. Although economic reforms have led to an increase in domestic 
revenues and a reduction of national debt, there is concern that the country is still too 
dependent on donor support, especially in terms of the provision of basic services such as 
education and health (Eminent Persons Group 2005: 22). There is also ongoing criticism that 
most of the economic reconstruction efforts have focused solely on Honiara, will the rural 
areas remain in disarray. This is a worry for the majority of the population live in these rural 
areas and up to 75 percent of the population are dependent on subsistence farming and fishing 
(NZAID Website 2010). If this rural sector is not supported then poverty will continue to be 
an issue for much of the country‟s population.  
 
6.7e Community Education and Reconciliation  
 
This is one of the main dimensions that needs to be fostered while RAMSI is still present in 
the Solomon Islands. There has been a general lack of community education and involvement 
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in the peacebuilding process. This will become problematic when RAMSI withdraws for the 
local community will not have the capacity to maintain the changes and reforms undertaken 
by RAMSI. The people of the Solomon Islands are still very much tribally based in many of 
their associations and interactions. By supporting this community focus with regionally based 
education about what reforms are being undertaken and what the local community needs to 
be doing in order to help peace flourish would be a start to building more peaceful and 
capable communities. Interaction with civil society groups needs to also be encouraged 
further by RAMSI, for they can act as an informal, but important, link between RAMSI and 
the wider population.  
 
6.8 Conclusion 
 
After an analysis of RAMSI, its structure and the work it has done in the Solomon Islands, it 
is fair to say that it still had a way to go before it can be truly classified as a peacebuilding 
mission. While significant steps have been taken to stop the violence and restore law and 
order in the Solomon Islands, there has not been enough attention or resources paid to the 
other important elements that make up the peacebuilding process. As noted above, there has 
been a significant lack of focus in the area of community education and rehabilitation. The 
approach taken by RAMSI is essentially top down, with little attention being paid to resolving 
the tensions in the wider society and reconciling the community as a whole. An overall 
analysis of the success of the mission will be undertaken in the next chapter. This will provide 
a critique of whether, in term of peacebuilding, this mission will be a success.   
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Chapter Seven 
The Future of Peacebuilding in the Pacific 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
The main purpose of this research was to provide an analysis of conflict in the Pacific region 
and examine the steps that have been taken to build peace after conflict has occurred. The 
foundation for this analysis was the theory of peacebuilding, which was first conceptualised 
by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992. The development of 
peacebuilding was primarily motivated by the fact that new ideas needed to be created about 
how to deal with the changing nature of conflict in the international system. This change in 
approach came about in reaction to the significant increase in internal conflicts worldwide. 
The international system was developed to deal with states and the interactions between 
states, not within them. State sovereignty permits countries to act as they like within the 
confines of their borders. However, it is within these borders that some of the most severe 
atrocities are taking place. Many international agencies are powerless to do anything though, 
for they are not permitted to intervene in the internal problems of states without being invited 
to do so by those in power. Article II of the United Nations Charter states that the 
organisation “does not have the right to interfere in matters that fall under the domestic 
jurisdiction of any member state” (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 12). States must give 
consent and invite intervention by the United Nations. So therefore new institutions need to 
be developed that are more suited to dealing with situations of internal conflict to fill this 
void.  Peacebuilding processes can offer states a new approach to conflict management that 
has a long term focus and emphasises cooperation and reconciliation. This approach 
highlights the importance of working with the local people in the post war environment. It is 
about working in partnership with all levels of society, from the grassroots up, to help to 
create durable and self-sustaining peace that can be maintained long after the peacebuilders 
withdraw.  
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The reason for studying the Pacific region is not so much because of the severity of conflict 
that has been experienced, but more so because of the disproportionate nature of conflict 
compared to the size of the region. The Pacific region has suffered significant unrest for its 
small size, much of which was spurred on as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s. Three 
conflicts which have been significant in the region, and have been the case studies used in 
this analysis, are the struggles for self determination in East Timor and Bougainville and the 
civil conflict in the Solomon Islands. Even though it‟s not necessarily defined as a Pacific 
nation, East Timor is included in this analysis because of the cultural connection between the 
East Timorese people and the Pacific region, as many see themselves as more of a Pacific 
people than affiliated with Indonesia and also because of the geographical position of East 
Timor in relation to other countries in the region, particularly Australia  
 
7.2 Overall Success of Peacebuilding  
 
As was mentioned in the introductory chapter of this research, success is hard to characterise 
in definitive terms. Success in peacebuilding needs to not only be about stopping the visible 
violence at hand, which is the first obvious step, but more so about developing durable, 
sustainable peace. The underlying causes and triggers of the violence need to have been 
addressed and reconciliation between the parties needs to have taken place for these cases to 
be considered a peacebuilding success. Ultimately, success in peacebuilding is related to a 
nation‟s “ability to make the transition from a state of war to a state of peace” (Hampson 
1997: 716).  
 
So how do we know if peacebuilding has been a success? First an analysis of wider conflict 
resolution success will be outlined. This will provide a clear understanding about how 
conflicts can be transformed. The next step is to identify what the dimensions are that lead to 
successful peacebuilding. This will help to characterise the differences between general 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding and how these differences can affect the likelihood of 
long term peace in the post conflict environment.  
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The most basic determinant of success of any conflict management approach is whether 
violence has come to an end or not. If violence continues then conflict management attempts 
have obviously failed to reach their most basic goal. Ending violence usually comes about 
through the intervention of a third party who can help to facilitate initial contact between the 
parties and work towards the creation of a ceasefire agreement to put the parties on a more 
stable track towards peace. It is at this stage that efforts towards disarmament and 
demobilisation also need to be embarked on to help create a more secure environment from 
which to begin further peacebuilding activities.  The establishment of peace is usually defined 
in terms of a five year time frame. This means that if violence has not relapsed within five 
years after the initial peace agreement then this settlement has been a success. If peace has 
been sustained for five years of more, it is considered to be durable peace. This timeframe is 
commonly used, although certain sources sight a longer time period of up to 10 years. The 
five year indicator is supported by Hartzel, Hoddie and Rothchild who state that “there are 
rare instances in which civil wars is resumed after five years of peace” (2001: 187).  
 
However, success of conflict resolution moves beyond just the basic goal of stopping direct 
violence. The next step that needs to be taken to ensure success is the resolution of the 
underlying causes of the conflict. If the factors that ignited the initial violence are not worked 
through, the likelihood of peace being sustained in the long term is debatable. Success of 
conflict resolution depends significantly on the willingness of parties to be involved in the 
process and to either accept external assistance or make steps forward in resolving the 
conflict themselves. Resolution cannot be forced upon parties in conflict. They need to be 
involved in the process in order to establish common ground upon which to build a future 
free from conflict and instability (Bercovitch 2006: 295). There needs to be a significant 
change in the relationship between the parties for the conflict to be considered successfully 
resolved. If parties‟ have not made steps forward in establishing a more harmonious 
relationship then future violence may result. Parties need to be able to exist in the same space 
and this will not be possible if steps towards reconciliation have not been made. Lederarch 
supports this idea and argues that there needs to be a shift from a “concern with the resolution 
of issues and toward a frame of reference that focuses on the restoration and rebuilding of 
relationships” (Lederarch cited in Bercovitch and Jackson 2009: 170).  
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Successful peacebuilding goes another step beyond the determinants of successful conflict 
resolution. Its focus is not only on stopping the violence at hand and working through the 
underlying causes of the violence, but also about helping to re-establish strong, capable and 
legitimate institutions that will help to foster long term self reliance and sustainability of 
peace. Peacebuilding success is pinned on the ability of post-conflict countries to function 
after the peacebuilders have withdrawn. Peacebuilding needs to be a locally driven process 
where the main focus needs to be on integrating the local people at every stage of the peace 
process so that they have the skills and capacity to maintain the institutional reforms long 
after assistance has withdrawn (Call 2008: 183-184).  
 
The peacebuilding process needs to also take into consideration the local culture of the host 
country and traditional practices in terms of dispute settlement and governance. Efforts taken 
to incorporate these traditional approaches with modern state building practices will be of 
significant benefit in the long run. People will feel a greater affiliation with state institutions, 
which in turn will mean sustained support and participation in all aspects of society. If 
peacebuilding missions do not take into consideration local traditions and practices and enact 
their missions in a culturally sensitive and inclusive manner then there is a greater likelihood 
of a backlash by the local people. 
 
 In line with this approach is the need to maintain an ongoing focus on reconciliation within 
society. Parties in a conflict have over time developed a very negative and distrusting view of 
each other. These insecurities and misconceptions need to be broken down and worked 
through for society to begin to heal. Psychological effects of war are in a way more 
problematic in the long run, in terms of community stability, than the physical effects of 
conflict. Efforts need to be taken to reconcile all those involved and try to establish a good 
working relationship between the parties who have to be able to exist side by side in society. 
If attention is not paid to reconciliation between all factions of the conflict then past 
grievances could once again be the source of violence in the future.  
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While peacebuilding failure can be attributed to the renewal of violence, other dimensions 
need to be examined that can also signify failure of the process. A significant sign of failure 
is a lack of sustainability and self-reliance. During the peacebuilding process, there is an 
important need to foster local capacities in all areas of society. When the peacebuilding 
mission withdraws those within society should be confident and able to maintain the reforms 
that have been made and take ownership of the new state institutions. If the local people are 
not able to cope on their own then this indicates failure on the part of the peacebuilders to 
meet an important goal. Indicators of this are a general weakness of state institutions, lack of 
legitimate leadership and a fair and honest judicial and governmental sector. Another key 
sign of failure is ongoing economic dependence. The peacebuilding process is meant to help 
establish fiscal self-reliance. Economic reforms are supposed to have been undertaken to 
strengthen the economic sector, which is key to ongoing self-sustainability. If improvements 
have not been made in the financial sector, including helping to reduce external debts and 
attract foreign investors and trade opportunities, then long-term rehabilitation of society is 
unlikely.  
 
From the examination undertaken above, peacebuilding success can be defined as being a 
four-fold approach. The key determinants of peacebuilding success are stopping violence, the 
duration of peace in the post-conflict environment, social and political transformation and 
psychological transformation. If these four factors are achieved then the peacebuilding 
mission can be said to have been a success. An outline of how these factors can be achieved 
is demonstrated below (See Figure 7.1).  
 
7.3 Typology for Determining Peacebuilding Success  
 
Determinants of 
Success  
What is required to achieve each determinant of success? 
Stop Violence   Get parties together: mediation/negotiation activities by a 
mutually agreed upon third party  
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 Ceasefire agreement: use of incentives to encourage 
commitment from all sides  
 Start disarmament and demobilisation activities and the 
reintegration of combatants  
 Peacekeeping/peace monitoring activities 
Duration of Peace (5 
year timeframe)   
 Credibility and legitimacy of intervention forces/peace 
process  
 Creation of a peace agreement that is inclusive of all 
factions who were involved in the conflict and meets the 
needs of all parties  
 Involvement of warring parties in the peace process: desire 
for peace; local ownership of the peace process  
 Undertake trust and confidence building measures: help to 
encourage mutual commitment and willingness to be 
involved in the process by all sides  
 Work through underlying causes of the violence 
Social and Political 
Transformation  
 Intervention by a legitimate third party  
 Institutional reform: Political, Judicial, Economic  
 Focus on building local institutional capacity 
 Foster self-reliance and sustainability   
 Inclusion of traditional practices and customs into state 
building process  
Psychological 
Transformation  
 Initially the role of peacebuilders: act as facilitator between 
the parties 
 Change in attitude between the parties  
 Transformation of relationship to one of cooperation 
 Ongoing focus on reconciliation: creating a good working 
relationship between the parties 
 Use of traditional methods of trauma healing and 
reconciliation  
 Community education: teach the local communities about 
alternative dispute resolution methods so violence will not 
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need to be resorted to again in the future  
 Deal with underlying causes of the violence, emotions and 
psychological effects of the conflict  
 Involvement of civil society organisations: trauma healing; 
truth commissions 
Table 7.1 Typology for Determining Peacebuilding Success  
 
One problem that comes up when trying to decide about peacebuilding success is whether 
success should be defined in terms of the overall mission or be analysed on an activity or 
sector specific basis. While none of the cases were peacebuilding failures (keeping in mind 
that true success in terms of the Solomon Islands cannot be judged until RAMSI withdraws) 
there were certain areas that could be considered as being more successful than others. The 
relative success of each of the three cases of peacebuilding that have been examined will now 
be assessed.  
 
7.4 Peacebuilding Success in East Timor 
 
After an analysis of the peacebuilding mission that was undertaken in East Timor, success of 
the process can now be examined. While there was significant success in the area of security 
restoration and reform, the overall peacebuilding mission in East Timor was not that 
successful in terms of the criteria mentioned in the above section. The main area that 
impacted on this poor overall level of success was a general weakness of institutional 
reforms, especially in the political arena, due to a lack of local capacity building and 
community education and development during the reform process.  
 
The central trigger for this conflict was the need by the Timorese people for self-
determination. The people of East Timor wanted to become independent from Indonesia and 
have the chance to build their own unique nation. This central goal has been achieved as 
independence was declared in May 2002. Achieving this aim is, however, only the first step. 
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While independence was a long sought after goal, the ability to sustain a new nation is a 
whole new challenge in itself. 
 
Both INTERFET and UNTAET made important steps forward in improving the security 
situation in East Timor in the post-conflict stage. They were able to curb the violence 
efficiently and create a more secure environment for the people of East Timor. A significant 
benefit in this case was the fact that most of the violent perpetrators fled to West Timor after 
INTERFET arrived in East Timor. This meant that any possible resistance to the intervention 
forces was greatly reduced. However, because relative peace was achieved rather easily, the 
attention paid to local security forces began to diminish over time. Since Indonesian forces 
had withdrawn from East Timor and much of the militia had fled to West Timor there were 
thought to be no immediate threats to security. There was little attention paid to capacity 
building of local security forces. The army remains a source of contention and the hasty 
creation of the police force has lead to an inherent weakness in its structure. Problems in the 
armed forces came to a head in 2006 when a military strike led to a resurgence of violence 
and the near collapse of law and order in East Timor. This violence also brought to the 
surface underlying ethnic issues that had not been dealt with during the initial intervention. 
International forces had to be called in to help stabilise the situation. This backslide into 
violence suggests an ongoing weakness of local capacity to deal with unrest and a lack of 
knowledge about how to work through problems without resorting to violence. Peacebuilding 
missions aim to educate local communities about peaceful conflict management practices, so 
that if problems arise in the future the local people with be able to deal with them in a 
nonviolent way. This aspect was clearly not emphasised by the UN mission in East Timor.  
 
Governmental reform is a key aspect of any peacebuilding mission and was the main focus of 
the UN mission in East Timor. Reform and rehabilitation of the government followed the UN 
state building model. Although improvements were made in re-establishing the government 
in East Timor there was a general lack of cohesion with the local culture and community. 
While successful elections have been undertaken since independence it has been hard to start 
afresh because politics is still dominated by past allegiances and divisions that existed during 
the conflict. Reforms may have taken place but East Timor has not made any significant steps 
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forwards in terms of local involvement, development of local capacity and the creation of a 
uniquely East Timorese governmental system. Peacebuilders are tasked with assisting war 
torn countries in establishing a government that reflects the local culture and traditions and 
can be maintained by the local people once assistance is withdrawn. On the whole, this has 
not been achieved in East Timor.  
 
Judicial and economic reform also came up against various challenges. While efforts were 
taken to train local people in the judicial sector the transition from training to implementation 
in key judicial roles was too hasty. The East Timorese people lacked any significant skills in 
this sector. There was an overall shortage of trained lawyers for one, many of whom had 
minimal work experience, and none of which had ever served as judges. While the need to 
train and employ local people in the judicial sector is an important aspect of peacebuilding, 
an overall lack of judicial experience made this transition unmanageable and weak from the 
outset.  If local people do not have the ability to act in positions of power such as this there is 
no real benefit for them being placed in these positions. While UNTAET‟s motivation to train 
the local people in the judicial sector is commendable, installing inexperienced local people 
in such an important role has led to a severe weakness of the judiciary. This will have a major 
effect on these reforms being successful in the long term for the judiciary is supposed to act 
as a check of government. If it cannot maintain this function then serious problems within 
governmental institutions could ensue. Economic reforms have also been generally 
unsuccessful. East Timor still remains to be one of the poorest countries in the international 
system. The country needs to become fiscally self-reliant for stability to be achieved in the 
long term. As has already been suggested earlier, there is a strong correlation between 
poverty and violence. If East Timor does not improve its economy then future violence could 
be expected.  
 
While this mission is deemed a success by the United Nations missions that were involved in 
the country, when aspects of the intervention are looked at more closely cracks in the 
approach begin to show. While the various UN missions that intervened in East Timor 
undertook various reforms within the country, these changes were dictated by the United 
Nations state-building model. There was a general lack of engagement with the local 
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community and limited inclusion of traditional practices within the new state institutions that 
were developed. It is these aspects that set the peacebuilding approach apart from other types 
of conflict resolution. As a result of this the local people feel very little connections with the 
newly reformed state institutions. This will have a significant impact on East Timor‟s ability 
to sustain the changes that have been made to the key state institutions for they lack 
legitimacy in the eyes of the people. This could have an effect on long-term self-reliance and 
self-sufficiency within the country.   
 
Determinants of 
Success 
Efforts undertaken in East Timor  
Stop Violence   Intervention by INTERFET and UNTAET 
 Weapons collection 
 Lack of reform of armed forces 
 Minimal demobilisation efforts  
Duration of Peace (5 year 
timeframe)   
 Lack of trust and confidence building measures 
undertaken between UNTAET and East Timorese 
people  
 General lack of local ownership throughout the peace 
process  
 Renewed violence in 2006 as a result of problems in 
the armed forces relating to discrimination and ill-
treatment  
Social and Political 
Transformation  
 Successful elections in East Timor  
 Weak institutional reforms in areas of the judiciary 
 Ongoing economic dependence  
 Lack of cultural affiliation between local people and 
UN state building approach  
 Lack of focus on long-term sustainability of institution 
or fostering of local self-reliance  
Psychological  Insufficient reconciliation activities by UN missions  
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Transformation   CAVR: positive step taken by East Timorese 
government to foster unity and reconciliation within 
the community   
7.2 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in East Timor  
 
7.5 Peacebuilding Success in Bougainville 
 
Overall, Bougainville is the most successful case of peacebuilding of those analysed. Goals 
that were established and activities that were undertaken were future focused and maintained 
an emphasis on equality and reconciliation between the parties. The parties were the main 
focus and drivers of the process. Over a decade on from the Burnham peace talks and nearly a 
decade since the signing of the Bougainville Peace Accords a stable and durable peace has 
been achieved in Bougainville. The initial approach taken by New Zealand at Burnham, one 
of patience, equality and cooperation, laid a solid foundation for the building of sustainable 
peace in Bougainville. The focus on reconciliation of the parties as well as the need to curb 
the violence and improve security on the island meant that peace was achieved at all levels of 
society. The parties learned how to live together in a new peaceful future that they have 
carved out for themselves. While fears still remain about future problems relating to the 
possible reopening of the mine, overall peace remains stable and durable in Bougainville.  
 
The root causes of the Bougainville conflict were territory and Bougainville‟s fight for self-
determination from Papua New Guinea. While the violence has subsided and an autonomous 
government has been established in Bougainville, independence has still not been achieved in 
full. As outlined in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which was established in 2001, a 
referendum to consider Bougainville‟s political status was not to be held for at least 10 years 
after the agreement was signed, conditional on the achievement of other aspects such as 
weapons disposal and the establishment of good governance. While peace in Bougainville is 
more or less stable and the government is growing in capacity, this referendum could bring 
possible renewed violence. However, by the time this referendum is enacted it is assumed 
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that the Bougainville government and society in general will have the means to deal with any 
possible backlash to the results of the vote.  
 
One significant aspect that had a real impact on the success of peacebuilding in Bougainville 
was that at the time of the Burnham talks both sides were committed to finding a peaceful 
solution to the conflict. Earlier attempts to resolve the conflict had been unsuccessful because 
neither side had wanted to make too greater concessions. The Burnham talks acted as a 
turning point in the conflict. At the time of these talks both parties were ready to work 
towards a mutually agreed upon solution to the conflict and peace became the most important 
goal for all those involved. The Burnham talks were a positive first step in the peacebuilding 
process. The focus was on building strong relationships both within the parties and between 
them. This process upheld one of the most important aspects of peacebuilding, trust and 
confidence building in the initial stages of the post-conflict phase. It is at this time that 
suspicion and mistrust between warring factions is at its highest. Those at Burnham were able 
to help develop a good working relationship between the participants, which made future 
discussions and negotiations easier. These initial steps that were taken at Burnham in 1997 
laid the foundation for success for the rest of the peacebuilding activities that were then 
undertaken.  
 
Another factor that added to the overall success of the peacebuilding mission was the way in 
which governmental reform was undertaken in Bougainville. Reforms were embarked on in 
stages, gradually easing the local people into self-sufficiency in the political sector. The 
Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) was a central document in the peacebuilding mission 
in Bougainville. It outlined a staggered approach to political developments for Bougainville. 
The first stage of the BPA was establishing Bougainville as an autonomous region. This 
meant the development of a new autonomous government. Elections were held for the 
Autonomous Bougainville Government in 2005 and resulted in the democratic election of a 
39 member parliament, with Joseph Kabui as Bougainville‟s first president. The next stage of 
the BPA, weapons collection, was completed in 2003. The final stage of the BPA outlines 
arrangements for a future referendum to be held concerning Bougainville‟s political status. 
This, however, is not be held for at least 10 years after the autonomous government has been 
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established and good governance has been achieved. This vote could potentiality be the 
source of future unrest in Bougainville, but only time will tell.  
 
The strong community focus and inclusion of traditional practices in Bougainville‟s new 
institutions were paramount to the missions overall success. It is these factors that helped to 
transform this mission from conflict resolution to sustainable peacebuilding. The 
peacebuilding process in Bougainville had a community wide focus and involved a wide 
spectrum of people from all levels of society. This helped to increase the legitimacy of the 
process and made any reforms more sustainable. There were also significant efforts made to 
weave traditional practices with modern state building approaches. This made the transition 
to self-reliance much smoother as people felt a cultural connection with the new institutions. 
 
Durable peace has been established on Bougainville and there has been no significant 
renewal of violence since the Burnham talks in 1997. The peacebuilding activities that were 
undertaken by a range of actors on Bougainville, perhaps most importantly New Zealand, 
helped to create a situation of stable, long term peace that has been sustained over time by the 
local people. Efforts taken to reconcile the warring parties in the initial stages of 
peacebuilding helped to build a solid foundation from which other reforms could then be 
begun. This helped to create a strong working relationship between the local people and 
meant that future state-building activities could be undertaken in a peaceful and stable 
environment. The weaving of traditional practices with modern state-building activities 
helped to legitimise the process among the local people. The people of Bougainville were in 
control of all stages of the peacebuilding process and the changes that were made within 
society reflected this.  
 
Determinant of 
Success 
Efforts Undertaken in Bougainville  
Stop Violence   Burnham peace talks 1997  
 Burnham Truce: Truce Monitoring Force/Peace 
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Monitoring Force  
 Lincoln Agreement 1998: arrangements for a ceasefire 
 Weapons collection and disposal activities  
Duration of Peace (5 
year timeframe)   
 Credibility and legitimacy of external involvement 
 Mutually agreed upon and future focused peace 
agreement (BPA)  
 Involvement of PNG and Bougainvillean factions 
throughout the peace process  
 Commitment and willingness of the parties to be 
involved in the peace process  
 Long-term, durable peace within society  
Social and Political 
Transformation  
 Legitimate intervention and third party facilitation by 
New Zealand  
 Strong institutional reform 
 Inclusion of traditional practices and customs in state 
building process  
 Focus on long-term sustainability of institution and 
fostering of local self-reliance  
Psychological 
Transformation  
 Ongoing focus on reconciliation: firstly by New 
Zealand and then maintained by local community    
 Emphasis on the need to change attitudes of the 
parties and develop a good working relationship 
between all parties involved in the process  
 Use of customary dispute resolution mechanisms  
7.3 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in Bougainville  
 
7.6 Peacebuilding Success in the Solomon Islands  
 
Peacebuilding success in the Solomon Islands cannot truly be judged until after RAMSI has 
withdrawn from the country and the people have taken charge of the new state institutions. 
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Until this happens however, suggestions can still be made about whether the mission will be a 
success in relation to how the process is unfolding at the present. By analysing how 
successful the intervention has been so far, we can judge not only whether the process will or 
will not be a success in the long term, but also if this intervention can truly be categorised as 
peacebuilding.  
 
The nature of the intervention will have a significant impact on whether this mission is 
successful or not. The mission has been divided into four phases. Phase one was restoration 
of law and order.  This phase was praised as a success by those involved and it is the aspect 
that RAMSI have paid the most attention to. However, as was seen in Chapter Six, the 
stability of the Solomon Islands recently came under threat when riots broke out in Honiara 
after the 2006 election results were announced. This outbreak of violence reflects the ongoing 
problems that are being experienced in the Solomon Islands. It also exemplifies how the 
hastiness in of need resorting to violent means is still deeply ingrained in the population. 
Other channels could have been used to voice frustrations about the election, but instead 
violence was used as a way of airing grievances. Until the security situation is properly dealt 
with in the Solomon Islands and real attention is paid to building the capacity of the armed 
forces so they can deal with unrest and educate the people about how to best approach 
problems then long-term peace remains debatable.   
 
The second phase of this intervention was state reconstruction and capacity building. While 
efforts were made by RAMSI to help build the capacity of local state institution there was a 
general lack of inclusion of the local people in this process or inclusion of traditional methods 
of governance that would have made the transition to peace both more acceptable and also 
more sustainable.   
 
The third phase of the mission was self-reliance and sustainability of peace. It is this phase 
which has received the most criticism. Many of the reforms that have been undertaken by 
RAMSI have been criticised as being unsustainable due to a lack of engagement with and 
inclusion of the local people. Peacebuilding reforms need to be enacted from the bottom up to 
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have the best chance of being sustained in the long-term. There is no point in making changes 
in a society if those within that society cannot maintain the changes once the intervening 
force withdraws. Another significant aspect relating to this phase is the need for greater 
reconciliation efforts to be undertaken to help create a more stable relationship between those 
who were involved in the conflict.   
 
The final phase of the mission is the withdrawal of RAMSI. This stage is crucial in terms of 
long term sustainability of the mission and will be the biggest test of what has been 
undertaken by RAMSI during its time in the Solomon Islands. If RAMSI withdraws too 
rapidly then the local people may not have been able to develop the capacity to take over the 
country‟s reformed institution. But if RAMSI stays on for too long then this can breed 
contempt and dependence in the country and RAMSI staff may be met with a violent 
backlash.  
 
One of the main concerns about the future stability of the Solomon Islands is the seemingly 
ingrained need to resort to violence as a way of settling disputes. This was most recently 
demonstrated during the post-election riots in 2006. There is a strong need to increase 
education on alternative dispute resolution methods in the Solomon Islands before RAMSI 
withdraws. People need to be taught how to deal with problems without using violence. If 
further measures are not taken to help with reconciliation and rehabilitation of society then 
long-term success is somewhat unstable. Significant problems still need to be addressed in 
the Solomon Islands before RAMSI can begin to consider withdrawal. The greatest task now 
is to establish a better partnership between RAMSI and the local people. RAMSI needs to act 
in greater consultation with the local people so that reforms are acceptable to the people and 
can be sustained once RAMSI withdraws.  
 
Determinant of 
Success 
Efforts Undertaken in the Solomon Islands 
Stop Violence  Strong focus on the restoration of law and order 
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 Ongoing use of violence as a way of expressing 
grievances 
Duration of Peace (5 
year timeframe) 
 Ongoing criticisms over legitimacy of external 
involvement 
 Lack of cohesion and cooperation between RAMSI 
and Solomon Islands government 
 Renewed Violence in 2006 
Social and Political 
Transformation 
 Lack of inclusion of local people or traditional 
practices in state building process 
 Weak institutional reforms 
 Limited focus on sustainability of reforms or efforts to 
build local institutional capacity within society 
Psychological 
Transformation 
 Lack of focus on reconciliation efforts between 
warring parties 
 Limited involvement of civil society organisations 
 Lack of focus on community education and the peace 
process or development of local alternative dispute 
resolution methods 
7.4 Summary of Peacebuilding Success in Solomon Islands  
 
7.7 Lessons Learned: Success of Future Missions 
 
The next issue that needs to be addressed is how to make sure a peacebuilding mission is 
going to be successful in the long term. From the cases above it is clear to see that certain 
factors of the interventions have been significant in terms of overall success. One critical 
factor that has impacted on the success of these peacebuilding missions is the level of local 
involvement in the peace process and engagement with the community. If peacebuilding 
activities are going to be undertaken in the post-war environment, they need to be done so 
with the support of the local community and in consultation with the local people. As can be 
seen from the Bougainville case, overall success of the mission was heavily influenced by the 
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fact that, first at Burnham and then with later reforms, the local people were involved from 
the very beginning and were in control of the process throughout. The new state institutions 
reflect this relationship because they were able to weave together traditional approaches with 
modern state-building practices. This aspect was not taken on board in terms of the mission in 
both East Timor and Solomon Islands. A lack of cultural inclusiveness throughout both 
missions has lead to significant weakness of reforms as a result. The local people feel very 
little affiliation with the new state institutions and lack the capacity to sustain these 
institutions themselves in the long term. Both the mission in East Timor and Solomon Islands 
was created to fit the ideals and aims of the intervening forces and not designed to suit the 
particular needs of the host countries. For peace to be sustainable the local people need to 
have taken ownership of the process. This, while emphasised in Bougainville, was not the 
case in East Timor of the Solomon Islands.  
 
Another aspect that helps to increase the likelihood of success of peacebuilding missions is 
the amount of attention paid to reconciliation and trust and confidence building measures 
between the parties of the conflict. Efforts taken to help create a better relationship between 
the parties of a conflict will have a considerable impact on success and the stability of peace 
in the long term. Unlike interstate conflict, parties cannot retreat back to their own territory 
once the conflict ends. They have to find ways of being able to exist in the same space after 
the conflict has been resolved. Trust is at an all time low after conflict so efforts need to be 
taken to reconcile those involved in the conflict and try to come up with some solution about 
how these people who were once enemies can now live side by side. Since peacebuilding is a 
long term process, intervening personnel can help to facilitate ongoing reconciliation efforts 
between all parties who were involved in the conflict. The inclusion of traditional approaches 
to reconciliation and justice can also be encouraged during this time as a way of furthering 
the connection between the peacebuilding process and wider society.  This aspect was 
supported in both East Timor and Bougainville. In the case of East Timor a commission was 
set up, CAVR, whose aim was to build a more united and reconciled community. CAVR 
incorporated customary law and traditions into its mandate. This commission was not 
however set up by the United Nations peacebuilding team but was in fact was created by the 
East Timorese government in 2002. On the part of the United Nations, the aspect of 
reconciliation was not fostered to any great degree.  In Bougainville various grassroots 
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organisation along with the peacebuilding team encouraged reconciliation among the warring 
factions. Building trust and attempting to heal past wounds was a significant and ongoing 
aspect right throughout the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville. No significant emphasis 
on reconciliation has been undertaken by RAMSI as of yet in the Solomon Islands. This 
aspect needs considerable attention before RAMSI withdraws.  
 
7.8 Where to From Here: Towards a Pacific Peacebuilding Commission 
 
The need to build long term, sustainable peace in war torn countries is becoming a more and 
more important goal for post conflict interventions.  A vital need is being developed to go 
beyond the basic conflict management approach of stopping the violence, and instead focus 
more on working through the underlying causes of violence in post conflict societies and 
helping to establish peaceful communities who have the ability and the tools to be self-
sufficient and stable nations. As outlined in the three cases studies that have been covered 
over the course of this research, peacebuilding missions have been undertaken in the Pacific 
region with varying levels of success. A shift in focus now needs to take place that 
emphasises how peacebuilding processes can be undertaken in the region.  
 
Conflict in the Pacific region continues to be an important area of research and one that 
deserves ongoing attention. Significant steps still need to be taken in order to reduce conflict 
and establish regional peace and security. The development of a regional peacebuilding 
commission could help move the region towards a more peaceful future. The arrangement of 
the commission could be based on the shape that the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission has taken. The advantage of a regional mechanism designed to undertake 
peacebuilding activities is that it can be more culturally aware than an outside actor would be. 
It would also be able to act as a monitoring agency that could undertake conflict prevention 
measures in places where unrest has been identified but violence has not yet broken out.  
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7.8a United Nations Peacebuilding Commission  
 
The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission was established in 2005 as a mechanism for 
addressing the specific needs of post-conflict societies and helps them towards recovery, 
reconstruction and development. The Commission was the result of discussions by world 
leaders at the 2005 World Summit. It was to be a United Nations mandated organisation to 
advise on, coordinate and facilitate peacebuilding missions and activities. The purpose of the 
Commission is summarised in a statement made by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in June 
2007, “By establishing the Commission, Members States of the United Nations have created 
an important new structure to support fragile societies recovering from the devastation of 
war” (United Nations Peacebuilding Website 2009). 
 
Mandate and Aim 
Under Resolution 60/180 and Resolution 1645 (2005) the United Nations General Assembly 
and the Security Council mandated the Peacebuilding Commission to: 
 “Bring all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed 
integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery; 
 Help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial 
investment over the medium to long-term; 
 Develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian 
and development actors” (United Nations Peacebuilding Website 2009). 
 
These resolutions outlined the purpose and aims of the Commission and also why such a 
mechanism was necessary in the international system. The main aim of the Commission is 
the need for a coordinated approach to peacebuilding and reconciliation in post-conflict 
societies with an emphasis of the long-term sustainability of peace. The Commission sees its 
role as a vehicle for addressing the special needs of countries emerging from conflict and 
assist them in their recovery and post-conflict development. However, they also recognise 
and emphasise the need to act in coordination with national government, and support their 
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priorities and strategies for peacebuilding, to maintain and strengthen national ownership of 
the process, which will help to ensure its sustainability (United Nations Peacebuilding 
Website 2009). 
 
Funding  
In 2006 the United Nation Secretary-General established the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Fund to help with the financing of post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives. The Peacebuilding 
Fund (PBF) is designed to “address immediate needs in countries emerging from conflict at a 
time when sufficient resources are not available from other funding mechanisms and will 
support interventions of direct and immediate relevance to the peacebuilding process” 
(United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Website 2009). The PBF relies on donations from 
Member states, organisations and individuals.  
 
The PBF allocates money through two branches, the Immediate Response Facility and the 
Peacebuilding Recovery Facility. Both fund initiatives that respond to the one or more of the 
following criteria:  
 “Immediate threats to the peace process and initiatives that support peace agreements 
and political dialogue; 
 Build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution 
of conflict; 
 Stimulate economic revitalisation to general peace dividends;  
 Re-establish essential administrative services” (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 
Website 2010).  
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7.8b Pacific Peacebuilding Commission  
 
One of the main benefits of creating a regional peacebuilding commission is that it could be 
organised in a way that was culturally appropriate for the region, therefore, enhancing its 
legitimacy and effectiveness in the eyes of the Pacific people. The commission could reflect 
the „Pacific way‟ of reaching decisions through consensus and having fluid agendas for 
discussions and decision making. The commission‟s aim would be to undertake the various 
aspects relating to peacebuilding success that were outlined earlier in this chapter. If it can 
follow this typology for peacebuilding success then its ability to build sustainable peace in 
post-conflict societies will be greatly improved.  
 
The Bougainville peace talks that were held at Burnham in 1997 could act as a constructive 
guide to how peace can best be established in a Pacific context. In Bougainville, New 
Zealand peacebuilder‟s had a wide society approach to the process, involving as many people 
as possible in the process. The focus was on the process and not the end result. New Zealand 
recognised that for peace to be sustainable in a society it had to be sought after by the people. 
Their help was not forced on the people of Bougainville and Papua New Guinea; it was 
requested by those that were involved. The process was undertaken using a traditional 
approach. New Zealand understood the idea of the „Pacific Way‟ which included no strict 
timetables, the use of consensus in decision making and the inclusion of large numbers of 
people. While the „Pacific Way‟ of collective decision making may seem more time 
consuming to outsiders, it increases the legitimacy of the process for those involved and its 
inclusion will be a major factor in increasing regional cooperation (Henderson and Watson 
2005: 181). This mission also reflects the way that local culture and traditional practices need 
to be weaved into all levels of the peacebuilding process. This helps to ensure local 
understanding of the new institutions and fosters greater support and sustainability of reforms 
that have been made to the state system.  
 
RAMSI could act as a blue print for the formation of a regional response to conflict in the 
Pacific. It was the first true regional mission in the Pacific, even if it was mostly Australian 
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personnel who were involved. However, for future missions to have more regional legitimacy 
they need to be led by someone other than New Zealand or Australia, whose motives for 
intervention are sometimes brought into question.  This, while advantageous in theory, will 
be harder to achieve in reality. This is because Australia and New Zealand, being the most 
developed nation in the Pacific, have the capacity to not only lead an intervention force but 
also to fund it. Without the creation of some sort of funding mechanism for the commission, 
true regional intervention by a country other than Australia or New Zealand is unlikely.  
 
The Pacific Plan, adopted by Forum leaders in October 2005, is the main regional initiative 
focused on security in the region. Regionalism has long been recognised as a way of 
overcoming national short falls. The Pacific Plan seeks to enhance regionalism in the Pacific 
as a way to tackle the region‟s main developmental challenges (Robertson 2005: 1).  The 
Plans four main pillars are economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and 
security, the same as that of the PIF. The aim of the Pacific Plan is to:  
“strengthen regional cooperation and integration including through pooling of 
regional resources of governance and the alignment of policies in order to further 
Forum members shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good 
governance and security” (Robertson 2005: 20). 
The Pacific Plan could act as the foundation for the development of a regional peacebuilding 
commission. Its aim is to try to enhance regional security and cooperation to make the region 
a safer and more peaceful place (Henderson and Watson 2005: 167). A regional 
peacebuilding commission could put this plan into action and act as the vehicle for achieving 
greater regional cooperation and stability.  
 
Structure of the Commission  
As outlined earlier in Chapter Three, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is the leading regional 
organisation in the Pacific region. Their membership outnumbers all other institutions in the 
region. It is because of this and their targeted focus on the improvement of security and 
establishment of regional peace that the Forum would be an appropriate vehicle for the 
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creation of a regional peacebuilding commission.  Establishing the commission under the 
auspices of the Forum would mean it would have the support and resources of the Forum to 
draw on to help enhance the capacity of the commission, which will be especially important 
in the early stages. To further increase capacity, the commission could be made up of special 
delegates from each of the PIF member countries, instead of heads of government. This way 
the commission can have a standing committee whose sole focus is on peacebuilding and 
post-conflict settlement. This committee should have regular meeting and act as a monitor of 
potential conflict hot spots in the region, with a focus on prevention as well as resolution of 
conflict. This way they can alert the Forum of unrest before major conflict breaks out. 
 
The commission could act as the leading regional actor in reducing conflict in the region and 
the main force behind post conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. It could also take on a 
central role of conflict monitoring and conflict prevention as a way of reducing violent 
conflict from erupting in the first place. There is currently no early conflict warning system in 
the region so the commission could fill this void (Henderson and Watson 2005: 199). The 
pacific peacebuilding commission‟s activities need to have a long term focus. Sustainability 
of peace should be the main goal of the commission. The focus needs to be on the process 
and not the end result.  
 
Peacekeeping will be an important aspect for the work of the Pacific Peacebuilding 
Commission. However, the likelihood of it having a standing peacekeeping force is 
somewhat unrealistic. Pacific Island nations are too small themselves to be able to give up 
members of their military forces. The cost of training and maintaining such a force would be 
far too expensive for the commission. Perhaps a more realistic alternative is if countries were 
willing to pledge certain numbers of troops from their forces to be used if peacekeepers 
needed to be deployed.  
 
Deployment of a peacebuilding mission should be on a by request basis only. When New 
Zealand intervened in the Bougainville conflict in 1997 it was only because their help had 
been asked for and agreed to by all parties involved. Although this process might be slow-
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moving and frustrating for those involved, for a request for intervention might take a while to 
eventuate, it is the best option if peace is to be sustainable. If intervention is forced on a 
country then they feel they have no ownership of the process and this will have an impact on 
its long term durability.  
 
The Pacific Peacebuilding Commission needs to establish and maintain links with local 
NGOs and civil society organisations during any missions it undertakes. This will provide the 
commission with good grassroots support and also with local knowledge of conflict 
situations. Civil society groups can act as a good bridge between the local people and the 
peacebuilding team. Community based initiatives for peace need to be fostered, as they act as 
a good partner to formal efforts.  
 
It would be beneficial to base the commission somewhere other than Fiji. Fiji is already the 
home to many regional institutions and these provide certain benefits to the area. This 
commission could be based in a post-conflict nation which has already had to deal with 
building peace on a community level and who may be better equipped to be the base of a 
regional peacebuilding commission. Honiara could be a good option for it is the capital that is 
most central is terms of population centres and also resources and is itself a post-conflict 
nation (Henderson and Watson 2005: 159).  
 
Funding  
Funding is a crucial issue that could hinder the success of such as organisation. Without 
financial support the commission would not be able to undertake long-term strategies, which 
are the key to establishing sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is a long term process and if there 
is not adequate funding to support its activities then it will not be able to produce the most 
sustainable results. Finding funding within the regional could be problematic as many island 
nations are very poor and would have limited ability to provide funds to a regional 
organisation when they are so desperately needed at home. An international agency or NGO 
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could fill this void by providing funding for the establishment of such a commission and 
could potentially finance its ongoing costs.  
 
7.9 Final Remarks  
 
The theory of peacebuilding requires ongoing attention and analysis in the international 
community. This approach to conflict management offers a new and innovative alternative to 
conflict zones and could provide a future free from violence for these states. While ideas 
surrounding peacebuilding are still in their infancy, the potential benefits that a peacebuilding 
approach could have are already quite obvious. By incorporating modern state building 
practices with traditional approaches and local customs, new systems of governance can be 
derived which are legitimate in the eyes of all involved. The strength of this process is in its 
ability to work alongside the local population and allow them to take ownership of the peace 
process. This is not an approach which can be implemented within these states. It requires the 
help and support of the wider society. Change needs to be driven from within for peace to be 
sustained and for local capacity to flourish.     
 
The three cases which were covered show the different approaches that can be taken under 
the guise of peacebuilding. While all three cases portrayed different strengths and 
weaknesses, the peacebuilding mission in Bougainville was the most successful. All activities 
that were undertaken in the post-conflict phase placed a strong emphasis on inclusion of the 
local people and developing a trusting relationship both with and between the parties. The 
solid foundation that was established at Burnham provided a strong basis for all future efforts 
that were undertaken. The mission followed a clear structure driven at all times by those in 
the community. As a result a peaceful future is now being enjoyed by the people of 
Bougainville. The peacebuilding mission is East Timor had various drawbacks which have 
lead to a somewhat weak state. Although much attention was paid to security reforms in the 
country, little emphasis was placed on important factors such as the economy and 
encouragement of local participation and education. East Timor is still very reliant on outside 
assistance and legitimacy of state institutions is still weak. Finally, as has already been stated, 
140 
 
the true success of RAMSI cannot be realised until after their withdrawal from the Solomon 
Islands. Until coordination and cooperation between RAMSI and the Solomon Islands 
government is improved, long-term success of the activities that have been undertaken by 
RAMSI remains uncertain.  
 
Looking towards the future, a Pacific Peacebuilding Commission could offer a solution for 
much of the unrest that is still going on in the region. However, regional capacity is still very 
low within the Pacific. Establishing and maintaining an institution such as this would be both 
time consuming and expensive. Unless actors from outside the region get on board to support 
the establishment of such an institution, the likelihood of it being set up and sustained by 
parties within the region is doubtful. 
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